4/2/06 word
Doing the Right Thing: Disability Discrimination and Readmission of
Academically Dismissed Law Students
Lynn M. Daggett*

I. An Illustrative Scenario ................................................................................................................4
II. Introduction ................................................................................................................................6
III. Applicable federal statutes – Section 504 and the ADA...........................................................9
A. Covered persons............................................................................................................12
1. Person with a disability; impairments...............................................................12
2. Substantial limitation ........................................................................................14
a. Effect of mitigators ...............................................................................14
b. “Substantial” limitation of a “major” life activity. ..............................16
B. “Qualified” ...................................................................................................................30
C. Substantive entitlements of eligible students ...............................................................32
D. Enforcement .................................................................................................................36
E. The prima facie case.....................................................................................................38
F. The IDEA’s different approach and the student expectations it creates.......................39
1. Eligibility ..........................................................................................................39
2. Protection from punishment for disability-related behavior. ...........................41
3. Substantive entitlements ...................................................................................42
4. Enforcement......................................................................................................42
5. Impact of the IDEA on law student perspectives..............................................43
IV. Judicial Deference to Academic Decisions by Higher Education Authorities
............................................................................................................................................45
V. Academic Dismissal Readmissions Cases and OCR Opinion Letters .....................................60
A. Law school readmissions process and standards .........................................................60
1. Academic dismissal criteria ...............................................................................60
2. Readmissions process and criteria .....................................................................61
* Professor of Law, Gonzaga University. J.D., University of Connecticut, Ph.D. (Education),
Duke University. Thanks to Gonzaga Law School and the Gonzaga Law School Foundation for
the summer research stipend which partially subsidized my work. Special thanks to Professors
Mary Pat Treuthart and M. Lisa Bradley for their extremely helpful comments on an earlier draft
on this article.

B. Court cases addressing disability discrimination claims by academically dismissed
law students..................................................................................................................62
C. Court cases addressing disability discrimination claims by other academically dismissed
higher education students.............................................................................................75
1. Evidence of discriminatory (bad faith, stereotypical and/or retaliatory)
thinking. ............................................................................................................78
2. Refusal to consider disability information.........................................................82
3. Limited deference in the First and Ninth Circuits. ............................................83
4. Judgment on the merits for a student. ................................................................87
D. OCR opinions addressing disability discrimination claims by academically dismissed
law students................................................................................................................93
E. OCR opinions addressing disability discrimination claims by other academically
dismissed higher education students.........................................................................101
F. Judicial deference to reasoned academic readmissions judgments is appropriate
..............................................................................................................................102
VI. Doing the right thing: guidelines and options for making
principled, nondiscriminatory readmissions decisions when students claim a disability
..........................................................................................................................................107
A. The consequences of going beyond statutory requirements .....................................107
1. The equities....................................................................................................108
2. Accreditation requirements............................................................................116
3. Academic freedom issues. .............................................................................118
4. Triggering additional disability law obligations ...........................................121
5. Potential tort and contract claims...................................................................123
B. Guidelines for complying with disability discrimination statutes in
readmissions cases ...................................................................................................124
1. Verify the existence of a statutory disability .................................................124
2. Carefully document consideration of the case by a faculty committee
and/or the full faculty....................................................................................127
3. Make a decision which is holistic and considers context .............................129
4. Give reasoned and informed consideration to disability information,
with appropriate confidentiality...................................................................131
5. Defer, and refuse to defer, as appropriate: university administrators and law
faculty should defer when appropriate, but the law faculty should not
defer, internally or externally, on academic issues ..................................133
6. Apply the readmission standard in a nondiscriminatory way......................135
a. Nondiscriminatory consideration of disability as an extraordinary
circumstance ........................................................................................136
b. Nondiscriminatory consideration of disability and prediction of future success
if readmitted. .....................................................................................137
VII. Conclusion............................................................................................................................140
-2-

I. AN ILLUSTRATIVE SCENARIO
Law schools regularly deal with academically dismissed students claiming that disability
resulted in their academic failure, and asserting that, perhaps with accommodations, they can be
successful if readmitted. Consider, for example, the following scenario:
A law student (“Student”) with a 1.87 GPA is dismissed at the end of her first year for
failing to earn her law school’s (“Law School”) minimum required GPA of 2.0. Student
petitions for readmission, asserting that her just-diagnosed learning disability of dyslexia/reading
disorder caused her academic failure. Student’s petition also asserts that if she is readmitted and
provided with accommodations for her disability consisting of: a) tutoring, b) note taking
assistance, c) elimination of the writing requirement, (a graduation requirement in which students
must research and write an academic paper similar to a law review article), and d) extra time on
exams she will be successful. Student’s petition notes that she always suspected she had a
reading problem since she reads very slowly, and after receiving her fall grades (averaging 1.75),
she suspected she might have dyslexia and considered getting tested, but decided to “tough it
out.” Student’s Spring grades averaged 1.92.
In support of her petition Student submits an evaluation report from a clinical
psychologist (“Evaluator”), dated after Student’s dismissal. In it, Evaluator diagnoses Student
with the specific learning disability of dyslexia/reading disorder, based in large part on testing
which indicates Student’s reading speed and decoding skills are well below average as compared
with college graduates. Evaluator concludes that Student is therefore covered by Section 504
and the ADA. The report states that Student has always had this learning disability which has
caused her great difficulty in reading, particularly in decoding words, and greatly slowed her
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reading speed, but Student has used her above average intelligence and self-developed coping
strategies to compensate prior to law school. Evaluator recommends Student receive tutoring,
note taking assistance, extra time on exams, and elimination of the writing requirement.
Evaluator concludes: “In my professional opinion Student is a bright, motivated young woman
who will succeed in law school if these accommodations are provided.”
Law School solicits feedback from Student’s teachers, two of whom report that Student
seems not to have mastered legal analysis nor many of the basic concepts. A review of Student’s
file reveals she earned a B average as a political science major at a state university. Student’s
LSAT score was quite low compared with those of her classmates, and Student was admitted to
Law School contingent upon her beginning in the summer and taking a reduced load. Student’s
tutor in the Law School’s Academic Resource Program notes that Student missed several
scheduled sessions, and also that Student was extremely active in extracurricular activities.
Student agrees in her appearance before the committee that she was an active member of six
student groups.
Law School’s readmission rule was adopted by the faculty and is contained in Law
School’s academic rules, which are set out in the student handbook. The readmission rule
requires a recommendation by a faculty committee to the faculty, which decides the matter by
majority vote. The burden is on the dismissed student to demonstrate that
1) her failure was caused by extraordinary circumstances, which are defined as beyond
those difficulties regularly encountered by law students (such as minor illness or the end
of a romantic relationship), and which exclude those for which the student had a
reasonable opportunity to recover or obtain administrative relief prior to being dismissed,
-4-

and
2) if readmitted, there is a convincing likelihood the student will achieve good standing in
law school, and be able to pass a bar exam and practice law competently.
Law School’s recent graduates have had some difficulty with its state’s bar exam; in
several recent administrations, Law School’s graduates’ pass rate has been below the state
average. Recent analysis by Law School of the bar exam performance of readmitted students
over the past few years indicates few of them have passed the bar exam.
Law School must decide whether to readmit Student. That decision is always difficult
and complex; it is even more so in Student’s case. Deciding whether to readmit Student involves
reviewing technical information concerning her learning disability, and considering: a) whether
Student’s learning disability is protected by federal disability discrimination statutes as Evaluator
asserts, b) whether the learning disability is an extraordinary circumstance as defined by Law
School’s readmission rule, c) what caused Student’s academic failure, d) whether the requested
accommodations are reasonable, and e) whether with (or without) them there is a convincing
likelihood Student will succeed in law school, on the bar exam, and in practice. In Student’s
case, Law School also faces review of its decision beyond that available to dismissed students
generally. Specifically, if Student believes Law School has acted on her petition in a way which
is discriminatory, she may file an internal complaint under the school’s disability policy, an
administrative complaint with the Office of Civil Rights and/or a lawsuit alleging violation of
federal disability discrimination laws.
II. INTRODUCTION
This Article examines disability discrimination claims brought by academically
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dismissed law students who have been denied readmission to law school, including the claims
which Student in the above scenario might bring if Law School does not readmit her.1 Part III of
the Article offers an overview of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Section 504")2
and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).3 They are the two federal statutes that
prohibit disability discrimination against covered higher education students, and under which
Student may file claims concerning Law School’s decision not to readmit her. This overview
pays particular attention to recent United States Supreme Court decisions that strictly interpret
the “disabilities” protected by these statutes,4 and to recent cases in which lower courts have
accordingly held that a student’s impairment is not a statutorily protected disability.5 The
statutory overview also compares the markedly different approaches of Section 504 and ADA
provisions concerning disability discrimination and higher education students, with the federal
preK-12 special education statute (the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”)),6

1

For other, brief, discussions of this issue, see Laura Rothstein, Disability Law and
Higher Education: A Road Map for Where We’ve Been and Where We May Be Heading, 63 MD.
L. REV. 122, 140-141 (2004); Laura Rothstein, Higher Education and the Future of Disability
Policy, 52 ALA. L. REV. 241, 258 (2000); Bonnie Tucker, Application of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 to Colleges and Universities: An Overview and
Discussion of Special Issues Relating to Students, 23 J. COLL. & UNIV. L. 1, 35-39 (1996); Adam
Milani, Disabled Students in Higher Education: Administrative and Judicial Enforcement of
Disability Law, 22 J. COLL. & UNIV. L. 989, 1004-08 (1996).
2

29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000).

3

42. U.S.C. §§ 12101 - 12213 (2000).

4

See infra Section III.A.2.

5

See infra Section III.A.2.b.

6

20 U.S.C. §§ 1401 - 1461 (2000).
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under which many such students were served earlier in their educational careers, and which
creates expectations on the part of the students about their eligibility and protection under higher
education disability law.
Part IV of the Article reviews and examines the Supreme Court’s tradition of deference to
higher education academic decisions, recently reiterated in the University of Michigan
affirmative action cases, in which higher education admissions decisions were challenged as
racially discriminatory.7 The Court has not yet decided a case in which an academically
dismissed student claims disability discrimination. The Court has, however, deferred in cases in
which higher education academically dismissed students made constitutional claims,8 and
appeared to defer to a higher education decision concerning the impact of a student’s disability
on her qualifications for admission to a higher education program.9 There is thus every
indication the Court would defer to a law school’s judgment in a case in which an academically
dismissed law student claimed disability discrimination.
Part V of the Article reviews the body of law (both actual lower court cases and OCR
administrative opinions) in which academically dismissed higher education students denied
readmission have made disability discrimination claims. In the overwhelming majority of these
cases and opinions, including all of the court cases involving law schools,10 schools have

7

Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).

8

See infra notes 171-202 and accompanying text.

9

See infra notes 203-215 and accompanying text.

10

See infra Section V.B.
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prevailed without going to trial, normally by receiving summary judgment.11 Moreover, courts
in these cases have regularly announced a policy of deferring to the school’s academic decisions
concerning academical dismissal and readmission.12 Examination of the few court cases in
which (non law) schools were not granted summary judgment offers helpful guidance to law
schools faced with such claims.13 The Article finds that the courts’ approach in these cases is
appropriate, although no doubt frustrating to students whose planned careers may well have
ended.14 The Article in Part VI offers guidelines and options for law schools trying to do the
right thing (i.e. make a decision which is both principled and nondiscriminatory) when faced
with readmissions petitions by Student or other dismissed students claiming a disability.15
III. APPLICABLE FEDERAL STATUTES – SECTION 504 AND THE ADA
Law schools are subject to two federal statutes which prohibit disability discrimination
against covered students, as well as employees.16 “Section 504"17 of the Rehabilitation Act of

11

See infra note 237 and accompanying text.

12

See infra notes 238, 258, and 288 and accompanying text.

13

See infra Section V.C.

14

See infra Section V.F.

15

See infra Section VI.B.

16

For overviews of the statutes’ applicability to higher education, see Laura Rothstein,
Disability Law and Higher Education: A Road Map for Where We’ve Been and Where We May
Be Heading, 63 MD. L. REV. 122 (2004); Laura Rothstein, Higher Education and the Future of
Disability Policy, 52 ALA. L. REV. 241 (2000).
17

29 U.S.C. § 794.
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197318 applies to all schools, public or private, K-12 or higher education, which receive any
federal education funds, such as federally guaranteed student loans, federal student grants, and
federal research grants.19 The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) applies to a much
broader variety of institutions, and without regard to whether they receive federal funds,
including employers (Title I),20 states and state and local government-run “public entities”
(including state law schools) (Title II),21 and “places of public accommodation,” specifically
defined to include private schools (Title III).22 Hence, absent very unusual circumstances,23
public law schools are forbidden from discriminating against covered students with disabilities
by both Section 504 and Title II of the ADA, and private law schools by both Section 504 and
Title III of the ADA. Law schools must also comply with any applicable state laws.24

18

29 U.S.C. §§701 - 795 (2000).

19

29 U.S.C. §794(b)(2)(A) (2000) (defining covered “program or activity” in pertinent
part as a college or university); 34 C.F.R. §104.3(h) (defining “federal financial assistance”).
Much of the meat of Section 504's obligations for schools are set out in its regulations, which
include separate sections and separate standards for K-12 public schools, 34 C.F.R. §§104.31-38
(2004), K-12 private schools, 34 C.F.R. §104.39, and higher education, 34 C.F.R. §§104.41-47.
20
42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 - 12117 (2000).
21

Id. at §§ 12131 - 12134.

22

Id. at §§ 12181 - 12189.

23

To avoid Section 504 obligations, a public or private law school and its parent
university would need to avoid receiving any federal education funds, including federally
guaranteed student loans and federal student grants. Title III of the ADA excludes “entities
controlled by religious organizations, including places of worship,” 42 U.S.C. §12187, which
theoretically could include a private, religiously controlled, law school. All public law schools
appear to be covered by Title II of the ADA.
24

Discussions of applicable state laws is beyond the scope of this Article. It should be
noted, however, that such laws might impose additional obligations on law schools, such as
-9-

The ADA is modeled on Section 504, and as concerns higher education students with
disabilities, the two statutes are essentially the same.25 In fact, the ADA explicitly provides that
no less than the applicable Section 504 standard shall apply to the ADA.26 An overview of
which students are covered by these statutes, and schools’ obligations to covered students,
follows. Generally speaking, both Section 504 and the ADA cover students with a physical or
mental impairment (present, past, or merely perceived) which is severe enough to “substantially
limit” a “major life activity” such as learning or walking. To be covered, students must also be
“qualified” for the school’s program, meaning that they can meet the school’s academic and
similar requirements, at least if certain academic or other adjustments, often referred to as
“reasonable accommodations,” are made. Some students’ disabilities actually preclude them
from being “qualified” for law school,27 while other students with disabilities are not

defining covered students more broadly than do the federal statutes, and/or imposing obligations
beyond the federally required academic adjustments.
25

See Bonnie Tucker, Application of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and
Section 504 to Colleges and Universities: An Overview and Discussion of Special Issues
Relating to Students, 23 J. COLL. & UNIV. L. 1, 2 (1996) (“With one possible exception, that
being in the area of safety, the ADA does not add any substantive protections for individuals
with disabilities in the postsecondary education context, although in some contexts there are
procedural differences.”).
26

42 U.S.C. §12201(a) (“Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, nothing in this
chapter shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under Title V of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 790 et seq.) or the regulations issued by Federal
agencies pursuant to such title.”), cited in Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc., v. Williams, 534
U.S. 184, 194 (2002).
27

Consider, for example, a first year law student who is in a car accident and left with
severe brain damage, which greatly impairs memory and reasoning. At the time of initial
admission, the student was academically and otherwise qualified to attend the law school.
Moreover, without question the now brain-damaged student has a disability that substantially
impairs learning and likely other major life activities. However, if the student can no longer
-10-

academically qualified for a law school’s program for reasons apart from their disability.28
Section 504 and the ADA also impose the same obligations on schools for covered
students. In addition to the obligation of nondiscrimination, schools are required to make their
programs physically accessible29 and to make some adjustments to their programs to
accommodate students’ disabilities.30 On the other hand, schools are not required to alter any of
the basic, essential requirements of their programs, such as minimum GPA and attendance
requirements.31
A.

Covered persons
1. Person with a disability; impairments. The two federal statutes define “person

reason well enough to maintain the minimum GPA the law school requires, even if academic
adjustments are provided, she is not “qualified” to continue attending the law school and is not
protected by the federal disability statutes.
28

Consider here the example of a different first year law student diagnosed with dyslexia,
a learning disability involving written language, who receives academic adjustments including
extra time on exams because the student’s dyslexia causes her to read and write much more
slowly than her classmates. This student fails to meet the law school’s attendance requirements,
and consequently receives grades of “F” in some classes and does not earn the minimum GPA
required by the law school. This student may have a substantially impairing disability under
Section 504 and the ADA but is not qualified to continue to attend the law school because she
has not met the school’s basic attendance requirements for reasons unrelated to her disability.
Note in this example that the disability, dyslexia, would not interfere with the student’s ability to
regularly attend class. Even in the case of other conditions (such as chronic fatigue syndrome or
fibromyalgia) which might preclude regular class attendance, however, OCR has found that
waiving law school attendance requirements is beyond legally required academic adjustments.
Seattle University School of Law, 27 Nat’l Disability L. Rep. ¶ 321 (OCR 2003).
29

See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 794c (Section 504); 42 U.S.C. §§ 12146, 12147 (ADA Title II);
12183 (ADA Title III).
30

34 C.F.R. § 104.44 (Section 504); 28 C.F.R. § 36.302 (ADA Title III).

31

34 C.F.R. § 104.44 (Section 504).
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with a disability” essentially identically.32 This term is defined in those laws’ general sections;
hence, with minor exceptions33 the definitions and interpretative case law apply across employee,
student, and other statutory contexts. Moreover, both statutes define persons with disabilities
broadly: rather than listing covered disabilities, the statutes refer to persons with a “physical or
mental impairment” which “substantially limits” a “major life activity” (such as learning or
walking).34 Persons with a history of such an impairment (such as persons with a history of
cancer, heart attack or mental illness) or who are regarded are having such an impairment are
also included in the definition.35 Law students with “impairments” included in Section 504 and
the ADA’s definitions include, for example, students with physical or sensory conditions (such
as cerebral palsy, quadriplegia, or impaired vision or hearing), learning disabilities and attention
deficit disorder, and emotional conditions including mental illnesses.36 Learning disabilities may
be the most common impairment of law students; according to one survey, more than half of law

32

29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (Section 504); 42 U.S.C. § 12 (ADA). See Toyota Motor
Mfg., Kentucky, Inc., v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 193 (“Congress drew the ADA’s definition of
disability almost verbatim from the definition of ‘handicapped individual’ in the Rehabilitation
Act, § 706(8)(B)”).
33

See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §705(20)( C)(4) (for employment purposes only, certain active
alcoholic employees are not covered); id. at (D) ((for employment purposes only, certain
contagious employees are not covered).
34

42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (ADA); 29 U.S.C. § 705 (a) (Section 504).

35

The Court limited the “regarded as” prong to cases where the person is believed to have
a substantially limiting disability when in truth there is either no disability, or a disability which
is not substantially limiting. Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471, 489-494 (1999). See infra
note 47 and accompanying text.
36

Section 504 regulations provide a nonexclusive list of disabilities. See 34 C.F.R. §
104.3(j)(2).
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students who requested accommodations had learning disabilities.37 Certain conditions are
specifically excluded by the statutes.38 Under Section 504 and the ADA, it is the higher
education student’s responsibility to self-identify as having a disability, and to pay for and
provide the school with appropriate documentation of the impairment.39
2. Substantial limitation.
As the Supreme Court has noted, “[m]erely having an impairment does not make one
disabled for purposes of the ADA. Claimants also need to demonstrate that the impairment
limits a major life activity. . . .To qualify as disabled, a claimant must further show that the
limitation on the major life activity is ‘substantial.’”40 The Court has also determined that the
extent to which an impairment is limiting must be examined in light of any mitigators, such as
hypertension medication, or corrective aids such as eyeglasses.
a. Effect of mitigators. In the “Sutton trilogy,” three 1999 United States
Supreme Court decisions involving employees with disabilities, the Court held that whether an
impairment is “substantially limiting” under the ADA and thus a statutorily protected disability
37

Donald Stone, The Impact of the Americans with Disabilities Act on Legal Education
and Academic Modifications for Disabled Law Students: An Empirical Study, 44 U. KANSAS L.
REV. 567, 570 (1996) (54% of students requesting exam accommodations have learning
disabilities).
38

Excluded conditions include persons currently using illegal drugs, 29 U.S.C.§706
(20)(C); 42 U.S.C. §12211, as well as a statutory list of conditions relating to sexuality,
gambling, kleptomania and pyromania, 29 U.S.C. at §706(20)(E),(F); 42 U.S.C. §12211.
39

See Bonnie Tucker and Bruce Goldstein, Legal Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Ana
Analysis of Federal Law § 9IID (2005); Kaltenberger v. Ohio Coll. of Podiatric Med., 162 F.3d
432, 437 (6th Cir. 1998); Brown v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 2005 WL 1324885 at *10 (S.D. Ohio
2005).
40

Toyota Motor Mfg, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 195 (2002).
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must be determined with reference to any mitigators.41 Thus a person with high blood pressure
who takes medication has a physical impairment but with the mitigating medicine it may not be a
substantially limiting statutory disability;42 similarly, a person with impaired vision corrected
with eyeglasses,43 or by “self-mitigation” in the form of bodily adjustments44 may not have the
“substantial impairment” required to be covered by the statute. These decisions relied primarily
on the ADA’s present tense language requiring that eligible persons have a disability which
“substantially limits” a major life activity,45 and rejected contrary administrative
interpretations.46 In them, the Court rejected the argument that persons in these situations were
“regarded as disabled” and thus covered by the statutes, requiring that persons must be perceived
to have a condition which substantially limits a major life activity to be “regarded” as having an

41

Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Service, 527
U.S. 516 (1999); Albertsons v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
42

Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521 (with medication, employee’s “high blood pressure does not
substantially limit him in any major life activity.”). Note, however, that if the mitigators have
their own negative effects (e.g. medicinal side effects) these must also be considered in
determining whether the impairment is substantially limiting.
43

Sutton, 527 U.S. at 488 - 489 (nearsighted pilots whose vision with corrective lenses
was 20/20 “have not stated a claim that they are substantially limited in any major life activity.”).
44

Albertsons v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, (employee with vision in only one eye used
“bodily adjustments” presumably involving cognitive correction of monocular vision to
compensate).
45

Sutton, 521 U.S. at 482-483.

46

See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 480 (noting guidance from EEOC, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App.
§1630.2(j), and Department of Justice, 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, App. A §35.104, indicating mitigators
are not relevant to disability determinations).
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impairment.47 While these cases were decided in an employment context, as discussed above,
the “substantially limits” ADA definition language interpreted by the Court is found in the
general provisions of the ADA and thus also applies to cases of disability discrimination by
students against schools.48 Moreover, and as a dissent in one of these cases noted, the ADA
definition of disability is “drawn ‘almost verbatim’ from the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.”49
Thus, law school and other higher education students’ disabilities are also to be evaluated with
any mitigators.50
b. “Substantial” limitation of a “major” life activity. In a 2002 decision,
Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, (“Toyota”), the Court held that “substantial” limitation
involves “considerable or to a large degree”51 “permanent or long-term”52 impairment of

47

See supra note 35 and accompanying text.

48

See 42 U.S.C. § 12102.

49

Sutton, 527 U.S. at 497 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 29 U.S.C. §706(8)(B) and the
Court’s opinion in Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 631 (1998)).
50

See, e.g., Pacella v. Tufts University School of Dental Medicine, 66 F.Supp. 2d 234 (D.
Mass. 1999) (dismissed dental student with vision problem did not have a statutorily protected
disability where the impairment was largely mitigated with corrective lenses; no discrimination
involved in his dismissal).
51

Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 196-197 (2002) (citing
dictionary definitions of “substantial”).
52

Id. at 198 (“The impairment’s impact must also be permanent or long term.”) (citing
EEOC regulations). See, e.g., Sanders v. Arneson Products, 91 F.3d 1351 (9th Cir. 1996)
(psychological impairment lasting four months is not a statutory disability); Ogburn v. UFCW
Local 881, 305 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2002) (short term depression is not a statutory disability);
Swanson v. University of Cincinnati, 268 F.3d 307 (6th Cir. 2001) (short term major depression
mitigated with medicine was not a statutory disability); see also 29 C.F.R. Part 1630 Appx §
1630.2(j) (listing examples of temporary impairments which are not statutory disabilities).
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activities “that are of central importance to daily life,”53 and further noted that "these terms need
to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled."54 While
reserving the question of whether Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) ADA
regulations which measure limitation as compared to the average person were within
legislatively delegated authority, the Court also quoted from these regulations:
According to the EEOC regulations, ‘substantially limited’ means ‘[u]nable to perform a
major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform;’ or
‘[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner, or duration under which the
average person in the general population can perform the same major life activity.’55
Thus, the Court noted that an employee who alleged that her carpal tunnel syndrome
substantially impaired her in the major life activity of performing manual tasks, an impairment
which kept her from performing assembly line work but not from performing daily living tasks
such as brushing her teeth, may not in fact have a statutorily protected disability.56
The Toyota court specifically noted that the definitional ADA language it interpreted was

53

Id. at 197 (“’Major life activities’ thus refers to those activities that are of substantial
importance to daily life.”) (citing dictionary definition of “major”).
54

Id. at 197. The Court also held that the “substantially limiting” determination must be
made on an individualized basis for each person. Id. at 199 (noting the wide range of severity of
carpal tunnel syndrome). In an earlier case, the Court affirmed a lower court finding that an
asymptomatic HIV-positive plaintiff was a person with a disability per se under the ADA, and
specifically a physical impairment which substantially impaired the major life activity of
reproduction. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998). The plaintiff had decided not to have a
child because of her condition, id. at 641, and the Court also noted the real and significant
medical risk of transmission to the child and/or to the partner during conception, id. at 639-641,
finding that “[c]onception and childbirth are not impossible for an HIV victim but, without
doubt, are dangerous to the public health.” Id. at 641.
55

Id. at 195-196 (citing 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(j)).

56

Id. at 199-203 (remanding for determination of whether the undisputed physical
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taken from Section 504 and applied not only to employment but also to other areas of the ADA,
specifically including public accommodations.57 Thus, under these decisions, a law student with
high blood pressure that is asymptomatic with medication would likely not have a statutory
disability and thus likely would not be covered by the statutes.58 Similarly, a law student with
mild dyscalculia, a math-related learning disability, which with self-mitigating coping strategies,
but without any school-provided academic adjustments, did not interfere with a wide range of
that student’s learning activities but did render the student unable to succeed in an LL.M.
program in tax law would likely not have a statutory disability which substantially impaired her
ability to learn in the LL.M program.59

impairment was substantially limiting to the plaintiff and thus statutorily covered).
57

Id. at 193-194.

58

In such a case it would be essential to have an evaluation of the student while on the
treating medication.
59

While perhaps ultra vires, see Sutton, 527 U.S. at 479 (suggesting EEOC has not been
delegated authority to write regulations concerning the ADA’s general provisions but
“determining [the regulations’] validity is not necessary to decide this case,” and declining to
decide “what deference they are due, if any.”), it is worth noting that EEOC ADA regulations
define “substantially limit” in general as
“(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general
population can perform; or
(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an
individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition,
manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can
perform that same major life activity.
(2) The following factors should be considered in determining whether an individual is
substantially limited in a major life activity:
(i) The nature and severity of the impairment;
(ii) The duration or expected duration of the impairment; and
(iii) The permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact
of or resulting from the impairment.”
The same regulations offer a different definition of “substantially limit” for the major life activity
-17-

Several courts have found graduate students’ diagnosed mental impairments (such as
learning disabilities and ADHD) not to “substantially” limit learning in the graduate school
context and thus not to amount to statutory disabilities. These decisions involved students with a
history of academic success at least through college without accommodations, and/or a diagnosis
based on test scores which documented below average performance only as compared with other
highly educated persons, rather than below average performance as compared with the general
population.
Most recently and notably, in Wong v. Regents of California, (“Wong II”), 60 a case

of working:
“(3) With respect to the major life activity of working-(i) The term substantially limits means significantly restricted in the ability to perform
either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the
average person having comparable training, skills and abilities. The inability to perform
a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity
of working.
(ii) In addition to the factors listed in paragraph (j)(2) of this section, the following
factors may be considered in determining whether an individual is substantially limited in
the major life activity of "working":
(A) The geographical area to which the individual has reasonable access;
(B) The job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an impairment,
and the number and types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities,
within that geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified because of
the impairment (class of jobs); and/or
(C) The job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an impairment,
and the number and types of other jobs not utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or
abilities, within that geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified
because of the impairment (broad range of jobs in various classes).”
29 C.F.R. §1630.2(h). The Court also reserved the question of whether work was a major
life.activity. 534 U.S. at 200.
60

410 F.3d 1052 (2005). In an earlier decision in the same case, the court denied the
school’s motion for summary judgment on a different theory (specifically that no reasonable jury
could find that the requested accommodations for alternative test formats were reasonable
onesmit the student violated disability discrimination laws), since there was not a record of the
school’s readmissions decision-making process. Wong v. Regents of Univ. Of Cal., 192 F.3d
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involving a dismissed medical student diagnosed with a learning disability, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed a summary judgment for the school, holding that the student’s undisputed impairment
was not a statutorily protected disability as a matter of law.61 As a young person, Wong had
received special education but also participated in gifted classes. In college, Wong earned a 3.5
GPA in biochemistry without accommodations.62 The student also took the MCAT without
accommodations, and successfully completed the first two years of medical school without
accommodations and passed the Boards Step 1, a national standardized test taken after two years
of medical school and required for physician licensing, without accommodations.63 After
struggling in and failing some clinical work, Wong was diagnosed with a learning disability,64
but was dismissed because of his unsatisfactory clinical work.65 He filed a disability
discrimination claim.

807 (9th Cir. 1999) (”Wong I”), discussed supra at note 334 and accompanying text.
61

Id. at 1056.

62

Id. at 1056-1057.

63

Id. at 1057.

64

Id. Testing revealed Wong’s reading comprehension was in the 99th percentile untimed,
but at an 8th grade level under time limits. Id. at 1066. For the Wong court the student’s testing
documentation of poor timed reading speed as compared with the general population was
insufficient evidence to survive summary judgment in light of the student’s long history of
success without accommodations.
65

Id. at 1057-1058. Typically in medical school third and fourth year students rotate
through various hospital departments such as internal medicine and surgery. During each
rotation students not only perform direct patient care but also read extensively on diagnosis and
treatment of conditions and diseases treated by the department in which the student is doing a
rotation in preparation for an exam.
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The Ninth Circuit framed the issue as “whether Wong presented sufficient evidence to
demonstrate that he was substantially limited in the specified major life activities [reading,
learning, and working] for purposes of daily living, or as compared to what is important in the
daily life of most people.”66 It concluded that Wong’s impairment did not substantially impair
reading or learning, relying heavily on his history of academic success without
accommodations.67 The court rejected Wong’s argument that its analysis made it next to
impossible for a student to prove a statutory disability68 and reiterated that whether an
impairment’s limitation is “substantial” must be made with reference to the general population:
The relevant question for determining whether Wong is "disabled" under the Acts was
not whether he might be able to prove to a trier of fact that his learning impairment
makes it impossible for him to keep up with a rigorous medical school curriculum. It was
whether his impairment substantially limited his ability to learn as a whole, for purposes
of daily living, as compared to most people. The level of academic success Wong
achieved during the first two years of medical school, without any special
66

Id. at 1065.

67

Specifically, the court noted that “[r]egarding the activity of learning, Wong's claim to
be "disabled" was contradicted by his ability to achieve academic success, and to do so without
special accommodations. Most notably, Wong completed the first two years of the medical
school program, the academic courses, on a normal schedule, with a grade point average slightly
above a "B," and he passed the required national board examination at that point, both without
the benefit of any special accommodations.” Id. at 1065.
68

The court noted “That is not to say that a successful student by definition cannot qualify
as "disabled" under the Acts. A blind student is properly considered to be disabled, because of
the limitation on the major life activity of seeing, even if she graduates at the top of her class.
Nor do we say that a successful student cannot prove "disability" based on a learning
impairment. A learning-impaired student may properly be considered to be disabled if he could
not have achieved success without special accommodations. But a student cannot successfully
claim to be disabled based on being substantially limited in his ability to "learn" if he has not, in
fact, been substantially limited, as that term is used in the Acts.” Id. at 1065.
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accommodation provided to him by the school, made that proposition implausible. . . .69
As to learning disabilities specifically, the Ninth Circuit noted that
The term "learning disability" . . . can be misleading, however, for it is clear that a person
who has a "learning disability" is not necessarily "disabled" under the Acts. The Acts use
the term in a narrower fashion, to cover only those persons who have an impairment that
substantially limits one of the major life activities. As a unanimous Supreme Court made
explicit in Toyota, . . . having an impairment does not necessarily mean that a person is
"disabled" for purposes of the Acts. The Acts establish a "demanding standard." [citation
omitted] To be "disabled" under the Acts, a person has to be substantially limited in a
major life activity, and that is measured by "most people's daily lives," not unique needs
of a particular position. [citation omitted] Although he may have a learning disability,
Wong is not substantially limited in the life activity of "learning" as compared to most
people. The law compels accommodations for someone who is "disabled" as that term is
used in the Acts, but not for everyone who may have a condition described as a
"learning disability.”70
A dissenting judge characterized the consequence of the majority standard as “effectively
bar[ring] the entire class of learning disabled students from receiving ADA accommodations in
graduate school.”71
The federal district court in Marlon v. Western New England College (“Marlon”),72 a
case involving a dismissed law school student diagnosed with several physical and cognitive
impairments,73 also found that the student did not have a statutory disability. Relying heavily on

69

Id. at 1065-1066 (emphasis added).

70

Id. at 1066-1067.

71

Id. at 1071 (Thomas., J., dissenting). The dissent suggested a more individualized, factbased approach, which would result in denial of summary judgment in the case at hand.
72

2003 WL 22914304 (D.Mass. 2003), aff’d, 29 Nat’l Disability L. Rep. ¶ 139 (1st Cir.

73

After being dismissed, the student was granted readmission and accommodations
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2005).

Toyota and the EEOC regulations defining “substantially limit,”74 the court rejected the student’s
claims that her major life activities of working and learning were substantially limited by her
impairments of learning disability, depression and panic attacks.75 As to working, the court
noted that EEOC regulations define substantial limitation of the specific major life activity of
working. as being unable to perform a broad class of jobs, but the plaintiff had worked
successfully as a paralegal without accommodations before and after her time in law school 76
As to learning, statements in the student’s neuropsychological evaluation indicated that the
learning disability was significant and longstanding. The court focused, however, on the
student’s actual past success in learning. In this regard, the court noted that before law school
the student had been academically successful in college and professionally successful as a
paralegal, all without accommodations, and thus her claimed learning disability-related inability
to succeed on long exams was not a substantial limitation on learning.77
A medical school received summary judgment in a disability discrimination claim

consisting of a reduced course load, notetaking, taped classes, and extra time for and typing of
exams for newly disclosed disabilities of carpal tunnel syndrome, anxiety, depression, and panic
attacks. Despite these accommodations and taking classes for the second time, the student again
failed to earn the required grades. She then obtained a diagnosis of a learning disability and
requested additional accommodations, but was denied a second readmission, and sued under
Section 504, the ADA, and state discrimination law. Id. at *2 - *3.
74

Id. at *6.

75

Id. at *7-8.

76

Id. at *7. Note that the EEOC regulations employ this broad class of jobs analysis only
for the major life activity of working. See supra notes 55 and 59 and accompanying text.
77

Id. at *7 and n.18.
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brought by a dismissed student in his last year of medical school.78 After struggling on exams
and being dismissed, the student was evaluated by the university’s own internal experts and
diagnosed with reading disorder and generalized anxiety disorder.79 The student had performed
well in high school and college.80 The student also got a second post-dismissal evaluation which
opined that the student’s “failure to pass standardized tests was due to his reading disorder” and
also concluding that the reading disorder “substantially impairs the major life activity of
learning,” and if the recommended accommodations were provided, the student would be
successful in medical school.81 Citing Toyota, the court found insufficient evidence of a legal
disability to survive summary judgment.82 While there was some dispute about whether the
student’s test scores were normed with other highly educated persons or with the general
population, the court found the student’s history of academic success in high school and college
dispositive:83
It stands to reason that not every individual who scores below average or low-average on
this particular neuropsychological battery can be deemed to be disabled, particularly

78

Brown v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 2005 WL 1324885 (S.D. Ohio 2005).

79

Id. at *1.

80

Id. at *2-*3.

81

Id. at *6.

82

Id. at *9-*12.

83

Id. at *11.
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since, as plaintiff’s situation demonstrates, an individual can succeed academically
through at least the college level despite scoring at the lower end of the range of the
scores on the battery. . . .In short, it is undisputed that plaintiff excelled in high school
and college and was eventually able to achieve passing and above passing grades in the
vast majority of his medical school courses. Certainly, this level of achievement greatly
exceeds that which the average, unimpaired individual is able to attain, so that it is not
reasonable to say that plaintiff was significantly restricted in his ability to learn as
compared to ‘the average person in the general population.’84
A bankruptcy court also recently found that a dismissed medical student’s attention
deficit disorder impairment was not substantially impairing when compared with most people
and thus did not amount to a statutory disability.85 None of the student’s three evaluations
indicated below average learning abilities as compared to other adults in general or those her
age.86
Some courts have performed a similar analysis in pre-Toyota cases. The Tenth Circuit
has also found that a medical student with “test anxiety” anxiety disorder manifesting on certain
exams does not have a substantially limiting disability, finding that “[a]n impairment limited to
specific stressful situations, such as the mathematics and chemistry exams which trigger [the
student’s] anxiety, is not a disability under the Rehabilitation Act.”87 In several cases involving

84

Id. at *11-*12.

85

In re Allegheny Health, Education and Research Foundation, 321 B.R. 776, 793-795,
797, 803-804 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2005) (disallowing dismissed student’s claims for more than $8
million against bankrupt medical school, and also rejecting claim that school regarded student as
having a statutory disability absent evidence the school perceived the student as having a
substantially limiting impairment).
86

87

Id. at 785-787.

McGuinness v. University of New Mexico School of Medicine, 170 F.3d 974, 980 (10th
Cir. 1998).
-24-

medical students diagnosed with attention deficit disorder, reading disorder, and/or disorder of
written expression seeking accommodations for the medical school Boards Step 1, courts have
also found that the students’ ability to learn was not substantially impaired as compared with
most people and thus they are not persons with a disability under Title III of the ADA.88 These
courts paid special attention to the students’ long history of average to superior academic
performance to find that any impairments they had89 did not substantially limit learning.90 These
courts also relied on legislative history and agency regulations as support for their conclusions
that a substantially limiting impairment is one which limits a major life activity as compared
with the general population, rejecting the students’ arguments that their learning should be
compared with persons of similar age and education level (i.e. college graduates).91

88

Gonzales v. National Board of Medical Examiners, 60 F. Supp. 2d 703 (E.D. Mich
1999) (student diagnosed with reading disorder and disorder of written expression); Price v.
National Board of Medical Examiners, 966 F .Supp. 419 (S.D. W.Va. 1997) (three students all
diagnosed attention deficit disorder, two of whom were also diagnosed with reading disorder and
disorder of written expression).
89

The courts also questioned the diagnoses obtained by the students. The defendants’
independent experts reviewed the evaluations supplied by the students, and disagreed with the
diagnoses. The courts found the defendants’ experts opinions more credible than those of the
students’ experts. Gonzales, 60 F. Supp.2d at 708; Price, 966 F. Supp. at 423-424.
90

Gonzales, 60 F. Supp.2d at 708-709; Price, 966 F. Supp. at 423-424. In the Gonzales
case, the court also rejected the argument that the student’s impairments limited the major life
activity of working under the special EEOC regulation’s standard, since the case was not brought
under the employment part of the ADA. 60 F. Supp.2d at 709-710.
91

Gonzales, 60 F. Supp.2d at 707-708 (citing S. Rep. No. 101-116; 28 C.F.R. Part 36
App. B; also noting general EEOC regulations definition 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii)); Price, 966
F. Supp. at 425 (same). The Department of Justice regulations for Title III of the ADA state in
pertinent part that “A person is considered an individual with a disability for purposes of Test A,
the first prong of the definition, when the individual's important life activities are restricted as to
the conditions, manner, or duration under which they can be performed in comparison to most
people. A person with a minor, trivial impairment, such as a simple infected finger, is not
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Not every lower court interprets Toyota this way. For example, in Singh v. George
Washington University (“Singh”), a federal district court found that it was appropriate to
compare a medical student to other college graduates to determine if her learning disability was
substantially limiting.92
In essence, the issue is whether “substantially” is to be defined objectively or
subjectively. The Court’s opinion in Toyota suggests that the standard is an objective one, and
the Ninth Circuit in Wong II and other courts so hold. These courts measure the substantialness
of the impairment against the functioning level of a reasonable, ordinary person. Wong II and
similar decisions’ objective analysis of a “substantially” limiting statutory “disability” is quite
different than the learning disability evaluation protocol used by evaluators to diagnose adults,
which compares the individual’s skills and achievement to the individual’s ability and
potential.93 Thus, when a law school receives information that a student has been diagnosed with
a learning “disability,” the limitations of the impairment have likely been measured in a largely
subjective manner quite different from the statutory analysis. The Singh court’s approach
approaches the subjective analysis employed by learning disability evaluators, with the student’s
learning compared to persons with similar levels of education.
While for certain physical or sensory impairments such as deafness, blindness, and
cerebral palsy, taking a subjective or objective approach likely makes no difference, the
impaired in a major life activity. A person who can walk for 10 miles continuously is not
substantially limited in walking merely because, on the eleventh mile, he or she begins to
experience pain, because most people would not be able to walk eleven miles without
experiencing some discomfort.” 28 C.F.R. Part 36 App. B.
92

Singh v. George Washington University, 368 F.Supp.2d 58, 65-68 (D.D.C. 2005)
(medical student).
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subjective and objective approaches may have very different consequences for mental
impairments such as learning disabilities and attention deficit disorder. Several commentators in
fact suggests that using the general population or “most people” standard means few if any law
or other higher education students with newly diagnosed learning disabilities will be legally
entitled to receive accommodations; these commentators disagree about whether this is a good
result.94
This analytic framework is also used by disability experts who have become familiar with
the relevant legal standards through their work reviewing requests for accommodations on bar
exams. These disability experts agree that many mental impairments (such as psychiatric
disabilities, ADHD, and learning disabilities) first diagnosed in graduate students do not
substantially impair learning and thus do not amount to statutory disabilities. For example, one
neuropsychologist expert on ADHD who reviews bar examination accommodations requests
notes that
reviewing the documentation, it is often unclear whether the student’s difficulty is a
function of ADHD or the fact that they are simply struggling to succeed in a more
difficult academic environment . . . .It is easy to forget that students who made it through
93
94

Eichhorn, infra note 152, at 34.

Melissa Krueger, The Future of ADA Protection for Students With Learning Disabilities
in Post-Secondary and Graduate Environments, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 607 (2000). The author
relies on public policy as well as EEOC regulations defining “substantial” limits on the major
life activity of working for employees, which require comparison with other persons of similar
training and experience. 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(j)(3). The author suggests that for the major life
activity of learning, the substantialness of the impairment be measured with reference to a group
of similar age and education level (e.g. a reference group of college graduates for law students);
Gregory Murphy, Toyota v. William and the Late-Discovered Learning Disability, 74 Bar
Examiner 46, 48-49 (2004); Stuart Duhl and Gregory Duhl, Testing Applicants with Disabilities,
73 BAR EXAMINER 7, 10 (2004) (after Toyota testing accommodations for bar examinees require
proof of impairment in “performing mental or physical tasks of central importance to their daily
lives, and not tasks that are tied only to taking the bar examination or practicing law.”).
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college are still likely above average in terms of their learning ability.95
This expert indicates a person diagnosed with ADHD likely does not have a statutory disability
“if [such] an individual has never been afforded accommodations yet has been able to complete
an undergraduate education and achieve law school admittance.”96
Other experts reach similar conclusions,97 noting
it is nearly impossible to justify the [ADHD] diagnosis when symptoms suddenly arise
after high school graduation. It is particularly hard when the first instance of any real
problems arose after graduation from college. . . .How impaired can a person be relative
to the general population if the worst or his or her problems occurs in academic settings
far beyond the reach of most people? Without persuasive proof that impairment has been
long-standing, consistent, and truly disruptive to normal functioning, the diagnosis is
likely inappropriate.98
Commentary from these disability experts also provides insight into the perspective of
evaluators who diagnose these impairments. One psychiatrist who reviews requests for bar exam

95

Ranseen, supra note 100, at 10 and 11; id. at 11 (noting that there is no standardized test
to diagnose ADHD; it is a clinical judgment);
96

Id. at 11; see also id. at 17 (“Let’s face it, whether or not it is a good thing in the long
run, it is not all that likely that someone who is in law school and has completed undergraduate
school, with or without [pharmacological] treatment, can really be considered [statutorily]
disabled. . . .”); id. at 17-18 (“Put simply, there are too many students diagnosed with ADHD and
requesting accommodation during adulthood who have clearly demonstrated – either with or
without treatment – a history of academic success that can only be viewed as well beyond that of
the average person within the population.”).
97

98

Gordon, Murphy, and Keiser, infra note 100, at 28-29.

Id. at 31; id. at 32 (noting that high IQ and/or hard work are not sufficient justification
for a late onset ADHD diagnosis); id. (“Generally, if an individual is able to cope with the
academic and social demands of a secondary education without substantial assistance, he or she
is likely neuropsychologically intact and therefor unimpaired compared to most people.”); id. at
33 (“By stretching the age of onset for symptom presentation until young adulthood . . .clinicians
risk distorting the concept of disability to include anyone who reaches an academic level that
outstrips her or her particular array of talents.”).
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accommodations from persons with psychiatric impairments notes “treating physicians,
therapists and other caregivers are ethically required to act as advocates for their patients, and as
a result their reports are rarely neutral or unbiased.”99 A neuropsychologist who reviews
requests for bar exam accommodations similarly notes concerns that evaluators often appear to
be acting as advocates rather than with impartiality, are more familiar with and oriented to IDEA
disability standards rather than the standards for statutory disabilities for higher education
students, and “typical clinical practice involves a natural desire to be helpful to the individual
requesting and paying for services.”100
The foregoing discussion does not mean there are not substantial numbers of law students
with statutory disabilities. For example, the law school where the author is a faculty member has
enrolled students with physical disabilities such as cerebral palsy and quadriplegia, sensory
disabilities such as legal blindness and deafness, and mental impairments which amount to
statutory disabilities such as dyslexia diagnosed in childhood and requiring special education
since that time. The foregoing discussion also does not mean law students should not pursue an
initial disability diagnosis while in law school. Diagnosis of an impairment, even if it does not

99

Douglas Tucker, Accommodations for Psychiatric Disabilities on the Bar Examination:
Perspectives from an Expert Reviewer, 71 THE BAR EXAMINER 14, 17 (2002) (also noting the
“strong incentives” for persons seeking accommodations to “distort their responses” and urging
evaluators to be vigilant in ferreting out any such attempted distortion and not rely solely on
information reported by the examinee to arrive at a diagnosis).
100

John Ranseen, Reviewing ADAD Accommodation Requests: An Update, 69 BAR
EXAMINER 6, 15-16 (2000) (also urging evaluators considering an ADHD diagnosis to rely
primarily on outside evidence of attentional difficulties beginning in childhood, rather than selfreported history or test scores); id. at 16 (citing unpublished research indicating the majority of
evaluators think disability involved comparison to peers rather than the general population);
Michael Gordon, Kevin Murphy, and Shelby Keiser, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder
(ADHD) and Test Accommodations, 67 BAR EXAMINER 26, 27-28 (1998) (reporting similar
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amount to a statutory disability and trigger eligibility for law school accommodations, may offer
the law student an opportunity for helpful treatment (pharmocological, compensatory strategy
and/or therapy) which may enhance the student’s functioning, academic and otherwise.
However, these legal developments do mean that many law students, law schools, evaluators,
and other officials such as university disability offices need to reexamine their beliefs concerning
legal disabilities.
B.

“Qualified”

The statutes protect only “otherwise qualified” persons with disabilities.101 While the
students in Wong II and similar cases may be characterized as not impaired enough to be
covered by the discrimination statutes, other persons’ impairments are so severe that they are not
qualified for certain programs and thus also are not covered by the statutes.102 Still other persons
are not qualified for a job or a school program for reasons unrelated to their disabilities. In
contrast to the definition of disability which applies generally to employees, students, and others,
“qualified” is defined differently in the Section 504 regulations in different contexts. As to
employees, statutory eligibility also requires that the person be “qualified,” or “able to perform
the essential functions” of the job, at least if reasonable accommodations are provided.103 For
higher education students, a “qualified” person is defined as “one who meets the academic and
technical standards requisite to admission or participation in the recipient’s education program or
conclusions re knowledge level and orientation of evaluators).
101

See 29 U.S.C. §794(a).

102

Cf. Haddon v. Board of Bar Examiners, 882 P.2d 509 (Mont. 1994) (evaluatoridentified “difficulties with ‘concept formation, problem solving, strategy generation, and
hypothesis testing’” would prevent bar success), cited in Duhl and Duhl, supra note 94, at 18.
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activity.”104
In its first Section 504 case, the Supreme Court held that a prospective nursing student
whose deafness, even with reasonable accommodations, prevented her from being able to
succeed in the clinical portions of her training,105 was not otherwise qualified and therefore not
protected by Section 504.106 Similarly, a person with significant permanent brain damage is
likely not otherwise qualified to be a law student. Other students with disabilities are not
qualified for a school’s program for reasons unrelated to their disabilities. As an example, a
student who is not admitted to a law school because of her low LSAT score and poor
undergraduate grades and also has a disability likely is not qualified for admission to that law
school because of a demonstrated lack of ability and academic success.
In the context of defining “qualified” for academically dismissed law students, such
students’ dismissal makes them not qualified to continue in law school. However, they are
otherwise qualified to apply for readmission and have their petitions considered on a
nondiscriminatory basis with the petitions of other students without disabilities.
C.

Substantive entitlements of eligible students

In addition to basic nondiscrimination and physical accessibility requirements, and anti-

103

34 C.F.R. §104.3(l)(1).

104

Id. at §104.3(l)(3).

105

Parts of the clinical training involved work in operating rooms and intensive care units
where the caregivers are masked and lipreading would thus not be possible. Id. at 403.
106

Southeastern Comm’y Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
-31-

retaliation provisions,107 under Section 504 regulations, higher education students may receive
“academic adjustments,” commonly referred to as “reasonable accommodations,” to their
educational programs.108 Students have the burden of documenting a disability and requesting
adjustments/accommodations.109 “Academic adjustments” or “reasonable accommodations”
(referred to in this Article as “accommodations”) are those which are necessary to allow the
student with a disability to participate in a nondiscriminatory basis with persons who do not have
disabilities.110 Such adjustments/accommodations are to be determined on a case-by-case basis
and do not include those which would pose an “undue hardship,” either financially or
administratively, on the school.111 The regulations include examples of academic adjustments:
extra time to complete degree requirements, substitution of required courses,112 “adaptation of

107

See 34 C.F.R. §100.7 (Section 504); 42 U.S.C.§ 12203; 28 C.F.R. §§35.134 (Title II);
36.206 (Title III).
108

34 C.F.R. §104.44. The obligation to provide persons with disabilities with reasonable
accommodations or academic adjustments stands in contrast to nondiscrimination obligations on
other bases, such as race and gender, which do not include such affirmative obligations.
109

See Tucker and Goldstein, supra note 39 at § 9IID.

110

34 C.F.R. §104.44(a) (“A recipient to which this subpart applies shall make such
modifications to its academic requirements as are necessary to ensure that such requirements do
not discriminate or have the effect of discriminating, . . .”).
111

34 C.F.R. §104.44(a) (“Academic requirements that the recipients can demonstrate are
essential to the instruction being pursued by such student or to any directly related licensing
requirement will not be regarded as discriminatory within the meaning of this section.”)
112

Perhaps, for example, a hearing impaired undergraduate student faced with a foreign
language requirement could substitute either a course which dealt with the written foreign
language only, or a sign language course.
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the manner in which specific courses are conducted,113 waivers of rules which limit the student’s
participation such as allowing a student whose disability precludes effective note-taking to tape
record class or waiving a no animal rule for a service animal,114 evaluating students in a
nondiscriminatory way,115 and providing “auxiliary aids” such as “taped texts, interpreters, orally
delivered materials. . . , [and] readers in libraries . . . .”116
Schools are not required to provide “devices or services of a personal nature” such as
“attendants, individually prescribed devices, [nor] readers for personal use or study.”117 Thus,
schools are generally not required to offer tutors to students, although to the extent a school
makes tutoring services available (perhaps through an Academic Resource Program or
upperclass students offering weekly tutorials for 1L classes) they must be available on a
nondiscriminatory basis to students with disabilities.118 Common reasonable accommodations
for law students with disabilities include access to special technology (such as casebooks on

113

34 C.F.R. §104.44(a).

114

34 C.F.R. §104.44(b).

115

34 C.F.R. §104.44( c). For example, a student with significant dyslexia, a learning
disability involving written language, likely reads and writes quite slowly and may need
extended time on examinations.
116

34 C.F.R. §104.44(d).

117

Id.

118

Oregon State University, 5 Nat’l Disability L. Rep. ¶ 19 (OCR 1993). See also
Robinson v. Hamline University, 1994 WL 175019 (Minn. App. 1994) (so holding with regard to
state discrimination law modelled on Section 504 in case brought by dismissed law student).
Moreover, to the extent the school offers services beyond reasonable accommodations, it may
charge for them. Id.
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CD), notetaking assistance, and extra time on examinations.119
Schools are also not required to provide adjustments or accommodations which would
compromise the essential requirements of its program. However, whether a requested
accommodation would compromise the essential elements of a law school program must be
determined on an individualized basis.120 Examples of accommodations which have in typical
law school contexts to go beyond reasonable ones include waiver of minimum GPA
requirements,121 waiver of class attendance requirements,122 taking exams at home,123 and

119

For a report on a law school survey regarding the kinds of accommodations law
schools provide for students with disabilities, see Donald Stone, The Impact of the Americans
with Disabilities Act on Legal Education and Academic Modifications for Disabled Law
Students: An Empirical Study, 44 U. KAN. L. REV. 567 (1996). See also Lisa Eichhorn,
Reasonable Accommodations and Awkward Compromises: Issues Concerning Learning
Disabled Students and Professional Schools in the Law School Context, 26 J. LAW & EDUC. 31,
34 (1997) (thorough overview of possible accommodations for students with learning
disabilities).
120

Cabrillo College, 2 Nat’l Disability L. Rep. ¶ 78 (OCR 1991) (“A generalized decision
that . . . requirements can never be waived, without consideration of the reasons for the existence
of an individual requirement, would not meet the standards set forth in Section 104.44 of the
regulation.”). As another example, although meeting law school attendance standards is
generally an essential requirement for law students, if a professor set a stringent attendance
requirement for her class, but made exceptions for nondisability reasons, modification of the
attendance requirements for that class might be a reasonable accommodation for a student with a
disability.
121

Analogously, the ADA Title II Technical Assistance Manual suggests that bar
examiners and other licensing authorities need not waive bar examination requirements nor
minimum passing scores as accommodations. Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice,
ADA Title II Technical Assistance Manual at 14 (undated).
122

OCR has found that waiving law school attendance requirements is beyond legally
required academic adjustments. Seattle University School of Law, 27 Nat’l Disability L. Rep. ¶
321 (OCR 2003).
123

McGregor, 3 F.3d at 859-860.
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providing an alternate format for multiple choice tests.124
In the specific context of deciding whether requested exam modifications are reasonable,
one expert suggests that if the modification “will change the skill being measured,” give the
student’s score a different meaning than the scores of other students, or would also benefit other
students without disabilities, it is not a reasonable one.125 Other experts note that “appropriate
accommodations help[] to better reveal an examinee’s true ability without inflating or . . .
diminishing it.”126
The decision whether a requested academic adjustment goes to essential academic
standards is one which is given deference by both OCR127 and the courts.128
While as discussed above the statutes’ eligibility definitions apply across contexts,
Section 504 and the ADA’s substantive provisions treat employees, preK-12 students, and higher
education students somewhat differently. Section 504's substantive provisions for higher
education students requiring “academic adjustments” are akin to those for employees requiring

124

Wynne, 932 F.2d at 794-95.

125

Phillips, infra note 417, at 16.

126

Martha Thurlow, Judith Elliott, Ronald Erickson and James Ysseldyke, Learning
Disabilities and Accommodations: Best Practices for Bar Exams, 66 BAR EXAMINER 17, 27
(1996).
127

Northern Ill. Univ., 7 Nat. Disability L.Rep. ¶ 392 (OCR 1995) (“OCR grants great
deference to recipients to determine which academic requirements are essential to their programs
of instruction).
128

Wynne, 932 F.2d at 795; McGregor, 3 F.3rd at 859; Brown, 2005 WL 1324885 at

*10.
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“reasonable accommodations” to perform their jobs.129 Like the academic adjustments provision
for higher education students, the reasonable accommodations provisions for employees exclude
modifications which would alter the essential functions of the employee’s job, as well as
modifications which would pose an undue hardship on the employer.130
D.

Enforcement

Section 504 regulations require schools to designate a Section 504 coordinator as well as
to establish an internal grievance process for “prompt and equitable” resolution of disability
discrimination complaints.131 External recourse is also available. Aggrieved students may file a
complaint under either Section 504 or Title II of the ADA with the Office of Civil Rights in the
U.S. Department of Education (“OCR”) within 180 days of the alleged violation, or at a later
time for good cause.132 OCR investigates complaints informally (normally by a on-site visit to
the school to review files and interview relevant persons, and without a hearing) and may issue

129

34 C.F.R. §104.12. The burdens of establishing eligibility and asking for
accommodations for higher education students also resemble those for employees as opposed to
preK-12 students. As discussed above, whereas under both Section 504 and the IDEA, public
preK-12 schools must identify and evaluate eligible students, 34 C.F.R. §104.32 (Section 504);
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3) (IDEA), higher education students, like employees, must self-identify to
their schools, pay for and supply appropriate documentation of their disability, and request
accommodations. Schools are not required to offer accommodations beyond those requested by
the student. See, e.g., Whittier College School of Law, 4 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 183 (OCR
1993).
130

See 34 C.F.R. § 104.12 (Section 504); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(5) (ADA).

131

34 C.F.R. §104.7. These regulations do not require schools to make the grievance
process available to applicants for admission. Id.
132

34 C.F.R. §100.7.
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an opinion letter containing a finding that disability discrimination has (not) occurred.133
Students may also file private lawsuits under both Section 504 and the ADA.134 Relief is
normally injunctive in nature; damages are available only under limited circumstances,135 and
not in private lawsuits under Title III of the ADA.136 Attorney’s fees are available to prevailing
plaintiffs, although recent case law developments make it more difficult to be eligible for a fee
award.137
E.

The prima facie case

A prima facie claim of disability discrimination in a readmissions case under Section 504
has four elements: 1) the plaintiff is a statutorily covered person with a disability, 2) she is
otherwise qualified for readmission, 3) she was denied readmission solely by reason of her
disability (here the student can make out a prima facie case, the school can articulate a legitimate
reason for its decision, and the student can then prove pretext,) and 4) the defendant school

133

29 U.S.C. §794a(a)(2) (making procedures under Title VI available); 34 C.F.R.
§104.61 (same).
134

29 U.S.C. §794a(a)(2).

135

See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)(2) (Section 504); 42 U.S.C. § 12131 (ADA Title II); id. at §
12188 (ADA Title III). Punitive damages are not available under ADA Title II nor Section 504.
Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002).
136

See 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(2).

137

29 U.S.C. §794a(b) (Section 504); 42 U.S.C. § 12188 (ADA). For example, in a recent
Supreme Court case, the Court indicated a private settlement of a civil rights claim was
insufficient “prevailing” to create eligibility for reimbursement of attorney’s fees. Buckhannon
Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Va. Dep’t of Health Res., 532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001). For a
discussion of this case’s impact on the IDEA, see Lynn Daggett, Special Education Attorney’s
Fees: of Buckhannon, the IDEA reauthorization bills, and the IDEA as civil rights statute, 8 UC
DAVIS J. OF JUV. L. & POL. 1 - 54 (2004).
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received federal education funds.138 It does not appear that reverse disability discrimination
claims are available,139 so schools may choose to engage in affirmative action in favor of
students with disabilities without fear of liability.140
F.

The IDEA’s different approach and the student expectations it creates

Most students entering law school with (or without) an impairment are familiar with the
coverage and entitlements of the IDEA, the federal preK-12 special education statute. Some
have their own experience being served under the statute; others (at least those in public schools)
likely saw the statute at work in their schools with certain of their classmates.141 The IDEA142

138

See, e.g., Zukle v. Regents of University of California, 166 F.3d 1041(9th Cir. 1999)
(dismissed medical student). With regard to the otherwise qualified requirement, this court
announced a burden shifting framework:
“the plaintiff-student bears the initial burden of producing evidence that she is otherwise
qualified. This burden includes the burden of producing evidence of the existence of a
reasonable accommodation that would enable her to meet the educational institution's
essential eligibility requirements. The burden then shifts to the educational institution to
produce evidence that the requested accommodation would require a fundamental or
substantial modification of its program or standards. The school may also meet its
burden by producing evidence that the requested accommodations, regardless of whether
they are reasonable, would not enable the student to meet its academic standards.
However, the plaintiff-student retains the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she
is otherwise qualified.”
Id. at 1047.
139

See infra note 407 and accompanying text.

140

At the law school where the author is a member of the faculty, the faculty recently
reaffirmed its commitment in admissions to diversity by deciding to consider a number of forms
of diversity in applicants, including disability. The law faculty has not decided to give special
consideration to disability or other diversity factors in readmissions decisions.
141

Disability evaluators also tend to be more familiar with and oriented to the IDEA than
to the laws governing higher education students. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
142

20 U.S.C. §§1401-1461.
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took effect with the 1978-79 school year.143
The statutes are set up quite differently; the IDEA is publicly funded;144 Section 504 and
the ADA are unfunded mandates.145 The IDEA applies to public preK-12 schools;146 as applied
to higher education Section 504 and the ADA apply to both public and private schools.147 The
IDEA’s approach to eligibility and substantive entitlements is markedly different than that of the
higher education statutes. Understandably, law students have expectations about coverage and
services in law school based on their earlier experience with the IDEA.
1.

Eligibility. Under the IDEA, a diagnosis of an impairment such as a

learning disability or ADD is normally sufficient to qualify for services. The IDEA defines
covered students as those aged 3 to 21, who are diagnosed with one or more of a statutory list of
disabilities, and who need special education instruction.148 The group of IDEA-eligible students
is thus both broader and narrower than the group of higher education students covered by Section
504 and the ADA. On the one hand, Section 504 and the ADA potentially cover impairments
not on the IDEA’s statutory list, as well as past and perceived impairments. On the other hand,
IDEA eligibility determinations are based primarily on a diagnosis, rather than the student’s level

143

The preK-12 regulations for Section 504 were modeled on and are quite similar ot the
IDEA. 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.31-104.38.
144

See 20 U.S.C. § 1411 (allotting funds for special education).

145

The ADA is Commerce Clause legislation. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (b)(4). Section 504
is a condition on the receipt of federal education funds. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (a).
146

See 20 U.S.C. § 1413 (requirements for local educational agencies).

147

See infra notes 17- 24 and accompanying text.

148

20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(3); 1412(a)(1).
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of functioning, which has become primary under Section 504 and the ADA.
The IDEA’s approach to eligibility is largely subjective. It involves no “substantial
limitation” analysis. A diagnosed student is IDEA-eligible unless she functions so well that she
does not need special education instruction,149 and no level of student functioning is too low for
IDEA eligibility.150 Thus, a gifted student with a learning disability or attention deficit disorder
may well be eligible if the disability limits the student’s ability to achieve her potential.151 The
typical evaluation approach for learning disabilities under the IDEA is even more subjective; a
requirement for diagnosing a learning disability is a significant gap between the individual
student’s intellectual ability (normally via an IQ test) with the persons’s measured
achievement.152
Schools have responsibility for identification and documentation of eligibility under the
IDEA and the preK-12 Section 504 regulations; they must seek out, evaluate at school expense,

149

20 U.S.C. § 1401(3) (ii).

150

See., e.g., Timothy W. v. Rochester, New Hampshire, Sch. Dist., 875 F.2d 954
(1st Cir.1989) (IDEA is a zero-reject statute; no student is so low-functioning as to be ineligible;
profoundly retarded and multiply handicapped student whom school’s experts opine has no
functioning cerebral cortex and thus cannot engage in higher order thinking is eligible under the
IDEA).
151

See, e.g., West Chester Area Sch. Dist. v. Bruce and Suzanne C., 194 F.Supp.2d 417
(E.D.Pa. 2002) (ADD student with high verbal IQ and much lower reading, spelling and math
reasoning skills who is earning passing but not excellent grades is IDEA-eligible).
152

34 C.F.R. § 300.541(a)(2); see Lisa Eichhorn, Reasonable Accommodations and
Awkward Compromises: Issues Concerning Learning Disabled Students and Professional
Schools in the Law School Context, 26 J. LAW & EDUC. 31, 34 (1997) (also providing a
thorough overview of diagnosis, nature, and possible accommodations for students with learning
disabilities).
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and identify eligible students.153 As discussed earlier, under Section 504 and the ADA, higher
education students have the burdens of identification, documentation, and requesting
accommodations.154
2.

Protection from punishment for disability-related behavior. There is no

“otherwise qualified” analysis under the IDEA limiting eligibility for students whose disabilities
prevent them from meeting a school’s standards. In fact, IDEA students are protected from
discipline for conduct related to their disability.155 An IDEA student cannot be punished,
particularly in the form of suspension or expulsion, for behavior that is a manifestation of his
disability.156 While most discipline under the IDEA is nonacademic (public preK-12 schools do
not academically dismiss students), this rule applies to all discipline. In contrast, Section 504
“forbids discrimination based on stereotypes about a handicap, but it does not forbid decisions
based on the actual attributes of the handicap.”157
3.

Substantive entitlements. In stark contrast to the “academic adjustments”

required for higher education students, the IDEA (as well as the substantive Section 504
provisions for preK-12 public school students) establish a right to a “free appropriate public

153

20 U.S.C. § 1412 (a)(3) (IDEA); 34 C.F.R. §104.32 (Section 504 preK-12 public
school regulations).
154

See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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20 U.S.C. §1415(k).
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Id. at §1415(k)(4), (5); see also Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S.345 (1986).
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Anderson v. University of Wisconsin, 841 F.2d 737, 740 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing Davis).
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education”158 in the “least restrictive environment.”159 Under the IDEA these obligations are met
by having a team of persons, including the parents, prepare an Individual Education Program
(IEP) for the student, in order to ensure that the student received the FAPE to which each IDEAcovered student is statutorily entitled. IEPs often include extensive personal instructional and
other services such as speech and language therapy, occupational and physical therapy, and
counseling, tutoring and personal aides, and even placement in a private school at the public
school’s expense.160 This experience creates expectations about eligibility and levels of required
services in higher education which are at odds with what the federal disability discrimination
statutes actually offer to higher education students.161
4.

Enforcement. Perhaps in part because of mistrust of schools based on

their past failings in dealing with preK-12 students with disabilities, Congress chose to set up an
elaborate, adversarial system in the IDEA for parents to challenge schools’ judgments.162 This
dispute resolution system includes an administrative hearing process for IDEA complaints
presided over by impartial hearing officers trained in both law and special education.163 Courts
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34 C.F.R. §104.33(a) (Section 504); 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1) (IDEA).
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34 C.F.R. §104.34(a) (Section 504); 20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(5) (IDEA).
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See 34 C.F.R. § 300.24 (defining related services to include various therapies and
counseling); 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (10) (placement in private schools).
161

Between their IDEA years and law school, students have of course been to college,
where they have had experience with the reduced entitlements of higher education students with
disabilities.
162

See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1415. States must make a complaint process available, as
well as mediation and administrative hearings.
163

20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3).
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hearing IDEA cases do so somewhat in the manner of hearing an administrative appeal of the
hearing officer’s decision, receiving the record and decision from the administrative hearing,
although in contrast to administrative appeals courts hearing IDEA cases may take additional
evidence.164 While money damages are generally not available for IDEA violations, attorney’s
fees are available to prevailing parents.165
5.

Impact of the IDEA on law student perspectives. Law students, including

those who participated in the IDEA, performed well enough academically to go on to enroll in
and graduate from college, and did well enough there and on the LSAT to be accepted to law
school. Acceptance to law school conveys to prospective law students that they have the ability
to succeed in law school,166 although law faculty are well aware that not everyone, including
some very bright persons, can master the unusual mode of analysis, often referred to as “thinking
like a lawyer,” that is at the heart of lawyering.
Such students enter law school with a history of academic success, some with significant
support under the IDEA, and a belief that they will continue to succeed. Once in law school, the
amount and level of work is significantly higher than most have encountered before, but for
those with impairments, the level of support is much lower than before. Some students who
were served under the IDEA in fact will not be persons with a disability under Section 504 and
the ADA, perhaps because they did not self-identify and document an impairment, or perhaps
because the impairment, with mitigators, does not substantially limit a major life activity and

164

20 U.S.C. § 1415 (i)(2)(C).

165

20 U.S.C. § 1415 (i)(3).

166

Law school accreditation standards limit law schools to admitting students the school
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thus does not amount to a statutory disability. A number of such students are bright enough to
have succeeded prior to law school without any participation in special education or
accommodations. For law students who are covered by the federal disability discrimination
statutes, the accommodations offered are often much more meager than the services provided
under their IDEA IEP.
It is likely that at no point in their pre-K-12 education has such a student’s impairment
been a barrier to academic participation, since the IDEA is a zero-reject statute, and special
statutory rules prohibit discipline for behavior related to the student’s disability. Moreover, the
vague higher education statutory language about what is required in terms of academic
adjustments/accommodations, in concert with the kinds of services that were available under the
IDEA, may cause frustration on the student’s part that assistance perceived to be both necessary
and legally required is not being provided by the law school. Other students who have never
been served or diagnosed as a person with a disability, find themselves struggling, paying for an
expert evaluation, and being told by the expert that they have a “disability” that has contributed
to their current academic struggles. These students may well assume that the diagnosed
“disability” means they are entitled to extensive services under disability laws.
When law students do not earn the minimum GPA required by the law school and are
dismissed, it is devastating. Most students have taken out significant loans to finance their
education.167 Of course, most unhappily for the student, the dismissal means they likely will not

believes will be academically successful. See infra Section VI.A.2.
167

Cf. Milam and Marshall, infra note 169 at 335 & n. 4 (most dismissal litigation
involves medical schools because of “financial investment and potential loss”).
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have a career as an attorney.168 Requesting new or different accommodations for an impairment
than what they received from the law school in the past, whether the impairment is one the
student has known about or is newly diagnosed as part of the readmissions process, perhaps
accompanied by an evaluator’s prediction of success if the accommodations are provided, offers
dismissed students a concrete basis for their belief that they will be successful if readmitted. It
also provides a legal basis for challenging the school’s decision if it is not in their favor.
However, as Parts IV and V of the Article explain, in the vast majority of cases, students
pursuing such claims will not get past summary judgment, as the court will defer to their
school’s academic judgment that the student should not be readmitted.
IV. JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO ACADEMIC DECISIONS BY HIGHER EDUCATION AUTHORITIES
There is a tradition of U.S. Supreme Court deference to higher education authorities’
academic judgments.169 This tradition spans several decades and was recently reaffirmed in the
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Id. at 347 (“Presumably, students who have invested substantial time and money in a
graduate or professional program, and who exhibit academic inadequacies throughout their
enrollment are most likely to sue universities for academic dismissals. Such students expect to
complete their education and practice their chosen profession. Indeed, the school has allowed
them to continue their education in the belief that they will receive a degree. The university’s
refusal to allow them to continue or to award a degree often results in litigation. On the other
hand, the academically inadequate student whom the university dismisses from the program
early does not have the same emotional, financial and personal investment. . . . [and] is less
likely to initiate a lawsuit. ”). In the author’s experience, dismissed students rarely believe they
are not capable of succeeding, if they are offered another chance.
169

For more thorough overviews of deference to higher education decisions than this
Article affords, see Steven Milam and Rebecca Marshall, Impact of Regents of the University of
Michigan v. Ewing on Academic Dismissals from Graduate and Professional Schools, 13 J.
COLLEGE & UNIV. L. 335 (1987); Anne Dupre, Disability, Deference and the Integrity of the
Academic Enterprise, 32 GA. L. REV. 393 (1998) (comparing the lack of deference under the
IDEA with the deference accorded universities, and arguing that, in part because of expertise,
preK-12 schools also deserve the deference accorded higher education judgments); Edward
Stoner and Michael Showalter, Judicial Deference to Educational Judgment: Justice O’Connor’s
-45-

University of Michigan affirmative action cases. Although the Court has not yet specifically
heard a case in which a dismissed student made a disability discrimination claim, this deference
has been extended to academic judgments even in the contexts of constitutional and
discrimination claims, as well as to claims by academically dismissed students,170 strongly
suggesting the Court would offer the same deference to a readmissions decision in the context of
a disability discrimination claim.
In the 1970's, in Board of Curators of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz
(“Horowitz”),171 the Court rejected procedural and substantive due process claims by a medical
school student who had been academically dismissed for unsatisfactory work in her clinical
rotations.172 As to procedural due process requirements, the Court relied upon the medical
school’s notice to the student of her insufficient academic progress and the “careful and
Opinion in Grutter Reapplies Longstanding Principles, as Shown by Rulings Involving College
Students In the Eighteen Months Before Grutter, 30 J. COLL. & UNIV. L. 583, 614 (2004).
170

For a discussion of lower court deference to academic dismissal decisions not
involving disability, see K.B. Melear, The Contractual Relationship Between Student and
Institution: Disciplinary, Academic, and Consumer Contexts, 30 J. COLL. & UNIV. L. 175, 196199 (2003).
171

435 U.S. 78 (1978).

172

The student was nearing the end of medical school, id. at 81, and some of the specific
issues underlying her academic failure were not purely academic (see id., noting “erratic
attendance” and “lack[] [of] a critical concern for hygiene” as specific reasons for rating the
student’s clinical performance as unsatisfactory). As one commentator has noted, the dismissal
in Horowitz may thus be characterized as less than purely academic, but the Court still found the
decision was owed deference. Fernand Dutile, Disciplinary versus Academic Sanctions in
Higher Education: A Doomed Dichotomy?, 29 J. COLL. & UNIV. L. 619,627 (2003) (despite
Supreme Court statements to the contrary in fact there is no bright line between academic and
nonacademic bases for punishment; for example, the commentator asks whether a grade of F in a
course for either not meeting attendance requirements or for cheating, causing a student’s GPA
to fall below the required minimum, is really an academic dismissal; suggesting that at least
rudimentary due process be extended to academic decisions and that deference to nonacademic
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deliberate” nature of the school’s decision, which was made by a committee and reviewed by the
faculty and administration.173 The Court found that the “significant difference between the
failure of a student to meet academic standards and the violation by a student of valid rules of
conduct” “calls for far less stringent procedural requirements in the case of an academic
dismissal.”174

In contrast to discipline, in which the Court’s precedent required some sort of

hearing, the Court held that in academic dismissals, a hearing was not required,175 in part because
“the school considers and weighs a variety of factors,”176 and academic judgments require
“expert evaluation of cumulative information.”177
As to substantive due process, the Court noted the subjective nature of the academic
dismissal decision and its resulting unsuitability for close judicial review:
[t]he decision to dismiss . . . rested plainly on the academic judgment of school officials
that she did not have the necessary clinical ability to perform adequately as a medical
doctor and was making insufficient progress toward that goal. Such a judgment is by its
nature more subjective and evaluative than the . . . average disciplinary decision. Like
the decision of an individual professor as to the proper grade for a student in his court, the
determination whether to dismiss a student for academic reasons requires an expert
evaluation of cumulative information and is not readily adapted to the procedural tools of

decisions is sometimes appropriate ).
173

435 U.S. at 85.

174

Id. at 86. With regard to the student’s claim that due process required an adversary
hearing, a claim the appeals court had adopted, the Court noted that “We stop short, however, of
requiring full trial-type procedures in such situations. A graduate or professional school is, after
all, the best judge of its students’ academic performance and their ability to master the required
curriculum.” Id. at 85 n.2.
175

Id. at 89-90.

176

Id. at 91 n.6

177

Id. at 90.
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judicial or administrative decisionmaking.178
The Court also found that judicial second-guessing of academic decisions could well be harmful
to the faculty student relationship:
The educational process is not by nature adversary; instead it centers around a continuing
relationship between faculty and students, ‘one in which the teacher must occupy many
roles – educator, adviser, friend, and, at times, parent-substitute. . . .This is especially true
as one advances through the varying regimes of the educational system, and the
instruction becomes both more individualized and more specialized. . . . We decline to
further enlarge the judicial presence in the academic community and thereby risk
deterioration of many beneficial aspects of the faculty-student relationship.179
Finally, the Court noted that historically, control of education was the province of
the states rather than the federal courts.180
As to any review of the merits of the decision, the Court found that “[e]ven assuming that
the courts . . . can review an academic decision of a public educational institution,” a showing of
arbitrariness or capriciousness would be required.181 Without discussion, the Horowitz Court
found no evidence of arbitrariness or capriciousness by the medical school.182
In the 1980's the Court heard claim by a dismissed student in Regents of the University of

178

Id. at 90 (emphasis added). Later, the Court noted that “Courts are particularly illequipped to evaluate academic performance.” Id. at 92.
179

Id. at 90.

180

Id. at 91 (citation omitted) (noting that “[b]y and large, public education in our Nation
is committed to the control of state and local authorities”).
181
182

Id. at 91-92.

Id. at 92 and nn.7-8 (adopting trial court’s finding on this issue, and noting that the
medical school had followed its own procedures and handled the plaintiff’s case no differently
than other such cases).
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Michigan v. Ewing (“Ewing”)183 who had failed the Boards Step 1 exam taken after the fourth
year of his school’s special six year B.A.-M.D. program.184 A nine-member committee voted
unanimously to dismiss the student after “considering the record in some detail,” including the
student’s report of circumstances which caused his failure: his mother’s heart attack a year and a
half earlier, and the end of a romantic relationship six months earlier.185 The student claimed
that the school’s refusal to let him retake the Boards, when all other students who failed the exam
were allowed to do so, and a school pamphlet stated that if a student failed the Boards, “an
opportunity is provided to make up the failure in a second exam,” was arbitrary and capricious in
violation of his substantive due process rights.186
Reversing the appeals court,187 the Court again reserved the question of whether
academic judgments would be reviewed for arbitrariness and capriciousness, finding no
arbitrariness or capriciousness in the university’s dismissal decision.188 As in Horowitz, the
Ewing Court found that the school used fair procedures and saw no evidence of bad faith in the

183

474 U.S. 214 (1985).

184

Id. at 216. The medical school refused to allow the student to retake the test. Id. at

215.
185

Id. at 216 and n.2. The trial court noted the student’s history of academic problems,
including many “marginal” (C and C-) grades, incompletes, repeated courses, delayed
examinations, makeup examinations, appealed grades, reduced course loads, and a leave of
absence. Id. at 217 n.4.
186

Id. at 219. The student’s score of 235 was well below the required score of 380, and
the national average of 500, and was the lowest score ever received by a student in the B.A.M.D. program. Id. at 216.
187

Id. at 221.

188

Id. at 222-223.
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decision.189 As in Horowitz, the Ewing Court found that the “faculty’s decision was made
conscientiously and with careful deliberation, based upon the entirety of Ewing’s academic
career,”190 and the committee that made the decision was “especially well situated to make the
necessarily subjective judgment” since it was in a unique position to observe him.191 This
careful, expert and holistic dismissal decision counseled judicial deference:
When judges are asked to review the substance of a genuinely academic decision, such as
this one, they should show great respect for the faculty’s professional judgment. [footnote
omitted] Plainly, they may not override it unless it is such a substantial departure from
accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did
not actually exercise professional judgment.192
The Ewing Court also reiterated the basis in federalism for judicial deference to (public
school) academic judgments193 and introduced the idea that academic freedom also indicated
deference to academic judgments,194 noting that
[a]cademic freedom thrives not only on the independent and uninhibited exchange of
ideas among teachers and students, . . . .but also, and somewhat inconsistently, on
autonomous decision making by the academy itself. . . . Discretion to determine, on
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Id. at 225 (“It is important to remember that this is not a case in which the procedures
used by the University were unfair in any respect; quite the contrary is true. Nor can the Regents
be accused of concealing nonacademic or constitutionally impermissible reasons for expelling
Ewing; the District Court found that the Regents acted in good faith.”).
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Id. at 225.

191

Id. at 228 (Powell, J., concurring).

192

Id. at 225 (citing Horowitz: “University faculties must have the widest range of
discretion in making judgments as to the academic performance of students and their entitlement
to promotion or graduation.”)
193
194

Id. at 229-230 (Powell, J., concurring).

Id. at 226. For an overview and history of the case law on academic freedom, see
Cheryl Cameron, Laura Meyers, and Steven Olswang, Academic Bills of Rights: Conflict in the
Classroom, 31 J. COLL. & UNIV. L. 243 (2005).
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academic grounds, who may be admitted to study, has been described as one of the ‘four
essential freedoms’ of a university.195
A prior case identified these four “essential freedoms” of a university: “ to determine for itself on
academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be
admitted to study.”196
The deference paid to the school’s judgment by the Ewing Court may be even greater
than that accorded in Horowitz. With the school’s pattern and practice of allowing students a
second opportunity to pass the Boards, even some students with many incomplete or low grades,
the Ewing Court found that while “it may well have been unwise to deny Ewing a second
chance,”197 dismissing him “was not beyond the pale of reasoned academic decision-making
when viewed against the background of his entire career at [the University.]”198 In a footnote the
Court indicated that rejecting Ewing’s reported causes of his failure was not “irrational,”199 as
the school might have had interpreted these causes as “inability to handle stress, . . .lack of

195

Id. at 226 n.12.

196

Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(emphasis added). One commentator notes that the disability discrimination statutes seem to be
drafted and interpreted to protect academic freedom; specifically, the limits on prohibited
discrimination such as the otherwise qualified requirement and the idea that reasonable
accommodations do not include those which alter a school’s academic standards. He suggests
that without these limitations, or if disability-based affirmative action were required, academic
freedom would be impaired. James Leonard, Judicial Deference to Academic Standards under
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Titles II and II of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
75 NEBR. L. REV. 27, 55-57 (1996).
197

Id. at 227 (noting that a second attempt at the Boards might have averted the
litigation).
198

Id. at 227-228.

199

Id. at 227 n.13.
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judgment and an inability to set priorities” which may have caused concerns about Ewing’s
ability to succeed as a practicing doctor.200 The Court also found that the school’s pattern and
practice of second chances to pass the Boards did not mean that the school “deviated from
accepted academic norms” in refusing Ewing a second chance at the exam.201 The Court noted
Ewing’s overall record, and that the school “was uniquely positioned to observe Ewing’s
judgment, self-discipline, and ability to handle stress, and was thus especially well-situated to
make the necessarily subjective judgment of Ewing’s prospects for success in the medical
profession.”202
Horowitz and Ewing did not involve discrimination claims, either statutory or
constitutional. In between these decisions, however, the Court decided a discrimination case
involving a student with a disability pursuing a career as a health care professional. In
Southeastern Community College v. Davis (“Davis”),203 a student was denied admission to a
nursing program squarely because of her disability: a severe204 hearing impairment. The school
determined this impairment prevented her from successfully and safely participating in the
clinical portion of her training, as well as being successful in nursing positions such as those in

200

Id.

201

Id. at 228 n.14.

202

Id. at 228 n.14 (also noting that the school had dismissed some other students before
allowing them to take the Boards).
203
204

442 U.S. 397 (1979).

With a hearing aid, Davis could detect some sounds but could not understand spoken
words without lipreading. Id. at 401.
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the operating room or ICU where doctors and nurses are masked,205 and thus made her not
“otherwise qualified” for admission despite her undisputed impairment. The student claimed
disability discrimination in violation of Section 504 and the Constitution. In its first Section 504
case,206 the Court cited Section 504 regulations defining “qualified” for higher education
students as meeting the school’s “academic and technical standards,”207 which the Court found
included “necessary physical qualifications.”208 Rejecting the student’s arguments that with
extra faculty supervision and waiver of some required courses she could succeed in certain
office-based nursing positions, the Court instead appeared to defer to the school’s judgment. The
court found that the special faculty supervision required for the student would amount to the
“individualized,” “personal” aids and services which Section 504 regulations explicitly said
were not required academic adjustments,209 and that waiver of the clinical coursework would be
a “fundamental alteration in the nature of [the] program” which also went beyond statutory
requirements.210 Similar to but less explicitly than in Horowitz and Ewing, the Davis Court
appeared to give some deference to the school’s decision that it could not offer the requested
academic adjustments and admit the student, relying in part on the lack of evidence of any
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Id. at 401-402. This decision was reviewed and affirmed by the entire nursing school

stafff. Id.
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See Id. at 405.

207

Id. at 406 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(3), now codified as 34 C.F.R. § 104.3).

208

Id. at 407.

209

Id. at 409 (citing 45 C.F.R. §84.44(a), now codified at 34 C.F.R. §104.44).

210

Id. at 409-410.
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“animus against handicapped individuals,”211 and the consistency of the school’s mission to train
students for all nursing positions with that of other nursing schools,212 although doing so might
have been inconsistent with some nursing licensing standards:
Southeastern’s program, structured to train persons who will be able to perform all
normal roles of a registered nurse, represents a legitimate academic policy, and is
accepted by the State. In effect, it seeks to ensure that no graduate will pose a danger to
the public in any professional role in which he or she might be case. Even if . . .licensing
requirements . . . are less demanding, nothing in the Act requires an educational
institution to lower its standards.213
The Court concluded that “[n]othing in the language or history of § 504 reflects an intention to
limit the freedom of an educational institution to require reasonable physical qualifications for
admission to a clinical training program.”214 The Court has taken a similar approach with regard
to employment, suggesting that an accommodation for an employee with a disability is not
reasonable if it conflicts with a major workplace rule which is disability-neutral, such as a
seniority system, unless the employee shows waiver would be reasonable in her particular
case.215
Much more recently, the Court deferred to a law school’s academic judgment in the
context of performing the demanding strict scrutiny analysis applied to claims of unconstitutional
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Id. at 413.
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Id.

213

Id. at 413 n.12.

214

Id. at 414.

215

U.S. Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 405 (2002) (waiver of seniority system as
accommodation is not a reasonable accommodation unless employee shows otherwise in her
particular case).
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race discrimination. In Grutter v. Bollinger (“Grutter”),216 the University of Michigan Law
School’s race conscious admissions program was challenged by rejected white students as race
discrimination in violation of the Constitution and Title VI.217 The law school’s detailed written
admissions policy, written and unanimously approved by the law school faculty, required
subjective and holistic review of applications by admissions officials, with consideration of
many enumerated factors including race. The law school sought a diverse class with a “critical
mass of minority students” both for academic reasons (to “promote ‘cross-racial understanding’,”
to “break down racial stereotypes,” and to make possible the “livelier, more spirited, and simply
more enlightening and interesting” discussion when a class consists of students with the “greatest
possible variety of backgrounds,”)218 and to prepare a group of future leaders who are well
prepared to deal with a diverse society.219
A majority of the Court found that these judgments were not only owed deference, citing
Horowitz and Ewing, but amounted to a compelling interest sufficient for the first part of
constitutional strict scrutiny analysis:
The Law School’s educational judgment that such diversity is essential to its educational
mission is one to which we will defer. . . . Our scrutiny of the interest asserted by the Law
School is no less strict for taking into account complex educational judgments in an area
that lies primarily within the expertise of the university. Our holding today is in keeping
with our tradition of giving a degree of deference to a university’s academic decisions,
within constitutionally proscribed limits. We have long recognized that, given the
important purpose of public education and the expansive freedoms of speech and thought
216

539 U.S. 306 (2003).

217

Id. at 317.

218

Id. at 330.

219

Id. at 331-332.
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associated with the university environment, universities occupy a special niche in our
constitutional tradition.220
In addition to reiterating the lack of expertise courts bring to review of academic
decisions as noted immediately above, the Grutter Court also noted the academic freedom basis
for its deference to the Michigan Law School faculty’s academic judgment,221 and concluded that
“‘good faith’ on the part of a university is ‘presumed’ absent ‘a showing to the contrary.’”222
In the undergraduate University of Michigan affirmative action case, Gratz v. Bollinger
(“Gratz”),223 the Court reiterated its general holding in Grutter that diversity could be a
compelling reason for higher education admissions.224 The Court did not specifically find,
however, that the undergraduate policy, which was apparently promulgated by University
admissions officers rather than academics,225 and did not rest on any specifically identified
educational basis, was owed deference or rose to the level of a compelling state interest.
Moreover, the point system used in the undergraduate admissions process, which assigned 20
points to racial diversity and various points to GPA, SAT, and other factors, and admitted
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Id. at 328-329 (citing Ewing, Horowitz, and Justice Powell’s concurrence in Bakke). In
Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), a groundbreaking earlier case
involving affirmative action a majority of the Court did not discuss deference, but Justice Powell
did in a concurring opinion. Id. at 312-313 (Powell, J., concurring).
221

Id. at 329 (noting in part that “[w]e have long recognized that, given the important
purpose of public education and the expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with
the university environment, universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition.”)
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Id. (citation omitted).
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539 U.S. 244 (2003).

224

Id. at 268.
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Id. at 253 (“University’s Office of Undergraduate Admissions . . . oversees the . . .
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students whose point total was at least 100,226 was not described by the Court as an “educational
judgment” as was the subjective, holistic whole file review performed by the Law School. The
Gratz Court quoted Justice Powell’s concurrence in Bakke which “emphasized the importance of
considering each particular applicant as an individual, assessing all the qualities that individual
possesses, and in turn, evaluating that individual’s ability to contribute to the unique setting of
higher education.”227 One commentator aptly sums up the Gratz majority opinion as holding that
the “undergraduate college’s reliance on one single factor – race – was not the exercise of careful
and deliberate educational judgment to which the judicial process might defer228. . . . There will
be judicial deference to careful and deliberate educationally informed decision-making on
campus but not to decisions in which educational judgment is not used.”229 This commentator
contrasts the Law School’s “multifactored, individualized analysis of every candidate, in which
the [Admissions] committee was allowed to rely on its years of experience to conduct a highly
complex task” with the automatic point awards at the undergraduate level which “did not require
application of any educational judgment.”230
These cases show a pattern of academic deference by the Court to higher education

admissions process . . . . using written guidelines for each academic year”).
226

Id. at 255.

227

Id. at 271 (citation omitted).

228

Edward Stoner and Michael Showalter, Judicial Deference to Educational Judgment:
Justice O’Connor’s Opinion in Grutter Reapplies Longstanding Principles, as Shown by Rulings
Involving College Students In the Eighteen Months Before Grutter, 30 J. COLL. & UNIV. L. 583,
614 (2004).
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Id. at 615.
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Id. at 615-616.
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academic decisions which is consistent in its underlying basis: the complex and subjective nature
of these decisions, protection of the student-teacher relationship, courts’ lack of expertise,
academic freedom, and federalism concerns. The Court has also consistently deferred to
academic decisions across contexts, including both constitutional (Horowitz, Ewing, and Grutter)
and discrimination (Grutter and Davis) claims, in decisions not to admit students (Davis and
Grutter) and to dismiss them (Horowitz and Ewing), as well as what accommodations to make
for a student with a disability(Davis), establishment of general academic standards (Grutter) and
applying them to individual students (Horowitz, Ewing, and Davis).
In several cases (Horowitz and Ewing, as well as the faculty-established admissions
standards in Grutter), the Court has noted the school’s careful decision-making process, perhaps
suggesting that such care might be a condition of judicial deference. In Ewing, the Court
rejected the student’s attempt to use pattern evidence, pointing to allegedly dissimilar treatment
of other students, as a basis for not deferring to the school’s judgment to dismiss him, but
suggested in Ewing that evidence of improper process or bad faith would be different. In its
most recent case, Grutter, the Court seemed to find it significant that the full faculty approved
the admissions standards in question. In all of the cases the decisions were made by a faculty
committee or by the full faculty, rather than administrators or other officials such as the
admissions officials who established the point-based undergraduate admissions found by the
Gratz court to amount to unconstitutional race discrimination.
The Court consistently noted with apparent approval the use of context and personal
knowledge to make the decisions: the students’ entire academic records in Horowitz, Ewing, and
Davis, the school’s experience educating the students in Horowitz and Ewing, and the needs of
-58-

the law school and society in Grutter. Finally, the Court appeared willing to characterize
“academic” decisions and the considerations which underlie them and thus merit deference
broadly: the attendance and hygiene concerns in Horowitz, determining that handling stress,
judgment, self-discipline, and setting priorities were important qualifications for successful
practice as a physician in Ewing, safety considerations in Davis, and preparing future leaders of
society and breaking down racial stereotypes in Grutter.
Not surprisingly, lower courts have followed the Supreme Court’s lead and deferred in
most cases to the academic decisions of higher education faculty. Commentators reviewing
these decisions offer a variety of reasons for this deference, including academic freedom, courts’
lack of expertise in academic matters, the inherent subjectivity of such decisions, the special,
nonadversarial relationship between university and student, and perhaps the idea that universities
are a “separate realm” whose working is not well understood by courts.231 Review of these
lower court decisions also reveals patterns: courts hearing student challenges to school academic
decisions tend to defer if 1) the school used and adhered to fair processes to make its decision,
including some articulated basis for the decision, 2) there is a reasonable or rational basis for the
decision, and 3) there is no evidence of bad faith by the school.232
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James Leonard, Judicial Deference to Academic Standards under Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act and Titles II and II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 75 NEBR. L. REV.
27, 57-60 (1996) (explaining basis of doctrine of academic abstention).
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See generally Steven Milam and Rebecca Marshall, Impact of Regents of the
University of Michigan v. Ewing on Academic Dismissals from Graduate and Professional
Schools, 13 J. COLL. & UNIV. L. 335 (1987); Fernand Dutile, Disciplinary versus Academic
Sanctions in Higher Education: A Doomed Dichotomy?, 29 J. COLL. & UNIV. L. 619,643-648
(2003); Anne Dupre, Disability, Deference and the Integrity of the Academic Enterprise, 32 GA.
L. REV. 393 (1998) (discussing deference specifically in the context of disability claims); James
Leonard, Judicial Deference to Academic Standards under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
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V. ACADEMIC 233 DISMISSAL READMISSIONS CASES AND OCR OPINION LETTERS
A.

Law school readmissions process and standards
1.

Academic dismissal criteria. Law schools are governed primarily by their

faculty,234 which operate by majority vote. By vote of the faculty, law schools typically enact
academic rules requiring students to maintain a minimum cumulative GPA. While the
establishment of a minimum GPA is a discretionary decision, its application to specific students
is objective and ministerial: students who do not achieve the minimum GPA are dismissed from
the law school and are no longer enrolled students. Dismissals most often occur at the end of the
first year of law school. Because the actual dismissal “decision” is normally a ministerial one
based on a student’s failure to achieve a disability-neutral minimum GPA standard, there is

and Titles II and II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 75 NEBR. L. REV. 27 (1996) (extended
discussion of deference in the context of disability claims).
233

This Article examines disability discrimination claims in the context of readmissions
requests by students who have been dismissed for academic reasons (i.e. failure to maintain
minimum required grades). Discussion of disability discrimination claims by students dismissed
for nonacademic reasons (e.g. misconduct) is beyond the scope of this article. For examples of
such nonacademic claims, however, see Gonzaga University, 27 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 286
(OCR 2003) (university did not engage in disability discrimination when it permanently
suspended law student with history of mental illness for “continued threatening and harassing
behavior,” including “harassing and threatening telephone calls to . . . faculty and other
students,” “impersonation of another student” and “threats of bodily harm” which violated
university conduct code); University of Idaho, 13 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 127 (OCR 1998)
(finding no disability discrimination where student with emotional, cognitive and physical
disabilities was suspended for one year for failing to disclose criminal history on his application,
and penalty for nondisclosure was not inconsistent with discipline imposed on students without
disabilities). These OCR opinions suggest that where the student is dismissed for violating some
general conduct rule which is applied consistently to all students, with or without disabilities, and
where the school considers disability information as appropriate in applying the rule (for
example, in addressing relevant state of mind issues), it appears that nonacademic discipline does
not violate disability discrimination laws.
234

See infra notes 430-431 and accompanying text.
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generally no plausible basis for a student with a disability to challenge her dismissal.235
2.

Readmissions process and criteria. Many law schools offer academically

dismissed students a chance to petition in writing to be readmitted to the law school, with
supporting documentation of the student’s choosing. Other law schools provide no opportunity
to dismissed students to apply for readmission, at least if their GPA falls below a certain level.
The process and standards for readmission are generally established in an academic rule enacted
by vote of the law school’s faculty. Usually, a faculty committee reviews readmissions
applications and other relevant information such as the student’s entering LSAT and GPA
credentials, and seeks comments from the student’s teachers. Generally there is not a formal
hearing but the student has a chance to appear before the committee, in order to make a statement
and/or to answer questions from committee members. The law school faculty may delegate the
power to make readmissions decisions to this committee, or the committee may prepare a
recommendation for full faculty vote.
Standards for readmission generally center around two issues: 1) whether the student’s
failure was for a good reason or “extraordinary circumstances,” which will no longer be an
obstacle to the student’s success, and 2) whether the student will be successful if she is
readmitted. The student typically has the burden of proving she meets the readmission standard.
In contrast to the actual dismissal, application of these readmissions standards involves

235

Of course, if a law school sometimes waived minimum GPA requirements and did not
actually dismiss all students who did not earn the minimum required GPA, a student with a
disability could claim discrimination if that same law school refused to waive the GPA
requirement and dismissed her. Cf. Central Carolina Comm’y Coll., 31 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶
78 ) (OCR 2005) (OCR investigation determines veterinary technician program followed its own
policy of not permitting more than one readmission to any dismissed student; finds no
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discretion. Consequently, students can and have claimed that their law school’s readmissions
standard has been applied to them in a discriminatory way.
B.

Court cases addressing disability discrimination claims by academically dismissed
law students.

Eight236 published opinions involve academically dismissed law students denied
readmission claiming disability discrimination under federal statutes. Each of these eight cases
reached identical procedural results: summary judgment for the school,237 affirmed by the First,
Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits in each of the appealed cases.
The cases make it clear that a disability discrimination complaint does not provide an
opportunity to review the merits of a law school’s decision not to readmit a student who has been
dismissed for academic failure. Anti-discrimination laws such as Section 504 do not guarantee
correct decisions about persons with disabilities. What they do require is a decision which is not
the result of illegal discrimination. This is especially true in the context of a school’s academic
judgments about a student, a context in which, in Anderson v. University of Wisconsin
discrimination against dismissed student with disability who was refused a second readmission).
236

For another case brought by a law student with an alleged disability who had been
dismissed twice, but was offered readmission, see Colombini v. Members of the Board of
Directors of the Empire College School of Law, 2001 WL 1006785 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (granting
summary judgment to the school). In this case, the school and the student disagreed over the
precise accommodations the school would offer to the student, but the student did reenroll and
eventually graduated. The court in this case found insufficient evidence that the student had a
disability; he presented the school with letters from a psychiatrist referring to an unspecified
disability, id. at *6 and refused to get a second opinion at the school’s expense, id. at *1, nor
offered any evidence of failure to provide reasonable accommodations or other discrimination,
id. at *7.
237

See also Robinson v. Hamline University, 1994 WL 175019 (Minn. App. 1994)
(affirming summary judgment for law school in case brought by dismissed law student under
state discrimination law modeled on Section 504).
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(“Anderson,”) a federal appeals court notes, citing Horowitz and Ewing, that “[t]he Supreme
Court has repeatedly admonished courts to respect the academic judgments of university
faculties.”238
In Anderson, a law student who had been academically dismissed filed several claims
including disability discrimination. The student was an alcoholic239 with a troubled academic
history240 which included an incident in which he “harassed and threatened his legal writing
partner” while drunk and earned a D in that course.241 The student petitioned for readmission to a
committee, claiming drinking had caused his academic failure and that he was now in recovery.
The committee denied the petition, finding he still drank, was not prepared for the stress of law
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Anderson v. University of Wisconsin, 841 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing University
of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985) (rejecting claim by academically dismissed student),
University of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978) (rejecting claim by academically
dismissed medical school student). For another case where a court announced a policy of
deference to a law school’s readmission decision and affirmed a summary judgment for the
school, see Hash v. University of Kentucky, 138 S.W.2d 123, 127, 128 (Ky. App. 2004) (citing
Anderson, Horowitz and Ewing) (student with a disability who voluntarily withdrew from first
semester of law school before taking exams because of depression and then was denied
readmission in part because of references in his application materials to a mentally ill law student
who went on a shooting spree); id. at 126 n.4 (noting that “a law school is entitled to consider a
candidate’s psychological and emotional problems, as any mental impairment may be relevant to
the . . . ability to cope with the stresses of law school, . . . to deal with constant pressures from
other students and professors, and to withstand the demands associated with classroom
attendance and participation”); id. at 129 n.11 (where student has not requested accommodations,
failing to provide accommodations does not violate the law).
239

The school did not contest the student’s assertion that he was a statutorily covered
person with a disability by reason of his alcoholism, although no accommodations were
requested. Id.
240

His first semester grades were below the required average. Id. at 739. Moreover, he
had not documented receipt of an undergraduate degree, and was not allowed to finish his first
year. Id. He was allowed to return the next year, and then to withdraw. The next year he again
reenrolled, earned grades below the required minimum, and was dismissed. Id.
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school, and would not succeed if readmitted.242
Citing Davis, the Seventh Circuit found the student not otherwise qualified because his
grades did not meet the school’s required standards, although that failure may have been directly
caused by the alcoholism disability.243 The court found no evidence of discrimination even
though other students with somewhat lower grades had been readmitted and the student’s grade
were quite close to the required minimum,244 and in spite of an opinion offered by the student’s
counselor that the student could now handle law school.245
The court framed the issue before it:
[t]he question is not whether a court believes that [the student] could handle the work. It
is whether the University discriminated against him because of his handicap – that is,
excluded him even though it would have readmitted a student whose academic
performance and prospects were as poor but whose difficulties did not stem from a
“handicap.” . . . [T]he Rehabilitation Act requires only a stereotype-free assessment of
the person’s abilities and prospects rather than a correct decision.246
Applying this standard, and in spite of the counselor’s opinion, the appeals court affirmed
a summary judgment for the school. The court explained that
Nothing in the record suggests that the University’s decision was based on stereotypes

241

Id. at 739.
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Id. The student grieved the denial to a different committee, which also declined to
readmit him. Id.
243

Id.

244

Id. at 740.

245

Id. at 741.

246

Id. at 741 (footnote and citations omitted). The court noted the school had allowed the
student to re-enroll several times and to take courses in its business school, as well as his
drinking and subsequent misconduct toward a classmate, as evidence of a lack of hostility toward
the student. Id.
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about [the student’s disability] as opposed to honest judgments about how [the student]
had performed in fact and could be expected to perform.247
The court also noted that “[n]ot a shred of evidence in the record suggests that the University
held a stereotypical view of [the student’s disability]. The committees and the Vice Chancellor
looked, hard, at what [the student] had done and could do.”248
The court specifically rejected the student’s claim that a jury should hear the matter and
hopefully agree with the student’s counselor’s assessment that the student could now be
successful in law school:
The [Rehabilitation] Act does not designate a jury, rather than the faculty of the Law
School, to decide whether a would-be student is up to snuff. The Law School may set
standards for itself, and jurors unacquainted with the academic program of a law school
could not make the readmissions decision more accurately than the faculty of the Law
School; the process of litigation would change the substantive standard in addition to
raising the costs of litigation.249
The court concluded that “[l]aw schools may consider academic prospects and sobriety
when deciding whether an applicant is entitled to a scarce opportunity for an education. At all
events, the University acted on the basis of Anderson’s performance rather than his
condition.”250
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Id.

248

Id.
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Id.; see also Scott v. Western State University College of Law, 112 F.3d 517, 1997 WL
207599 (9th Cir. 1997) (table) (unpublished decision); cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1050 (1998)
(affirming summary judgment for law school where dismissed student claimed disability
discrimination; student who had been dismissed for academic failure was not otherwise
qualified, and student did not even assert a disability in initial request for readmission).
250

Id. at 742.
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Allison v. Howard University (“Allison”)251 involved the unfortunate situation of a law
student dismissed at the end of his third year, presumably after investing much time and money
in a legal career, after failing a 12-credit clinical course.252 Various law school committees
rejected an appeal of the clinic grade and five readmissions petitions.253 In his readmissions
petitions, the student informed the law school for the first time that he had a disability,
“temporary emotional distress” beginning in the fall of his third year.254 The court granted
summary judgment to the school and other defendants on all claims.255 As to the Section 504
claim, the court found that the student “likely would have serious difficulty” proving both that he
was a covered person with a disability, and that he was otherwise qualified for readmission.256
The court also found “not even a scintilla of evidence” that the student’s readmissions petitions
were denied solely by reason of his alleged disability, finding instead, citing Anderson, that the
student was denied readmission because of his academic performance.257 In granting summary
judgment on the claim that failure to offer accommodations, and to change the clinic grade,
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209 F. Supp.2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002).
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Id. at 58. The student had also done poorly in other courses. See id. (D’s in three
courses in the first semester of law school); id. at 58 n.3 (failing grade in Legal Writing III).
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Id. at 58.
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Id. It is unclear whether the student provided documentation of his condition or
merely asserted it.
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Id. at 63. The student sued the law school and the clinic professor who failed him,
claiming a violation of Section 504 by not readmitting him and by not offering reasonable
accommodations, as well as asserting constitutional and state law tort and contract claims. Id. at
56.
256

Id.
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amounted to breach of contract, the court cited Horowitz and Anderson and announced it would
defer to the law school’s judgments.258
In Gill v. Franklin Pierce Law Center (“Gill”),259 another third year law student was
dismissed after receiving poor grades. The student petitioned for readmission to a faculty
committee, which denied it, as did the full faculty on appeal, citing lack of ability to succeed and
an inadequate plan260 to address the cause of the failure.261 The student sued under Section 504,
noting that on his application’s personal statement he reported that he was an adult child of an
alcoholic.262 The court granted the school’s motion for summary judgment.263 The court found
no evidence that the student was otherwise qualified for readmission because he did not meet the
ability to succeed readmission standard.264 Citing precedent cases involving dismissed medical
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Id.
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Id. at 61 (citations to Horowitz and Anderson omitted).
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899 F. Supp. 850 (D.N.H. 1995).
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The student’s plan included quitting his part-time employment, a change in diet, a
study schedule, and “medita[tion] to overcome my anger at whatever institutional deficiencies I
see at [the law school].” Id. at 854-855.
261

Id. at 852. The Committee’s denial also noted other problems, from failure to timely
respond to the committee’s questions to noncompliance with various law school rules.
262

Id. at 851, 855. The student claimed he disclosed that he suffered from post traumatic
stress syndrome on his statement, but the court’s review of the statement indicated otherwise.
263

Id. at 857. The student was proceeding pro se and did not file a response to the
school’s motion. The school did not dispute, for purposes of its motion, the first element of the
prima facie case, that the student was a covered person with a disability. Under current law, the
school would appear to have had a strong argument that the student did not have a statutory
disability.
264

Id. at 855.
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students, the court also found that for students with disabilities, ability to succeed if readmitted
should be predicted with the provision of reasonable accommodations, if “the student ever put . .
. the school on notice of his handicap by making ‘a sufficiently and specific request for
accommodations.’”265 The court found that the disclosure on the students’s application’s
personal statement was insufficient to meet this standard.266 In another case involving the same
law school, the First Circuit affirmed a summary judgment for the school in a case brought by a
dismissed law student with diplopia, a vision impairment, finding no evidence that the decision
to dismiss was based on disability discrimination rather than the stated reason that the student
“lacked the analytic skills” necessary for law school success.267
In Scott v. Western State University College of Law (“Scott”),268 the Ninth Circuit
affirmed summary judgment for the law school on an academically dismissed first year law
student’s Section 504 and ADA Title III claims.269 The student claimed a disability for the first
time in his applications for readmission.270 The court found that the student’s academic

265

Id. at 854 (citing Wynne v. Tufts Medical School, 932 F.2d 19, 24-25 (1st Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1030 (1993); Nathanson v. Medical College of Pennsylvania, 926 F.2d
1368, 1381 (3rd Cir. 1991)).
266

Id.

267

Murphy v. Franklin Pierce Law Center, 56 F.3d 59 (1st Cir. 1995).

268

112 F.3d 517, 1997 WL 207599 (9th Cir. 1997) (table) (unpublished decision); cert.
denied, 522 U.S. 1050 (1998).
269

Id. at *2.

270

Id. at *1.
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dismissal rendered him not qualified.271 Moreover, since the school had no knowledge of the
alleged disability when it dismissed him, the court found that the dismissal could not have
resulted from disability discrimination.272 The student requested accommodations not specified
in the opinion; the court found that accommodations would not be required since they would
require the school to “lower or substantially modify [its] standards.”273
The most recent of this group of cases is Marlon v. Western New England College
(“Marlon”).274 In Marlon, a dismissed student was granted readmission and accommodations
consisting of a reduced course load, notetaking, taped classes, and extra time for and typing of
exams for newly disclosed disabilities of carpal tunnel syndrome, anxiety, depression, and panic
attacks.275 Despite the accommodations and taking classes for the second time, the student again
failed to earn the required grades.276 She then obtained a diagnosis of a learning disability and
requested additional accommodations, but this time was denied readmission, and sued.277 As

271

Id.

272

Id. The court’s reasoning is unconvincing here; the claim centered on the denial of
readmission rather than the ministerial “decision” to dismiss, and the school did have notice of
the claimed disability when it denied readmission.
273

Id.

274

2003 WL 22914304 (D. Mass. 2003) (awarding summary judgment to the law school);
aff’d, 29 Nat’l Disability L. Rep. ¶ 139 (1st Cir. 2005) (agreeing that the student did not have a
statutory disability).
275

Id. at *1-2.

276

Id.

277

Id. at *2-3. Claims were made under Section 504, the ADA, and state discrimination
law, asserting in part that the school failed to effectively implement her accommodations. Id. at
*5.
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discussed earlier in this Article, the court found that the student was not a covered person with a
disability under the federal statutes.278 The Marlon court also noted that the school was not on
notice of the learning disability until after the student had been dismissed for the second time,
and thus it could not be the basis for illegal discrimination.279 Finally, and as to the student’s
claim that the school regarded her as having a disability since it received a letter stating she had a
disability and needed accommodations, the court found that “[t]he mere fact that an ADA
defendant makes an accommodation is not evidence that it regarded the plaintiff as having a
disability.”280 The court also noted that the letter, from the school’s disability services office, did
not find nor make a determination that the student was a statutorily covered person with a
disability.281
Like Anderson, McGregor v. Louisiana State University (“McGregor”)282 is a case in
which a federal appeals court, this time the Fifth Circuit, announced a policy of deference to a
law school’s readmission decision. In McGregor, a student with neurological and spine injuries
causing fatigue and pain received some accommodations from the law school but was denied
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Id. See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text. The court thus did not reach the
issue of the implementation of the accommodations for the student.
279

Id. at *8 & n.18. As in Scott, the court’s reasoning is questionable here; the claim
centered on the denial of readmission rather than the ministerial “decision” to dismiss, and the
school did have notice of the claimed disability when it denied readmission.
280

Id. at *9 (citing employment cases so holding).

281

Id.

282

3 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1132 (1994).
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others, and had continuing academic difficulty in his first year.283 The next year, the student
received additional accommodations as he was now wheelchair-bound, but in the spring was
denied the accommodation of taking his exams at home, and again had academic difficulty.284
He was offered readmission again to retake his spring 1L classes, but requested advanced
standing, a part-time schedule, and taking his exams at home as accommodations.285
The Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment on all claims for the school.286 The court
found that the accommodations requested (as well as some of the accommodations the school
agreed to provide) went beyond those which were legally required and would work to alter the
school’s standards, specifically including the school’s academic decision to require full-time
status.287 The court held that “absent evidence of discriminatory intent or disparate impact, we

283

The school provided the student with a special parking permit and extra time on an
exam, id. at 854-855, but denied the student part time status as an accommodation as the school
had made an academic judgment that all first year students must be full-time. Id. at 855, 858.
The student did not earn the required minimum grades in his first semester. Id. at 855.
Nonetheless, the school allowed him to audit two classes in the spring and provided individual
tutoring, and he earned passing grades. Despite the school’s rule requiring dismissed students to
wait a year, he was readmitted for the next fall as a full-time probationary first year student. Id.
at 855-856. The school’s admissions and academic policies at the time resulted in a high student
attrition rate. Id. at 854 n.3.
284

Id. at 856.

His grades were passing in the fall but below passing in the spring. Id.

285

Id. at 857. The student and school could not agree, and the student sued not only the
school, but each of the faculty committee members, personally, asserting Section 504, ADA,
constitutional and state law claims. Id. at 857, 862-867.
286
287

Id. at 868.

Id. at 859-860. The court noted that not requiring alteration of academic standards
reflected Section 504's balancing of the school’s right to set its own academic standards and the
right of students with disabilities to be free from discrimination. Id. at 858 (citing Alexander v.
Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985)).
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must accord reasonable deference to the Law Center’s academic decisions.”288 Finding no
evidence of discriminatory intent, the court deferred to the school’s academic decisions to
require full-time status and to require exams be taken in class, decisions which were based in
part on maintaining equity among students.289 The student was thus found to be not otherwise
qualified for retention because he could not meet the school’s academic standards with
reasonable accommodations.290
Finally, Aloia v. New York Law School (“Aloia”)291 involved a third year student
dismissed for low grades whose petition for readmission and request for reconsideration were
denied. The student then submitted a letter from his doctor indicating that he had central nervous
system metabolic disorder. The school again reconsidered the case and offered to allow the
student to reenroll at a later time, if he supplied medical documentation that the condition was
sufficiently under control so as to allow him to resume his studies. The court initially granted a
preliminary injunction allowing the student to reenroll and take exams immediately.292
Ultimately, however, the court granted summary judgment for the school. The court held it
would defer to the school’s decision,293 and rejected the student’s attempt to prove discrimination
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Id. at 859 (citations omitted). The court assigned to the student the burden of
demonstrating that his requested accommodations were reasonable. Id. at 859 n.11.
289

Id. at 859-860.

290

Id. at 860.

291

1988 WL 80236 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).

292

The court said this decision was based on the possibility of irreparable harm, rather
than a showing of likely success on the merits. Id.
293

Id. at n.4 (“Faculty academic evaluations of this nature are entitled to considerable
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by comparing the treatment of his petition with those of other dismissed students.294 The court
also found that the school was entitled to find the student’s medical documentation insufficient
and require a medical statement that his condition was sufficiently under control so that he could
resume his studies.295
*****
These cases’ uniform ultimate result – summary judgment for the school – did not vary
although the nature of the claimed disability in these cases varied greatly from physical to
emotional to mental, and some dismissals occurred at the end of the first year and others in the
third year (Allison, Gill and Aloia) when the students presumably had made major investments,
financial and otherwise, in preparing for a career as an attorney.
Several patterns and areas of guidance for law schools are apparent from this group of
cases. First, in a number of the cases (Anderson, Allison, Marlon and McGregor) the students
had a long record of academic struggles in law school, and several students (Anderson, Marlon
and McGregor) had been given prior second chances to succeed before the dismissal. The long
term academic struggles and prior second chances in these cases may have been taken by the
deference from the courts.”).
294

Id. at n.4. The court distinguished one other dismissed student’s situation, and as to
two other more similar cases in which the students were readmitted noted that “the Law School's
policies reserve to the Academic Status Committee the right to consider each student on an
individual basis. In the case of the two students in question, they had demonstrated higher
levels of academic performance than had Aloia. The Law School says, in substance, that those
performances furnished sufficient evidence of potential to retain the students in question.”
295

Physician statements supplied to the school indicated "this condition is treatable and
has an excellent prognosis for full functioning," and it is “imperative that Richard remain in Law
School so as to facilitate" his treatment by medication, were found by the court to “stop well
short of expressing an opinion that treatment has succeeded to the point where the individual is
able to "meet all of a program's requirements in spite of his handicap.” Id. at n.5.
-73-

courts deciding them as evidence of the absence of any hostility toward students with disabilities
on the one hand, as the Anderson court appeared to do. On the other hand, the McGregor
opinion hints that perhaps the law school had done the student a disservice by waiving so many
standards and rules.
Second, in two cases, Anderson and Aloia, the students attempted to create an inference
of discrimination from pattern evidence. In both of these cases, the courts rejected an inference
of bad faith from the student’s proffered evidence that other dismissed students had been treated
differently. Third, in Marlon, the only one of the group decided after Toyota, the school was
successful in convincing the court that the student’s impairments did not amount to a statutory
disability, despite the opinion of the student’s evaluator; in another, Allison, the court questioned
the student’s status as a person with a disability. Fourth, in several cases, for example Anderson
and Allison, the court announced it owed deference to the school’s decision not to readmit; in
MacGregor this deference was extended to the school’s decision as to whether providing
requested accommodations would alter the school’s academic standards. Fifth, in several cases
(Anderson, Gill, Scott, Marlon and Aloia) the disability was claimed for the first time after the
dismissal. Aloia suggests that in this event the school can request documentation beyond that
supplied by the student and can condition readmission upon additional information. Finally, Gill
indicates that the school should attempt to predict the student’s ability to succeed with reasonable
accommodations.
C.

Court cases addressing disability discrimination claims by other academically
dismissed higher education students

Disability discrimination cases brought by academically dismissed students against non-74-

law school higher education programs296 show a similar pattern to those brought against law
schools. In most such non-law school cases, summary judgment or dismissal was granted to the
school.297 Frequently, the courts in these cases deferred to the school’s academic judgments
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In a very early Section 504 case in which the court engaged in extensive analysis to
determine such now obvious issues as whether there is a private right of action and whether
administrative exhaustion is required prior to filing suit, a court addressed a disability
discrimination claim by a doctor with multiple sclerosis who was rejected by a psychiatric
residency program at a teaching hospital. Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colorado, 658 F.2d
1372, 1377-82 (10th Cir. 1981). While the case involves admission to a residency program rather
than academic dismissal, Pushkin is worth noting, as the court in that case determined that the
doctor was rejected on the basis of stereotyped information about his disability, and in spite of a
letter from the doctor’s supervisor in his prior residency that the doctor performed well and his
condition did not impair his performance. Id. at 1387-88 (also noting interview ratings by a four
person committee were the articulated basis for the denial, for this applicant only, and describing
stereotyped comments by committee members and assumptions by them about the effects of the
doctor’s condition). One commentator suggests the court in this case performed an analysis like
that of intermediate scrutiny under the Equal Protection clause. Anne Dupre, Disability,
Deference and the Integrity of the Academic Enterprise, 32 GA. L. REV. 393, 412 (1998).
297

Wong v. Regents of University of California, 410 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir.2005) (dismissed
medical student with learning disability who performed well academically throughout college
and two years of medical school does not have a “substantially limiting” statutory disability);
Zukle v. Regents of University of California, 166 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 1999) (dismissed medical
student); Kaltenberger v. Ohio College of Podiatric Medicine, 162 F.3d 432 (6th Cir. 1998)
(student with ADD who failed out even after being readmitted and receiving accommodations);
Wolsky v. Medical College of Hampton Roads, 4 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 91 (4th Cir. 1993)
(medical student with panic disorder; disability claims are time-barred); Pacella v. Tufts
University School of Dental Medicine, 66 F. Supp.2d 234 (D.Mass. 1999) (dismissed dental
student with vision problem did not have a statutorily protected disability where the impairment
was largely mitigated with corrective lenses; no discrimination involved in his dismissal);
Ferrell v. Howard University, 17 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 194 (D.D.C. 1999) (medical student
with ADD who failed Boards Step 1 three times; no discrimination where school was unaware of
the disability which was not yet diagnosed at the time readmission was refused; also noting split
of authority on whether ADD was an ADA disability); Leacock v. Temple University School of
Medicine, 14 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 30 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (medical student with learning
disability; no discrimination where student merely mentioned to school after she was dismissed
that she might have a learning disability and school was unaware of a diagnosed disability at the
time readmission was refused and school employed fair procedures to allow dismissed students
to appeal their dismissal; school not required to reconsider decision after disability is
documented; claims also time-barred); Betts v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, 30
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surrounding the readmission.298

Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 241 (4th Cir. 2005) (premedical student with learning disability found in
earlier decision not to amount to a statutory disability whose grades improved after
accommodations but did not achieve required cumulative GPA in special program for guaranteed
entry into medical school whose acceptance was rescinded because of grades); Lewin v.Medical
College of Hampton Roads, 910 F. Supp. 1161 (E.D. Va. 1996) (dismissed medical student);
Ellis v. Morehouse School of Medicine, 925 F.Supp. 1529, 1539, 1541-1542 (N.D. Ga. 1996)
(fourth year medical student with dyslexia); Goodwin v. Keuka College, 929 F. Supp. 90, 94
(W.D.N.Y. 1995) (occupational therapy student who was dismissed under rule requiring
automatic dismissal upon failing two field placements later diagnosed with mental illness; a
“student may not challenge a particular grade or other academic matter absent demonstrated bad
faith, arbitrariness, capriciousness, irrationality, or a constitutional or statutory violation”); Id. at
95, (nor is “a student who is automatically terminated from a program who brings subsequent
evidence of an alleged learning disability [] entitled under federal law to reconsideration of that
decision based on new evidence”); Riedel v. Board of Regents of State of Kansas, 4 Nat.
Disability L. Rep. ¶ 276 (D.Kans. 1993) (medical student alleging learning disability diagnosed
two years after dismissal for failing Boards Step 1 four times; student lacked standing since he
was neither enrolled nor an applicant); Hanlon v. Board of Regents of the University of
Wisconsin System, 27 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 274 (Wisc. App. 2004) (asthmatic student
dismissed from physician assistant training program; no discrimination where school was
unaware of the disability at the time of dismissal; no discrimination where student merely
mentioned to school after she was dismissed that she had asthma and school was unaware of a
diagnosed disability at the time readmission was refused); cf. Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Sciences
Center of Brooklyn, 22 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 30 (2nd Cir. 2001) (dismissed medical student
who did not earn required grades even after retaking the first year subsequently diagnosed with
attention deficit disorder and learning disability; summary judgment granted on claim seeking
only damages and not injunctive relief because of limitations on the circumstances under which
damages are available under Title II of the ADA and Section 504); Amir v. St. Louis University,
16 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 29 (8th Cir. 1999) (medical student with obsessive compulsive
disorder who failed his clinical work; affirming summary judgment for school where no
evidence indicated dismissal was based on discrimination rather than failing grades, but
reversing summary judgment for school on retaliation claim where dismissal and other adverse
actions followed student’s filing of grievance); McGuinness v. University of New Mexico
School of Medicine, 170 F.3d 974 (10th Cir. 1998) (medical student with test anxiety and
unsatisfactory grades who refused opportunity to repeat coursework). Tips v. Regents of Texas
Tech University, 921 F. Supp. 1515 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (entering judgment apparently after bench
trial for school on disability claim by dismissed student in graduate psychology program who
failed her written qualifying exams).
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See, e.g., McGuinness, 170 F.3d at 979 (10th Circuit); Zukle,166 F.3d at 1047-48 (9th
Circuit) (and noting “we must be careful not to allow academic decisions to disguise truly
discriminatory requirements. The educational institution has a ‘real obligation ... to seek
-76-

Only one non-law school case resulted in a judgment for the student. The few non-law
school cases in which the dismissed student’s claim survived summary judgment offer guidance
with regard to what will cause a court not to defer to a school’s educational judgment not to
readmit a dismissed student: primarily, affirmative evidence of discriminatory intent or bad faith.
1. Evidence of discriminatory (bad faith, stereotypical and/or retaliatory)
thinking. The court in Carlin v. Trustees of Boston University (“Carlin”)299 announced it would

suitable means of reasonably accommodating a handicapped person and to submit a factual
record indicating that it conscientiously carried out this statutory obligation.’ [citation omitted]
Once the educational institution has fulfilled this obligation, however, we will defer to its
academic decisions”); Kaltenberger, 162 F.3d 432, 436-37 (6th Circuit) (citing Horowitz and
Ewing, also holding that school’s academic decisions concerning which accommodations are and
are not reasonable are entitled to deference, noting “[w]e should only reluctantly intervene in
academic decisions ‘especially regarding degree requirements in the health care field where the
conferral of a degree places the school’s imprimatur upon the student as qualified to pursue his
chosen profession’”); Ellis, 925 F.Supp. at 1539, 1541-42 (N.D. Ga.) (deferring even though
dismissed fourth year medical student enrolled in another medical school and was apparently
successful there); Ferrell, 17 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 194 (D.D.C.) (citation omitted) (a
judgment by a school official that a student has not performed adequately to meet the school’s
academic standards is a determination that usually calls for judicial deference”); Leacock, 14
Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 30 (E.D. Pa.) (citation omitted) (“[w]here there is an academic
dismissal, . . . ‘courts are ill-equipped to review the largely subjective academic appraisals of the
faculty’”) (also citing Horowitz and Ewing as mandating deference); Betts, 30 Nat. Disability L.
Rep. ¶ 241 (4th Cir.) (citation omitted) (noting school’s “two choices: ignore years of objective
evidence, . . . and allow Betts to matriculate based solely on good grades on five tests taken (with
double time) ovefr 18 days; or rely on Betts’ entire academic record . . . and render its
judgement. . . . We decline to limit the faculty’s academic judgment in this fashion. ‘Courts
must also give deference to professional academic judgments when evaluating the reasonable
accommodation requirement.”); cf. Diaz v. Lehman College, City University of New York, 11
Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (college student with depression who ceased
attending class and left the college with a 1.108 GPA; college’s minimum 2.0 GPA requirement
is a reasonable decision entitled to deference); White v. University of South Carolina-Columbia,
1996 WL 276540, *3 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (nursing student with learning disability provided with
some accommodations who was not earning required grades and withdrew; absent evidence of
discrimination, deference is owed to school’s determination regarding which accommodations of
those recommended by evaluator are reasonable ones).
299

907 F. Supp. 509 (D. Mass.1995).
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normally defer to a school’s judgment but found sufficient evidence of pretext to deny the
school’s motion for summary judgment. The case involved a student with depression in a
doctoral pastoral psychology program who successfully completed three years of classroom
instruction and clinical training. She then sought a leave of absence as her depression worsened
and she was ultimately hospitalized, then denied readmission to the program.
As to deference, the court held that it would “‘defer[] to the institution’s decision if there
is evidence that the University made a professional, academic judgment that [a] reasonable
accommodation [was] simply not available.”300 In this event, the court noted that the burden
would shift to the plaintiff to show “that facts were genuinely disputed or [that] there [is]
significantly probative evidence of bad faith or pretext.”301 Applying this standard, the court
found that the school had offered evidence that it had terminated the student because, based on
feedback from several faculty and supervisors, she “lacked the capacity” for “psychodynamically
oriented pastoral psychology,”302 and had offered to allow her to transfer to a different program.
The court also found that the student had offered evidence of pretext, including that no ‘lack of
capacity’ was mentioned until her leave of absence and hospitalization, that her third year
clinical experience was successful according to her supervisor, and perhaps most notably, a
statement by her advisor that the student was dismissed because “her history of ‘serious mental

300

Id. at 510 (citing Wynne v. Tufts University School of Medicine, 932 F.2d 19, 27-28
(1st Cir. 1991).
301

Id. (citing Wynne, 932 F.2d at 26).

302

Id. at 511.
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health problems’ . . . did not provide ‘the kind of environment that is conducive to a return.’”303
The court concluded that the school “has absolute authority to render an academic judgment, but
that decision must be a genuine one.”304
Similarly, in Amir v. St. Louis University (“Amir”),305 the Eighth Circuit’s announced
deference resulted in summary judgment for the school on a student’s discrimination claim.
However, the court found sufficient evidence of retaliation for that claim to survive summary
judgment. Amir involved a medical student who had some difficulty, both academic and
behavioral, in his first two years of classroom-based instruction, but was not at risk of
dismissal.306 After the student entered his third year, which involved clinical rotations, his
mental health difficulties escalated to the point where he was hospitalized. 307 He was then
denied readmission to the rotation and filed a grievance.308 He was eventually permitted to
complete the rotation with the same supervisor, but in the interim the psychiatry department had
passed a new grading policy which gave the supervisor more discretion.309 The student would

303

Id.

304

Id.

305

184 F.3d 1017 (8th Cir. 1999).

306

Id. at 1022.

307

Id. at 1023 (the student believed he was being poisoned by his food, drink and
medicine, and tried to purge the “poison” with forced vomiting and laxatives). During his
psychiatry rotation, the student was diagnosed with obsessive-compulsive disorder and his
supervisor, the chairperson of the school’s Psychiatry department, convinced him to hospitalize
himself. Id.
308

Id.

309

Id. at 1023-1024.
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have passed the rotation under the old grading policy but failed it under the new policy, the only
student to do so.310 Several months later, the school dismissed the student “based on a history of
poor academic performance and a long-standing history of inappropriate behavior,
misrepresentations, and difficulties dealing with staff and faculty” and “failing grades in [two
clinical rotations] and [being] ranked near the bottom of his class in overall performance in
[another rotation].”311 The student enrolled in and completed medical school in the
Philippines.312
The trial court had granted summary judgment to the school on both claims,313 but the
Eighth Circuit saw the retaliation and the discrimination claims quite differently. The appeals
court found enough evidence of possible retaliation against the student for filing the grievance
and the lawsuit to reverse summary judgment on the retaliation claim for the school.314
Specifically, the student’s grievance had made the supervisor admittedly angry, and soon
thereafter the department which she chaired changed a grading policy which expanded
discretion, and which she used to fail the plaintiff student and no one else.315 After the initial

310

Id. at 1023. He was denied the opportunity to redo the rotation or to do it at another
location or with another supervisor and was placed on leave while his possible dismissal was
investigated, id. at 1024, at which point he filed a lawsuit.
311

Id.

312

Id. He amended his lawsuit to claim that his dismissal and refusal to implement his
requests as reasonable accommodations amounted to illegal disability discrimination in violation
of Title III of the ADA. Id.
313

Id.

314

Id. at 1026-1027.

315

Id. at 1026 & n.3.
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lawsuit was filed, the medical school then dismissed the student without a chance to redo the
rotation, as it had allowed him and other students to do in the past.316
On the other hand, the court saw insufficient evidence, either as to the refusal to provide
the requested accommodation or as to the dismissal, for the discrimination claim to survive
summary judgment. The court found no evidence that the student’s disability motivated his
dismissal; it found that either his academic performance or retaliation against him for his
grievance and lawsuit were the motives supported by some evidence.317 As to the refusal to
grant the requested accommodations, the court cited Ewing and announced a policy of deferring
to reasonable academic judgments: “We will not invade a university’s province concerning
academic matters in the absence of compelling evidence that the policy is a pretext for
discrimination. . . . No such inference can be drawn in the present case.”318
2.

Refusal to consider disability information. Two medical students’ claims

survived summary judgment when the school refused to consider their disability information,
another form of discrimination. In Steere v. George Washington University (“Steere”),319 a
medical school committee recommended to the dean that a student with poor grades be
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Id. at 1027. For a case granting summary judgment on a dismissed student’s first
amendment retaliation claim, see Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Sciences Center of Brooklyn, 22
Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 30 (2nd Cir. 2001).
317

Id. at 1028.

318

Id. at 1029 (citations omitted) (also noting that school policy precluded students with
academic difficulty from doing coursework elsewhere,and request for a different supervisor was
not disability-related).
319

368 F.Supp. 2d 52 (D.D.C. 2005).
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dismissed.320 The student had not identified himself as having a disability either while enrolled
or to the committee, but submitted documentation of attention deficit disorder and a learning
disability to the dean and requested accommodations.321 The dean “gave no weight to plaintiff’s
disability report, stating that his decision was based on plaintiff’s poor academic performance
and that he was adopting the [committee] recommendation.”322 The student enrolled in a
medical school in the Caribbean, where he received accommodations (extended time on exams)
and earned passing grades,323 and sued his former school under Title III of the ADA. The court
found that the student may have been entitled to a “second chance,” not of readmission itself but
of reconsidering his request for readmission in light of the new impairment information, since
the student was not at fault in not identifying himself as having a disability earlier, and denied
the school’s motion for summary judgment.324 More recently, and on essentially a rerun of
Steere (a dismissed student at the same medical school submitted documentation of a learning
disability to the dean after the committee recommended dismissal, and the dean refused to
consider the new disability information), the same court again denied summary judgment to the

320

Id. at 54.

321

Id. at 54-55.

322

Id. at 55.

323

Id.

324

Id. at 57-58. The court contrasted this case, where the student provided documentation
of an impairment before the decision to dismiss, to others where the student either did not
mention a disability or only self-reported as possibly having a disability without submitting an
actual diagnosis. Id. at 56 (citations omitted).
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school in Singh v. George Washington University (“Singh”).325
3.

Limited deference in the First and Ninth Circuits. Two federal appeals

courts require schools to create a factual record of their deliberations when considering
readmission of a student with a disability as a condition of deference to the readmission decision.
These courts reason that this condition affords both deference to the school’s academic judgment
and meaningful protection of the student’s rights under disability discrimination laws.
In Wynne v. Tufts University School of Medicine (“Wynne”),326 an academically
dismissed student diagnosed with dyslexia requested an alternative format to multiple choice
tests as an accommodation for his disability. While ultimately granting summary judgment to
the school,327 the First Circuit, citing Ewing, announced a policy of deference to the school’s
academic judgment in the context of statutory discrimination claims, with limits.328 Specifically,
the court required a “factual record” from the school demonstrating that the school had
considered alternative ways for the student to meet its academic standards with reasonable
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Singh v. George Washington University, 368 F. upp.2d 58 (D.D.C. 2005) (deference is
not appropriate where the disability information has not been considered) (also finding an issue
of fact as to whether the dismissed medical student was a person with a disability under federal
statute), reconsideration denied, 2005 WL 2009875 (D.D.C. 2005).
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932 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1991), on appeal from remand, 976 F.2d 791 (1st Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 507 U.S. 1030 (1993).
327
328

976 F.2d at 796.

The court contrasted Ewing, in which there was no statute which limited the school’s
freedom to use its academic judgment. 932 F.2d at 25. The Wynne deference standard has been
criticized as too limited. Claire McCusker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Its Potential for
Expanding the Scope of Reasonable Accomodations, 21 J. COLL. & UNIV. L. 619, 634 (1995)
(calling Wynne “an inroads into the halls of academe by calling upon professional educators to
present evidence regarding the steps they have taken to verify the reasonableness of their
determination”).
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accommodations:
If the institution submits undisputed facts demonstrating that the relevant officials within
the institution considered alternative means, their feasibility, cost and effect on the
academic program, and came to a rationally justifiable conclusion that the available
alternatives would result either in lowering academic standards or requiring substantial
program alteration, the court could rule as a matter of law that the institution had met its
duty of seeking reasonable accommodation.329
The court found a “conclusory affidavit” from the medical school’s dean insufficient as it
did not consider alternatives and it was not specifically clear that this was the medical school’s
faculty’s judgment,330 and remanded the case.331 On remand, the court found the factual record
submitted by the school, which detailed the faculty’s thought process as to why a different
testing format would alter its academic standards, to be sufficient as a matter of law, even as
against the student’s affidavits indicating that one other medical school and a national testing
service offered oral versions of multiple-choice tests, and affirmed a summary judgment for the
school.332 The court noted:
[T]he point is not whether a medical school is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ in making programrelated decisions. Such absolutes rarely apply in the context of subjective
decisionmaking, particularly in a scholastic setting. The point is that Tufts, after
undertaking a diligent assessment of the available options, felt itself obliged to make ‘a
professional, academic judgment that [a] reasonable accommodation [was] simply not
available.333

329

Id. at 26. The court indicated that the sufficiency of this factual record would normally
be a legal question, id., and thus presumably resolvable by summary judgment. Id.
330

Id. at 27. In a dissent authored by then-Judge Breyer, three judges agreed with the
limited deference standard announced by the majority, but found that the dean’s affidavit met
this standard. Id. at 29-31 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
331

Id. at 29.
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Id. at 794-95.

333

Id. at 795.
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This limited deference approach to issues both of whether requested accommodations are
reasonable and whether, with accommodation, dismissed students are "qualified" to continue
their studies was adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Wong v. Regents of University of California
(“Wong I”):334
[D]eference is not absolute . . . courts still hold the final responsibility for enforcing the
Acts, including determining whether an individual is qualified, with or without
accommodation, for the program in question. We must ensure that educational
institutions are not "disguis[ing] truly discriminatory requirements" as academic
decisions; to this end, "[t]he educational institution has a 'real obligation ... to seek
suitable means of reasonably accommodating a handicapped person and to submit a
factual record indicating that it conscientiously carried out this statutory obligation’. . . .
Subsumed within this standard is the institution's duty to make itself aware of the nature
of the student's disability; to explore alternatives for accommodating the student; and to
exercise professional judgment in deciding whether the modifications under
consideration would give the student the opportunity to complete the program without
fundamentally or substantially modifying the school's standards. See Wynne I, 932 F.2d
at 26 (explaining that institution needs to submit "undisputed facts " showing that
"relevant officials" "considered alternative means, their feasibility, [and] cost and effect
on the academic program") (emphasis added); id. at 28 (refusing to defer when institution
presented no evidence regarding "who took part in the decision" and finding "simple
conclusory averment" of head of institution insufficient to support deferential standard of
review). We defer to the institution's academic decisions only after we determine that the
school has fulfilled this obligation.335
Applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit reversed the summary judgment granted to the
school on the reasonableness of the requested accommodation of an eight week reading period
prior to each clinical rotation. The appeals court found an issue of fact as to whether this was a
reasonable accommodation for several reasons: the Section 504 regulations specifically include

334

192 F.3d 807 (9th Cir. 1999). As discussed earlier, see supra notes 60-71 and
accompanying text, the court later granted the school’s motion for summary judgment on a
different basis; namely, that the student did not have a statutorily protected disability, as his
impairment was not substantially limiting in light of his history of academic success, without
accommodations.
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extending the time to complete degree requirements as an example of a reasonable
accommodation, the school had provided pre-clinical rotation reading periods in the past for
Wong and other students, and Wong had been successful with a reading period, the reading
period was being recommended by a member of the medical school faculty who was the school’s
Coordinator of Student Learning Disability Resource Teams,336 the decision not to offer the
accommodation was made by the school’s dean without consideration of disability information
or consultation with the student, the initially articulated basis for refusing the reading period was
not academic, but rather the student’s reported desire to graduate in the normal time and the
dean’s belief that the student did not need to reading period, and finally the dean told the student
not to mention the requested accommodation to the school’s readmission committee.337
The court concluded:
The deference to which academic institutions are entitled when it comes to the ADA is a
double-edged sword. It allows them a significant amount of leeway in making decisions
about their curricular requirements and their ability to structure their programs to
accommodate disabled students. On the other hand, it places on an institution the
weighty responsibility of carefully considering each student’s particular limitations and
analyzing whether and how it might accommodate that student in a way that would allow
the student to complete the school’s program without lowering academic standards or
otherwise unduly burdening the institution. . . . We will not sanction an academic
institution’s refusal to accommodate a disabled student and subsequent dismissal of that
student when the record contains facts from which a reasonable jury could conclude that
the school made those decisions for arbitrary reasons unrelated to its academic
standards.338
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Id. at 817-18 (citations omitted).
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On these facts the court found that a jury could find this faculty member to be an
expert on whether the reading periods would be a reasonable accommodation. Id. at 820.
337

Id. at 819- 20.

338

Id. at 826.
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4.

Judgment on the merits for a student. A final case, Dearmont v. Texas A

& M University (“Dearmont”),339 actually resulted in a judgment for a dismissed student which
included reinstatement, money damages, and attorney’s fees. A student in a small agricultural
economics doctoral program twice failed his qualifying exams. He was then tested and found to
have a learning disability involving the processing of symbols. With the accommodation of
double time, the student then took the qualifying exams, which very recently had been modified
in content, format and grading, for a third time, earning a lower score than he had previously.
The student then had a “surprise oral exam” from departmental faculty and was dismissed, but
offered the opportunity to continue as a research assistant. The student appealed, and the
decision was affirmed by committee without allowing the student to appear in person. The
student then appealed to the school’s graduate council, which ordered reexamination under the
original content, format and grading procedures. The department then changed the GPA
requirements for serving as a research assistant; the student did not meet the new requirement
and was replaced. Without the income for this position the student apparently was not
financially able to continue his studies.
The court found as follows, in language that offers helpful guidance for schools on what
not to do when dealing with an academically dismissed student with a disability:
[b]y the time Dearmont [was diagnosed] . . . , the faculty had formed an opinion from the
effects of his disability that Dearmont was a marginal student at best, and they refused to
make a reasonable accommodation to his handicap. When required by outside pressure,
they went through the motions of accommodation, while stepping up the pressure directly
and indirectly. The actual accommodations were more than offset by the concomitant
harassment. . . .

339

2 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 10 (S.D. Tex. 1991).
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[Section 504] does not require institutions to engage in the expensive, empty gesture of
educating people who cannot function productively in the community. It does, however,
prevent this kind of casual rejection of someone who is capable and qualified because of
ungenerous perceptions of the effects of a non-disabling handicap.
A vast amount of the process of higher education must be subjective. The necessity of
subjectiveness does not require society to abandon the students to the mere will of the
professors, the experts. If any governmental program [ought] to be able to articulate the
reason of its procedures, graduate education should. Governmental professors, with their
own careers, policies, and favorites, are no less prone to abuse of the authority the
community has conferred on them than the officer on the beat.
Despite making exceptions for other students who had a problem passing the qualifying
examination, the faculty decided that Dearmont's performance made him unqualified. To
support their decision to replace Dearmont with a more promising candidate, Dearmont's
faculty advisors threw him a surprise defense of his research plan. Assuming his
performance at the inquisition was deficient, it was a wholly contrived requirement. The
development of Dearmont's research had never been discussed with him in any deliberate
session with any of the faculty advisors before the bushwhacking.
The actions of the defendants show a rejection of Dearmont based on his handicap,
followed by a series of transparent gimmicks to cloak the decision with additional
evidence.340
*****
The non-law school cases, most of which involve medical school or other health care
professional training programs, also show a pronounced pattern of success for the school, and
perhaps even more consistently announced deference to the school’s decision than do the law
school cases. The seven cases in which the school did not completely prevail (Carlin, Steere,
Singh, and Amir, in which the school was denied summary judgment, Wong and Wynne, in which
the school lost its initial motion for summary judgment but then prevailed on a subsequent
summary judgment motion, and Dearmont, in which a judgment was actually ordered in favor of
a dismissed student against a school) show clear patterns which provide helpful guidance for

-88-

schools. First, in a number of the cases the dismissal/readmission decision was made by a single
person (a dean in Singh, Steere, Wong) or a small and presumably close department (Carlin, with
apparent significant influence on the decision by a single faculty member who was the student’s
adviser, and Dearmont). In such cases, the danger of a decision tainted by discriminatory intent,
or at least a disputed issue of fact on intent, is likely heightened. Second, in several cases (Singh,
Steere, and Wong I), the decision-making dean refused to consider the student’s disability
information. In these two cases, there was a committee that made a recommendation to the dean
but apparently without any preannounced standards to apply to make that recommendation.
Third, in several cases, there was evidence that the decisionmaker(s) engaged in
discriminatory (bad faith, stereotypical and/or retaliatory) thinking. In Carlin, a previously
successful student was found to have a “lack of capacity” and terminated after she was
hospitalized for depression. In Amir, grading and other policies and practice were changed and
applied to the student’s detriment by a small department chaired by a person who was admittedly
angry that the student had filed a disability discrimination complaint. In Wong, the dean
instructed the student not to mention the disability to a committee and did not initially articulate
academic reasons for his denial of requested accommodations. Last but certainly not least, in
Dearmont the court found that the small department engaged in harassment after the student
documented a disability. Fourth, in two cases (Steere and Amir), there was unusually strong
conflicting evidence that the student could succeed: the dismissed student enrolled at another
school, received the requested accommodations, and was academically successful.341
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Id.

341

Such conflicting evidence is less likely to be available to law students, since law
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Finally, in some cases, the denial of readmission was contrary to the recommendation of
an internal school expert. In Wong, for example, the decision was contrary to a recommendation
by an internal faculty expert. Similarly, the assessment of the student’s ability conflicted with
her clinical supervisor’s favorable assessment of the student’s performance in Carlin. Similarly,
in an OCR opinion discussed below,342 DePaul University’s internal expert evaluation that a
student’s dyslexia impairment was significant conflicted with its law school’s assessment based
on the previously supplied report of an eye doctor that the dyslexia was not significant. One
pattern these cases do not evidence is a pattern of greater deference to schools when the
disability is mental as opposed to physical, despite the contrary suggestion of one
commentator.343
*****
When the law school and non-law school are combined, a variety of patterns emerge.
Most striking of course is the pattern of results: schools win, and do so convincingly, normally at
the as-a-matter-of-law level at the summary judgment or dismissal stage, rather than going to
trial and reaching the merits.

This is so in large part because courts hearing these disability

discrimination claims routinely announce a pattern of deference to the school’s academic
judgments. Deference is specifically extended to the decisions as to 1) whether the dismissed
school accreditation requirements require dismissed students to sit out two years before applying
to other law schools. See ABA Law School Accreditation Standard 505, available at
www.abanet.org/legaled/standards/standard.html. However, if a law school allows dismissed
students to continue in summer courses while their petitions are pending, students’ grades in
those courses may amount to such evidence.
342
343

See infra notes 377-396 and accompanying text.

Tucker, supra note 25, at 39 (suggesting that for academic decisions generally, more
deference is paid when the student’s disability is mental rather than physical).
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student meets the school’s readmission standards, and 2) whether academic accommodations
requested by the dismissed student are reasonable on the one hand, or would alter the school’s
academic standards on the other.
While the courts’ announcement of deference to these decisions is consistent, there is
some variety in the articulated reasons for the deferral, the conditions that will trigger deferral,
and the exact nature of the deferral. One commentator, suggests that “[w]hile deference
determinations under Section 504 and the ADA vary considerably, the general trend . . . seems to
be toward some form of rational basis review.”344 Another, Professor James Leonard, reviews
the cases on disability challenges to academic decisions including dismissal and readmission,
and identifies three approaches to deference in these cases. In the first approach, in which
Professor Leonard finds only one case, the court simply did not defer and instead allowed the
parties to create a battle of experts, with the court ultimately imposing its own judgment.345
Leonard places McGregor and Anderson in a second group of cases in which, largely for reasons
of lack of judicial expertise, and much in the manner of the Court in Ewing, courts will “defer to
academic authorities whenever they can demonstrate a reasonable [educational] basis for their
decisions,”346 and there is no evidence of discriminatory intent. The third group of cases, into
which Leonard places Wynne, supplements the reasonable basis standard of the second group of
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Anne Dupre, Disability, Deference and the Integrity of the Academic Enterprise, 32
GA. L. REV. 393, 418 (1998).
345

James Leonard, Judicial Deference to Academic Standards under Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act and Titles II and II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 75 NEBR. L. REV.
27, 61-62 (1996) (citing Pushkin, supra note 296, which involved a doctor seeking a paid
residency and is thus technically an employment case).
346

Id. at 63-68.
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cases and adds a requirement that the school “consider any suggestions for accommodations in
good faith and keep reliable records of the decisional process.”347
This pattern of deference to higher education schools’ academic judgments in the context
of federal statutory disability claims is again in contrast to the approach taken under the IDEA.
Although IDEA disputes typically involve a challenge to a school’s academic judgment about
what is the free appropriate public education for a given student,348 or where is the least
restrictive environment to provide that program,349 courts do not defer to the school’s judgment
on these issues.350 This lack of judicial deference exists even though the staff at public preK-12
schools, unlike higher education faculty, is formally trained in education and the team which
makes IDEA programming decisions includes at least one internal school expert in special
education.351 However, because of the special dispute resolution system Congress established

347

Id. at 68-69 (suggesting that this standard is actually the most protective of school
autonomy, as whether a school engaged in good faith consideration of accommodations is
normally an undisputed factual issue which can be resolved at the summary judgment stage).
348

The first U.S. Supreme Court case interpreting the IDEA involved a dispute over its
free appropriate public education provision. Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982)
(IDEA’s appropriate education requirement requires a program reasonably calculated to confer
educational benefit; as to hearing impaired student easily earning passing grades with tutoring
and a hearing aid IDEA is satisfied; a full-time sign language interpreter is not required).
349

See, e.g., Sacramento Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994)
(least restrictive environment for student with mental retardation is general education).
350
351

20 U.S.C.§ 1414; 34 C.F.R. §300.344.

For a comparison of the lack of deference under the IDEA with the deference accorded
universities, and an argument that, in part because of expertise, preK-12 schools also deserve the
deference accorded higher education judgments, see Anne Dupre, Disability, Deference and the
Integrity of the Academic Enterprise, 32 GA. L. REV. 393 (1998).
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for the IDEA,352 and in marked contrast to the cases where courts examine higher education
students’ disability discrimination claims, a court reviewing a dispute under the IDEA has the
benefit of the expertise not only of school authorities but also of the hearing officer who is
trained in special education.
D.

OCR opinions addressing disability discrimination claims by academically
dismissed law students.

While not binding precedent, OCR has issued numerous opinions concerning disability
discrimination complaints by academically dismissed law and other higher education students.
Just as in the courts, academically dismissed students have had very little success with OCR. In
almost all of the law school cases, OCR has found for the school.353 A review of these opinions,
however, indicates OCR takes a somewhat different approach than the courts.
The OCR opinions concerning academically dismissed law students do not discuss
deference specifically; however, in other cases OCR has announced a policy of deference.354
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See supra notes 162-164 and accompanying text.
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University of Alabama, 1 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 121 (OCR 1990); University of
Chicago, 26 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 187 (OCR 2003); McGeorge Law School, 1 Nat.
Disability L. Rep. ¶ 337; Golden Gate University, 2 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 253 (OCR 1991);
Cleveland State University, 3 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 198 (OCR 1992); Hastings College of
Law, 4 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 226 (OCR 1993); University of San Francisco, 17 Nat.
Disability L. Rep. ¶ 61 (OCR 1999); Villanova University, 16 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 170
(OCR 1999); University of Akron, 26 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 263 (OCR 2003); Texas
Wesleyan University, 13 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 208 (OCR 1998); Southwestern University
School of Law, 26 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 211 (OCR 2003).
354

Northern Ill. Univ., 7 Nat. Disability L.Rep. ¶ 392 (OCR 1995) (“OCR grants great
deference to recipients to determine which academic requirements are essential to their programs
of instruction); University of Tenn. at Martin, 14 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 72 (OCR 1998)
(“[A]bsent evidence of a discriminatory intent, reasonable deference must be accorded to the
academic decisions of educational institutions.”); Indiana University Northwest, 3 Nat. Disability
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OCR does make it clear, however, in the dismissed law student opinions that meeting the
school’s minimum academic standards is an essential academic requirement, and a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for dismissing/refusing to readmit a student. As to those standards,
OCR has suggested that a variety of readmissions standards are nondiscriminatory, from not
making a readmissions process available at all,355 to rules which limit the opportunity to petition
for readmission to students in a certain GPA range, and provide no opportunity to petition to
students with GPAs below this range;356 to requiring dismissed students to sit out a year before
reenrolling.357 In applying the school’s readmission standard, OCR has suggested that schools
may consider a variety of information, including accreditation standards concerning
admission,358 whether the petition is honest and truthful,359 or is of good quality;360 and whether

L. Rep. ¶ 150 (OCR 1992) (OCR deference to “collective wisdom of the faculty”).
355

Southwestern University School of Law, 26 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 211 (but if a
process is established, it must be available on an equal basis to students with disabilities). Note
that if a readmissions process is not available, dismissed students with disabilities could still use
the Section 504 grievance procedure, as well as OCR complaints and litigation to challenge their
dismissal.
356

University of Akron, 26 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 263 (2.0 minimum GPA; students
below 1.8 have no opportunity to petition for readmission).
357

Texas Wesleyan University, 13 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 208.

358

Villanova University, 16 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 170 (referring to former ABA
requirement 304 that “A law school shall not, either by initial admission or subsequent retention,
enroll or continue a person whose inability to do satisfactory work is sufficiently manifest. . . .”,
now see ABA accreditation standards 501 and 505).
359
360

Cleveland State University, 3 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 198.

Golden Gate University, 2 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 253 (spelling grammar and other
mechanical problems as well as less than “compelling reasoning and arguments”).
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the student is effective in any presentation to-- and meeting with-- the committee.361
All of these standards and information must be applied to and considered for all students,
with and without disabilities. To determine whether the decision was tainted by improper
discrimination, OCR often interviews the committee members who made the readmission
recommendation/decision, reviews the school’s policies and practices with regard to students
with disabilities,362 and examines statistics and individual files of other petitioning students,
presumably in order to compare application of the readmissions standard and process as between
applicants with and without disabilities.
As concerns specific disability information presented by a petitioning student, OCR
indicates that law schools may require dismissed students to provide documentation of disability
or other circumstances,363 and law schools must give any such submitted documentation
“reasoned and informed consideration.”364 Moreover, law schools may require expert
evaluations to be submitted in writing and need not agree to have the expert appear in person to
discuss the evaluation with the committee (presumably to the extent it does not allow petitioning
students to present witnesses generally).365
After duly considering disability information supplied by a petitioning student, OCR has
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University of Alabama, 1 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 121 (student rambled and did not
answer committee’s questions).
362

See Tucker, supra note 25, at n.22 and accompanying text, for a collection of OCR
opinions on the issue of the existence and adequacy of such policies.
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Southwestern University School of Law, 26 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 211.
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Southwestern University School of Law, 26 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 211.
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Villanova University, 16 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 170.
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suggested that law schools may find that the nondisability reasons contained in a student’s
readmission petition caused her failure, rather than a disability not disclosed in the petition.366 A
law school may conclude that academic failure was caused by circumstances unrelated to any
disability. For example, a law school may deny admission to a student with a disability because
of a “very low LSAT score” and “simply not understand[ing] the basic concepts of the subject
matter.”367 Similarly, a law school may conclude that a student’s learning disability did not
cause his academic failure.368 A law school may conclude that the student’s failure was caused
by lack of understanding of the material, lack of preparedness for class, lack of organization and
being an hour late for an exam, rather than a disability.369
When a law school’s readmission standard requires extraordinary circumstances, a law
school need not find a dismissed student’s disability to be an extraordinary or compelling
circumstance,370 but law schools must consider dismissed students’ disabilities which were
“previously unknown or undisclosed,” to the extent the school considers other unknown or
undisclosed nondisability circumstances.371
In considering a dismissed student with disability’s potential to succeed if readmitted, a
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Southwestern University School of Law, 26 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 211.
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Hastings College of Law, 4 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 226.
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McGeorge Law School, 1 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 337 (student with learning
disability who succeeded on some timed exams and whose reading speed was in the normal
range); University of Alabama, 1 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 121 (legally blind student with
cumulative GPA of 0.533).
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Whittier College School of Law, 4 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 183 (OCR 1993).
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University of San Francisco, 17 Nat. Disability L. Rep. 61 (1999).
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law school should evaluate “how the student’s disability affected his or her performance, and
whether the student has been provided the necessary [accommodations].”372 When petitioning
students assert that they can succeed with accommodations, law schools must take failure to
receive accommodations into account in making readmissions decisions if there has been
reasonable documentation of a disability and a proper request for accommodations, however the
“significance of the failure to receive [accommodations] would vary with the circumstances of
the case.”373
A law school may determine that certain requested accommodations are not reasonable.
For example, while whether an accommodation is reasonable must always be determined on an
individualized basis, OCR has found certain requests in specific cases to be beyond those which
are required reasonable accommodations. Normally, for example, minimum GPA requirements
are essential academic standards and waiver of them is not a reasonable accommodation.374
Along the same lines, a law school need not agree to a dismissed student’s request for
accommodations in the form of breaking down complex essay exam questions into parts and
allowing outline format for answers, as these adjustments would modify essential elements of the
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Southwestern University School of Law, 26 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 211.
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Hastings College of Law, 4 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 226.
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Southwestern University School of Law, 26 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 211.
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University of Akron, 26 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 263 (also noting that school’s
judgments and resulting rules concerning minimum GPAs and opportunities for readmission
were based on past successes of students with low GPAs, the school’s bar pass rate, and a desire
to avoid taking tuition from students whose prognosis for academic success, success on the bar
exam, and competence in practice was poor, and were recommended by a faculty committee and
adopted by the full faculty).
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law school program.375
In two reported law school cases, each more than ten years old, OCR expressed concern
about a law school’s handling of a student with a disability’s readmission petition. In one such
case, OCR appeared to believe that the law school had steered a student who might have a
disability toward an evaluator about whose qualifications OCR had concerns, but made no final
determination as to whether the school had engaged in discrimination.376 OCR noted that this
evaluator had established a course of “treatment” (OCR’s quotation marks) for the student’s
learning disability. The school agreed to fund “valid diagnostic testing . . . from a qualified
professional.” One might infer from this that OCR thought the learning disability may not have
been appropriately diagnosed and could not be “treated” effectively, at least by this evaluator.
In the second case, DePaul University,377 the student in question had not been formally
diagnosed with, nor received any services for, an impairment prior to law school, and had
maintained a B average in college.378 As a college senior, an ophthalmologist (an M.D.
specializing in vision care) informed her that she was dyslexic without doing any testing.379 The
student reported she was dyslexic on her application as a means of supporting her assertion that
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Villanova University, 16 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 170 (also noting that an expert
evaluation which stated the student needed these changes to succeed in law school actually was
evidence that she could not be academically successful unless the law school program was
fundamentally altered).
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Pepperdine University, 7 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 62 (OCR 1995).
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4 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 157 (OCR 1993).
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her LSAT score underestimated her ability.380 She attached a letter from the ophthalmologist
which noted that “dyslexia is minimal and [she] should not require accommodations.”381
In her first year of law school the student struggled and was referred by a friend to the
university’s program for diagnosing and evaluating students with learning disabilities.382 The
program completed testing on the student and orally requested accommodations for the student,
specifically a reduced course load and extra time on exams, from the law school.383 The law
school asked for written documentation before making a decision; when documentation was
provided, which was near the end of the academic year, the law school implemented the bulk of
the requested accommodations.384 The student did not earn the minimum required grades, was
academically dismissed, and petitioned for readmission.385
After two days of meetings to decide 33 readmissions petitions in which much
information was not available until the members arrived at the meeting, the readmissions
committee granted 13 of the petitions.386 The student’s petition was the only one which reported
a disability and it was denied.387 In fact, the committee could not recall any prior petitions
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asserting a disability.388 A readmissions form for each student had a space for the committee to
write the reasons for its decision, but the form was left blank or only cursorily completed in
many cases including that of the complaining student.389 There were no notes of the meeting
available from the law school or individual committee members.390
In the complaining student’s case, no committee member could remember who was
assigned responsibility for presenting her petition, nor could any committee member specifically
recall the reason(s) for denying it, and the partial recollections were somewhat inconsistent.391
OCR closely second guessed both the committee’s reasoning as much as it could be
reconstructed, and its pattern of readmitting a number of students who appeared to be no more
qualified than the complaining student. For example, the committee readmitted a student who
attributed her failure to a personal problem which happened before starting law school but for
which she did not receive counseling during her first year of law school, and others who
attributed their failures to “difficulties with the academic rigors of law school,” and “poor study
habits” respectively.392 Moreover, OCR found that some of the committee members’ comments
to one another, particularly a statement by one member that the impairment was “now just an
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Lapse of time may explain the committee members’ lapse of memory. These
readmissions decisions took place in the summer of 1988. The OCR decision is dated May 1993,
almost 5 years later. Section 504 regulations provide that OCR complaints must be filed within
180 days of the alleged discrimination, unless OCR finds good cause for a later filing. 34 C.F.R.
§100.7. The opinion does not address the delay in filing the complaint.
392

Id.
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excuse for her poor grades,” demonstrated an improper, stereotyped view of how disability might
impact academic performance.393 OCR concluded that the committee had considered the
disability information in a stereotyped rather than an informed way.394 Under these
circumstances, OCR faulted the committee for not undergoing any training, nor consulting with
its own in-house experts at the university program for students with learning disabilities.395 The
university agreed to settle the complaint in an undisclosed manner.396
E.

OCR opinions addressing disability discrimination claims by other academically
dismissed higher education students.

In non-law school academic dismissal readmissions cases, OCR has also consistently
found for the school.397 In the one non-law school academic dismissal readmissions case in
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In more recent cases, OCR has made it clear that under normal circumstances, schools
must consider expert information in a reasoned and informed way, but are not required to seek
out nor defer to expert opinions on academic issues. See, e.g., Southwestern Community
College District, 29 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 210 (OCR 2004) (school which provided OCR
with detailed record of its decision-making process, in which the school considered letter of
support provided by the university disability support services officer but denied readmission
petition of academically dismissed dental hygiene student did not engage in illegal
discrimination).
396
397

Id.

Southwestern Community College District, 29 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 210 (OCR
2004) (dental hygiene student); Lourdes College, 29 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 25 (OCR 2004)
(nursing program); Touro University, College of Osteopathic Medicine, 24 Nat. Disability L.
Rep. ¶ 292 (OCR 2002); Eastern Virginia Medical School, 2 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 229 (OCR
1991); Texas Chiropractic College, 2 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 252 (OCR 1991); University of
Pennsylvania, 28 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 192 (OCR 2003) (M.S.W. student); cf. California
State University, 7 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 96 (OCR 1995) (student denied readmission to
teacher preparation program after withdrawal “by mutual consent” and related to her emotional
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which OCR determined Section 504 had been violated, the school had failed to offer the student
timely and reasonable accommodations.398 The school agreed to readmit the student on
probationary status and provide appropriate accommodations.399
F.

Judicial deference to reasoned academic readmissions judgments is appropriate

Judicial deference to the judgment of a law school or other higher education program’s
faculty not to readmit an academically dismissed student is the only sound approach.400 The

disability); Regent University, 27 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 63 (OCR 2003) (school did not
discriminate when it required M.B.A. student with bipolar disorder who withdrew from program
after erratic and threatening behavior to undergo a psychiatric evaluation as a consideration of
readmission).
398

Tuskegee University, 1 Nat. Disability L. Rep. ¶ 226 (1990) (university disability
office told student with learning disability before he enrolled that accommodations would be
available; that office’s director then retired, and the student was not provided with
accommodations for several months until the problem was discovered).
399
400

Id.

Other commentators agree. See Anne Dupre, Disability, Deference and the Integrity of
the Academic Enterprise, 32 GA. L. REV. 393, 466-471 (1998) (deference should extend to the
academic decisions of both preK-12 and higher education academic decisions, with limits such
as those announced in Wynne which she equates with intermediate scrutiny); James Leonard,
Judicial Deference to Academic Standards under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Titles
II and II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 75 NEBR. L. REV. 27, 88-90 (1996) (advocating
the Wynne limited deference approach); id. at 70-74 (academic higher education decision are
particularly subjective and far outside the courts’ expertise and thus without deference would be
resolved by a battle of experts in areas in which the experts themselves disagree and in which
there are no concrete standards to apply); id. at 74-83 (higher education academic standards and
decisions are polycentric in nature, as described by Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits of
Adjudication, 92 HARV. L.REV. 353, 394 (1978), involving many interdependent competing
interests and thus are unsuited to judicial resolution but are appropriately resolved by managerial
direction, such as faculty decision-making, and also noting that law school standards are schoolspecific and thus what other schools do is not particularly probative evidence); id. at 83-84 (lack
of deference would incentivize schools to soften their academic standards to avoid litigation and
inappropriately adversarialize the student-faculty relationship); id. at 85-86, 88-89 (unlimited
deference may not encourage schools to truly introspect and consider alternatives for students
with disabilities, but Wynne limited deference standard addresses this concern).
One commentator suggests that the judicial deference to academic decisions generally is
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readmissions judgment is not only academic in nature, but is subjective, complex, contextdependent, and highly specialized. Apparently in contrast to the approach at some medical
schools where a single dean makes the decision,401 at law schools readmissions decisions are
normally made by a group of persons (a faculty committee or the entire faculty). In the case of a
student claiming a disability, there are built-in statutory incentives to err on the side of the
student in close cases,402 thus minimizing the possibility of the decision being made
inappropriately. In contrast even to another group of deferred-to academic decisions, initial
admissions to higher education programs, the decision not to readmit a student who has been
academically dismissed is made by a faculty after it has had considerable experience with the
student’s academic performance and abilities. Readmission of an academically dismissed
student is thus the sort of decision most inimical to the program’s academic freedom, and most
outside the expertise of the courts.
Deference to these decisions is also particularly appropriate at the level of professional
school and similar programs, where virtually all the actual cases occurred, because of the stakes
involved in wrongful readmission for the readmitted student, the school, and the public.
Whether or not she has a disability, the student who wrongfully is not readmitted at least can try
appropriate because it “provides for a more efficient distribution of decision-making between the
courts and higher education while retaining the ability for courts to intervene in situations where
the university officials may act inappropriately.” Edward Stoner and Michael Showalter,
Judicial Deference to Educational Judgment: Justice O’Connor’s Opinion in Grutter Reapplies
Longstanding Principles, as Shown by Rulings Involving College Students In the Eighteen
Months Before Grutter, 30 J. COLL. & UNIV. L. 583, 585 (2004).
401
402

See Steere and Signh, discussed supra at notes 319-325 and accompanying text.

The prospect of costly litigation, as well as the prospect of losing the litigation and
becoming responsible for the student’s attorney’s fees under these fee-shifting statutes, provide
incentives for schools to err on the side of the student in close cases.
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her luck at other schools and perhaps ultimately continue on her planned career path. For
example, the many students in the court cases and OCR opinions discussed above whose
impairments are first diagnosed at the time of their dismissal can develop learning and other
coping mitigative strategies for their newly discovered impairments and later apply for
admission. In contrast, the student who is wrongfully readmitted (that is, is readmitted when she
is not academically capable even if reasonable accommodations are provided) is at serious risk of
being unable to pass related licensing exams such as bar exams and the medical Boards exams,
and/or to competently practice her chosen profession. As one court has noted, by readmitting a
student, a school conveys its imprimatur that the student will in fact be successful in these
ways.403 When a student is wrongfully readmitted, the school’s integrity and reputation are
harmed. Most importantly, there is obvious risk to the public if wrongfully readmitted students
go on to practice their profession less than competently. In the case of health care professionals,
health and safety are directly at risk. In the case of attorneys, the risk is not a physical safety one
but rather puts at risk the competent resolution of clients’ high stakes legal problems, including
for example incarceration of criminal defendants, and custody of children.
Deference is also consistent with the systems established by Congress for resolution of
disability discrimination disputes. While the IDEA establishes a system of impartial hearing
officers trained in both special education and law who have the necessary expertise to closely
review a school’s judgment, no such system is in place for higher education students’ disability

403

Kaltenberger, 162 F.3d at 436-37 ((citing Horowitz and Ewing, also holding that
school’s academic decisions concerning which accommodations are and are not reasonable are
entitled to deference, noting “[w]e should only reluctantly intervene in academic decisions
‘especially regarding degree requirements in the health care field where the conferral of a degree
-104-

discrimination claims. Judges hearing IDEA lawsuits receive the administrative record from this
hearing, including specific findings of fact and conclusions, and may base their judgment solely
on this record, treating the matter in the manner of an administrative appeal. In contrast, in
higher education Congress chose not to establish administrative hearings, and chose not to
involve expert hearing officers; hence, the judge hearing a higher education disability
discrimination case does so without an administrative record nor independent expertise.
The different natures of the schools covered by the IDEA on the one hand, and the
schools covered by the Section 504 and ADA provisions concerning higher education students
on the other, also suggest the appropriateness of deference. The IDEA essentially applies to
public preK-12 schools. The IDEA is a government-funded program which applies to schools
which are governmental entities. It is government regulating government. Moreover, IDEAcovered public preK-12 schools are not ones which are thought to possess either institutional or
individual faculty academic freedom in the same way as do higher education institutions and
faculty members. Students attend IDEA-regulated public preK-12 schools at least in part to
comply with state compulsory education laws; they have not chosen to attend. However, and
again unlike higher education, under state laws there is a right (under state statute if not also
under the state constitution) right to attend public preK-12 school; while enrollment in public or
private higher education is a privilege rather than a legal right. In contrast, many higher
education institutions are private. Private or not, higher education institutions clearly enjoy
academic freedom both at the institutional and individual faculty level. Section 504 and the
ADA offer no specific government funds to subsidize providing accommodations and the other

places the school’s imprimatur upon the student as qualified to pursue his chosen profession’”).
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costs of compliance. Higher education program enrollment is of course optional.
The IDEA is helpful in providing guidance in one area: the plethora of disputes
concerning the application of imprecise statutory standards to specific cases which would occur
if there were close judicial review of academic decisions regarding students with disabilities
rather than deference to those decisions. Like Section 504's and the ADA’s imprecise terms of
impairments such as limiting coverage to impairments which “substantially” limit a major life
activity and “reasonable” accommodations or adjustments, the IDEA’s own imprecise terms
entitle students to an “appropriate” education in the “least restrictive environment.” The
imprecise and subjective nature of the statutes’ coverage and entitlements and the “otherwise
qualified” limitation also suggest that Congress meant for schools to operate with some
discretion. This imprecision also invites disputes over whether statutory obligations have been
met. Under the IDEA, the combination of close administrative and judicial review, and the
imprecise statutory standards, has in fact resulted in an enormous amount of litigation.404
The limits courts have put on deference, particularly the “factual record of introspection”
limited deference standard in the First and Ninth Circuits, provide sufficient protection for
students claiming disability discrimination. Requiring a school to carefully consider disability
and other information concerning a student with a disability, and to create a record of those
decisions, helps to ensure that a school will give disability information the reasoned and
informed consideration the law requires and make a good faith readmissions decision. Whether
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The Individuals with Disabilities Law Reporter (IDELR), a looseleaf service which
collects court and hearing officer decisions under the IDEA, had 43 volumes from 1978 when the
IDEA took effect through September 2005. Recent IDELR volumes numbered 1000+ pages
each.
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or not this limited deference standard is applied, affirmative evidence of any discriminatory
(stereotypical, bad faith, or retaliatory) thinking by a school405 or refusal to consider disability
information will likely result in a triable issue of fact precluding summary judgment, but the
mere fact of denying readmission to a student with a disability406 will not be sufficient for her
discrimination claim to withstand a summary judgment motion.
VI. DOING THE RIGHT THING: GUIDELINES AND OPTIONS FOR MAKING
PRINCIPLED, NONDISCRIMINATORY READMISSIONS DECISIONS WHEN STUDENTS CLAIM A
DISABILITY

A.

The consequences of going beyond statutory requirements

Law schools may consider doing more than the statutes require in one or more of three
ways. First, law schools may choose to serve some students with impairments which do not
amount to statutory disabilities. Second, law schools may offer more than statutorily required
reasonable accommodations to students with (statutory or nonstatutory) disabilities. Third, law
schools may choose to apply the readmissions standard more leniently to dismissed students with
(statutory or nonstatutory) disabilities. Some parent universities of law schools may wish to
make one or more of these choices for the university, including the law school.
While choosing to go beyond statutory requirements would not appear to open law
schools up to reverse discrimination claims by students without disabilities,407 other

405

Evidence of discriminatory thinking can be obtained by the student using discovery, or
perhaps through the investigation process if an OCR complaint is filed.
406

Nor, apparently, will allegations that other students similarly situated were treated
differently.
407

Other discrimination laws such as Titles VI, VII, and IX, which prohibit discrimination
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considerations including law school accreditation requirements, issues of academic freedom,
potential triggering of additional disability law obligations, and even potential tort and contract
liability, limit and to some extent caution against going beyond statutory requirements.
Moreover, the equities do not clearly favor doing more than the statutes require.
1.

The equities. From the perspective of the student with a statutory or

nonstatutory disability, the equities weigh heavily in favor of serving students with diagnosed
impairments even if they do not amount to statutory disabilities, providing academic adjustments
even if they go beyond legally required ones, and applying the readmissions standard leniently to
students with statutory or nonstatutory disabilities. For example, the student in Wong whose
dyslexia has caused him to read very slowly, but whose impairment does not amount to a
statutory disability, has an equitable argument that failure to offer him extra time on exams will
mean that the exam will measure his slow reading speed more than his mastery of the course
material. A dismissed law student with a newly diagnosed impairment and who has thus never
had accommodations, such as Student in the illustrative scenario, may also argue as a matter of
equity that if she can demonstrate a real possibility of success with accommodations, the school
should offer her a second chance even if there is not the convincing likelihood of success
required by the School’s readmission standard.
While these arguments are cogent ones, there are competing concerns and counter

“on the ground of ” race or gender, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (Title VI prohibition “on the
ground of race, color, or national origin”)and have been interpreted as prohibiting discrimination
against either gender, and against any racial minority or racial majority group. See, e.g., Gratz,
discussed supra notes 223-230 (affirmative action program amounts to illegal race discrmination
against white applicants). In contrast, Section 504 and the ADA define the group of covered
persons with statutory disabilities, and prohibit discrimination against the covered group. See,
e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 794(a) (Section 504).
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arguments also centered on equity and fairness. As a threshold matter and as discussed below,408
from the perspective of the law school faculty, maintaining academic standards is primary. It
does no one any good, most of all the dismissed student, to readmit her if there is not a good faith
belief she will succeed, not only by maintaining required grades while in law school but also by
passing the bar exam and practicing competently. As one court observed in a non-law school
case, granting a degree (and readmission in the shorter term) conveys the school’s imprimatur
that the student can and will be successful in these ways.409 Also and as discussed below,410
accreditation standards also bar law schools from (re)admitting students unless they are likely to
succeed the second time around.
Beyond this mandated limitation of readmission of any student, with or without a
disability, to those who are likely to succeed, law schools have some discretion in deciding how
to apply readmissions standards to students with disabilities and still comply with disability law.
The faculty may believe equity among all the school’s students is best served by holding
everyone to the same standards, particularly as regards extra time on exams, except when
disability laws require academic adjustments, for a number of reasons, from the nature of law
school grades, to line-drawing concerns, to concerns about test validity and skills needed for
successful law practice, to risking future failure on the bar exam and in practice for the student
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See infra notes 430-432 and accompanying text.
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Cf. Steven Milam and Rebecca Marshall, Impact of Regents of the University of
Michigan v. Ewing on Academic Dismissals from Graduate and Professional Schools, 13 J.
COLL. & UNIV. L. 335, 352 (1987) (“Graduate and professional schools owe a duty to the public,
the student and the respective professions to assure that they award degrees only to qualified
individuals. The same obligation compels institutions to dismiss those not qualified to practice.”
410

See infra Section VI.A.2.
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provided with nonrequired accommodations.
.

As to offering academic adjustments to students without statutory disabilities, or beyond

legally required reasonable accommodations, it is important to note that this decision is a
qualitatively different one than other sorts of affirmative action; for example, considering
diversity of various kinds (race, gender, disability, etc.) in making initial admissions decisions.
This latter sort of affirmative action is done in the context of deciding which qualified students
will be offered an opportunity for legal education. Once such students are admitted, they are
held to the same academic standards as all other students; there no individualized adjustment of
academic standards.
In contrast, offering some law students academic adjustments which go beyond legally
required reasonable accommodations (for example giving a student with a reading disorder
impairment primarily involving slow reading speed which is not a statutory disability extra time
on exams) gives individual students an academic experience and in some cases an evaluation of
their performance which is different than those for most students.

In a graduate school program

where grading is criterion-based (i.e. excellent work receives a grade of “A,” no matter how the
other students perform), such a practice might affect the individual student (her grades might
overestimate her performance), but would not likely have much impact on the other students.
The great majority of law schools, however, have mandatory grade curves which mean that law
school grades are largely normative, measuring how the student performed relative to her
classmates. Thus in law school there is special risk that academic adjustments beyond legally
required ones unfairly disadvantage other students. A legal commentator notes “a general sense
of unease . . . about whether the various accommodations afforded for learning disabilities truly
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‘level the playing field’ in a meaningful and valid way, or instead serve to provide unfair
advantages to some. In some cases, . . . a strong suspicion of ‘gaming the system’ arises.”411
Hence, a law school may decide not to go beyond statutory requirements because it believes the
fair and equitable thing is to hold all students to the same academic standards except as required
by law.
Law schools may also be concerned about the impact of the specific academic adjustment
of extra time on exams on the validity of scores on those exams, and thus wish to limit that
adjustment to circumstances where it is legally required. Commentary by some disability experts
corroborates this concern. It is not documented, for example, that the accommodation of
additional time on exams for students with disabilities does not impair test validity.412 Some
research with extra time on the SAT suggests the extra time compromises its predictive
validity.413 Other research suggests that extra time and quiet rooms “increases the testing scores

411

Murphy, supra note 94, at 46.

412

See, e.g., Tucker, supra note 99, at 17 (assuming test anxiety is a legal disability,
providing extra time as an accommodation does reduce anxiety for the examinee, creating, the
“paradox. . . of a non-anxious examinee with extra time”); Ranseen, supra note 96 at 8-9
(effectiveness of typical exam accommodations for examinees with ADHD such as extra time
has not been documented with empirical research; “there is no evidence that an accommodation
of extra time does not alter test validity,” citing another expert review of studies of extra time for
examinees with reading disabilities do not seem to help these students differentially; all
examinees afforded additional time improved their performance); Gordon, Murphy and Keiser,
supra note 100, at 35 (“Unlike accommodations such as wheelchair ramps or elevator signs
written in braille, ADHD accommodations are universal in their potential benefit even for people
without the disorder.”); id. (“In the case of ADHD there is no scientific research nor theoretical
basis to indicate that extra time on an exam is necessarily helpful.”).
413

Phillips, infra note 417, at 23 (citation omitted) (research indicating SAT scores of
learning disabled students given extra time predicted higher freshman college grades than those
students actually received).
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of all test takers.”414 One commentator notes, for example, that if an exam is speeded, an extra
time accommodation “would be unfair to the applicants without disabilities.”415

Experts note

that when diagnosing an impairment and recommending accommodations, evaluators “gear their
efforts toward helping their patients feel better. . . and will not tend to worry terribly much . . .
about the ultimate implications of lax standards for test integrity or simple fairness for all.”416
Another commentator, an education professor with a J.D. and a doctorate in
psychometrics, examines the impact of test accommodations for examinees and concludes that
while test accommodations for persons with physical disabilities do not reduce test validity,
accommodations for examinees with mental disabilities may in fact compromise test validity.417
Standards of professional associations for educators and psychologists indicate
Unless it has been demonstrated that the psychometric properties of a test . . . are not
altered significantly by some modification, the claims made for the test . . . cannot be
generalized to the modified version.”418
More generally, other disability experts note success on exams without accommodations
may correlate with skills needed by practicing attorneys, specifically suggesting that attorneys
need to remain attentive for long periods, be able to “sustain mental effort” for long periods, and

414

Ballard and Elwork, infra note 420, at 34.

415

Duhl and Duhl, supra note 94, at 14.

416

Gordon, Murphy, and Keiser, supra note 100, at 29.

417

Susan Phillips, High-Stakes Testing Accommodations: Validity versus Disabled Rights,
64 BAR EXAMINER 8 (1995).
418

Id. at 12 (citations omitted) (also noting the small populations given modified exams
make any empirical research on this issue difficult at best, and suggesting in deciding requests
for test accommodations, the test’s purpose, skills to be measure, and inference to be drawn from
the score should all be considered).
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“work under pressure.”419 Some experts note that “some learning disabilities (e.g, reading
disorders) involve mental functions that are inherently relevant and critical to the practice of
law”420 and thus accommodations “may mask certain disabilities that are important to the
practice of law and simply make it easier for learning disabled applicants to pass the bar
examination.”421 These experts posit that mental processing speed and distractibility, which test
accommodations attempt to compensate, may in fact be relevant to law practice, which involves
“researching, understanding, retaining, and applying an enormous amount of highly complex
legal information. . . . . [L]awyers must be able to pay a great deal of attention to detail, . . .
express themselves clearly. . . often under time pressure and in emotionally charged situations, . .
. [and possess] quick thinking and the ability to focus.”422 Thus, “the presence of a learning
disability may impede a person’s ability to practice law.”423
Returning to the student without a statutory disability but with reading disorder-related
slow reading speed, the law school may also understand that its students’ reading speed varies
greatly and for a myriad of reasons (from students’ overall information processing speed to their

419

John Ranseen and David Campbell, Adult Attention Deficit Disorder: Current
Concepts and Controversies, 65 BAR EXAMINER 49, 54 (1996).
420

Robin Ballard and Amiram Elwork, Accommodating Learning Disabled Applicants
During Bar Examinations: What is reasonable under the ADA?, 74 BAR EXAMINER 31, 31
(2005).
421

Id.

422

Id. at 33.

423

Id.; id. at 34 (“Licensing boards should assume that some learning disabilities can
significantly impede an applicant’s ability to practice law effectively. The public interest is
protected not by using measuring methods that assess the applicant’s potential abilities, but by
employing those methods that attempt to determine how the applicant will actually serve his or
-113-

reading skills to their temperament to their interest in the material to their work ethic) and
determine that it is not equitable to provide extra time on exams only for students whose slow
reading speed is related to an impairment and not caused by other reasons. The faculty may be
concerned about line drawing, specifically about how far to go in tailoring education and
evaluation to each student’s strengths and weaknesses. If a student has a diagnosed impairment
of dyslexia but it does not amount to a statutory disability, should the student have extra time for
her exam? If so, does equity also require postponing the same exam for a student who is
recovering from a virus, or for a student who had a fight with her significant other. A disability
expert questions whether a “low-achieving student” who would likely perform better on an exam
with extra time “is less deserving of the opportunity to demonstrate maximum performance than
is a student who has been labeled learning disabled.”424 Similarly, the faculty may not find it
administratively (nor perhaps financially)425 workable to tailor education and evaluation beyond
the ways in which the statutes require, particularly given the large size of most law school
classes.
A law school might also conclude that the student with a nonstatutory disability is not
herself served well by offering adjustments that will not be available later in life to the student.
As earlier parts of this Article make clear, bar examiners typically do not offer accommodations
beyond those which are legally required, and have trained disability experts in the relevant legal

her clients).
424

Phillips, supra note 417, at 12; id. at 14 (“To minimize the potential for an invalid
inference, a test user may want to grant only those accommodations judged essential.”).
425

Section 504 and the ADA offer no funds to cover any of the costs of compliance. See
supra notes 144-145 and accompanying text.
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standards to review requests for accommodations.426 Employers are required only to offer
reasonable workplace accommodations to employees with statutory disabilities. Some
commentators and attorneys with disabilities suggest that rigorous application of academic
standards, presumably including readmission, is in the best interests of students with disabilities
as well as other students. One commentator, referring to the post-law school experiences and
opinions of several law school graduates with disabilities, suggests that
Schools do their students a disservice by allowing them to become dependent upon
accommodations such as extra time that will not always be available in practice. As one
learning disabled graduate . . . noted, "I thought [school] was the big hurdle. But it turns
out it isn't.... I really don't see that I'm ever going to eliminate the fact that I take twice as
long to do things as other people." . . . .This student would have been better served had he
received counseling, before graduation, from someone like Paul Grossman, the OCR
attorney described . . . above. [Grossman] acknowledges that he has to work on
weekends, holidays, and over vacations. . . . He does so willingly, however, because he
loves his work. . . . Similarly, many learning disabled law students succeed academically
simply by studying longer and more intensely than their classmates. . . . Of course, in law
practice, in which the average non-disabled practitioner already works long hours, it is
extremely demanding to self-accommodate in this way. Thus, students preparing for
practice should be counseled that the demands on their time in practice will be even
greater than those in law school.427
Another commentator suggests that “students who make individual agreements with
professors to remain in the university often may be postponing academic dismissal. . . .and
increasing likelihood of a lawsuit when the student is eventually dismissed.”428 In Ewing, the
evidence was that “[Ewing] often beguiled his professors into allowing him to postpone or retake

426

For some of the commentary by disability experts used by bar examiners, see notes 94100 and accompanying text.
427

Lisa Eichhorn, Reasonable Accommodations and Awkward Compromises: Issues
Concerning Learning Disabled Students and Professional Schools in the Law School Context, 26
J. LAW & EDUC. 31, 61-62 (1997) (citations omitted).
428

Milam and Marshall, supra note 169, at 350-351 and n.108.
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examinations or to ignore certain of his low mid-semester scores so as to raise his overall course
average.”429
2.

Accreditation requirements. Law school accreditation requirements

impose two relevant limitations: 1) law schools cannot (re)admit students whom the law school
does not predict will be both academically successful and capable of passing the bar exam and
meeting other licensing requirements, and 2) law schools must set their own educational policy,
which of course includes setting and applying academic standards for dismissal and readmission.
Law schools operate under ABA and AALS accreditation standards that prohibit them
from readmitting students unless the school believes the student will be successful.430 A law
school cannot readmit a student, with or without a disability, which the law school does not
believe will be academically successful. Accreditation standards also limit admissions and

429

Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Ewing, 106 S.Ct. at 507.

430

ABA Standards for the Accreditation of Law Schools provide in relevant part:

Standard 501. ADMISSIONS. . . (b) A law school shall not admit applicants who do not appear
capable of satisfactorily completing its educational program and being admitted to the bar.
Standard 505. PREVIOUSLY DISQUALIFIED APPLICANT. A law school may admit or
readmit a student who has been disqualified previously for academic reasons upon an affirmative
showing that the student possesses the requisite ability and that the prior disqualification does not
indicate a lack of capacity to complete the course of study at the admitting school. . . . For every
admission or readmission of a previously disqualified individual, a statement of the
considerations that led to the decision shall be placed in the admittee's file. See
www.abanet.org/legaled/standards/standard.html.
AALS Standard Section 6-2(a) Admissions provides in pertinent part: a. A member
school shall admit only those applicants whose applications have been evaluated pursuant to a
process consistent with Bylaw 6-3 and who appear to have the capacity to meet its academic
standards. See www.aals.org/about_handbook_requirements.php.
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retention decisions to law schools acting through their faculty and dean;431 thus, universities
cannot readmit law students. These accreditation standards also reserve to the law school
“academic standards for retention, advancement, and graduation of students,” and provide that
while “[a] law school may involve alumni, students, and others in a participatory or advisory
capacity; . . . the dean and faculty shall retain control over matters affecting the educational
program of the law school.”432
Hence, to the extent academic adjustments would be involved, a law school’s parent
university cannot unilaterally choose to go beyond statutory requirements in certain academic
respects for law students. Specifically, a university cannot unilaterally decide to offer academic
adjustments to a law student without a statutory disability (for example, unilaterally offering
extra time on exams to a student whose learning disability does not substantially impair her
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ABA Law School Accreditation Standards and interpretations provide in relevant part:
Standard 204. GOVERNING BOARD AND LAW SCHOOL AUTHORITY. a) A governing
board may establish general policies that are applicable to a law school if they are consistent with
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learning or other major life activities), nor unilaterally offer academic adjustments to students
with statutory disabilities which are beyond statutory reasonable accommodations (for example,
unilaterally offering a waiver of attendance requirements to a student with quadriplegia). These
decisions can only be made by the law school.
3.

Academic freedom issues.433 Academic freedom protects both higher

education institutions and individual faculty. There are several types of academic freedom
claims. For example, academic freedom claims may be made by institutions against government,
such as the U.S. Supreme Court case in which universities unsuccessfully asserted that the
Solomon Amendment limited their academic freedom.434 In the disability context, either faculty
or institutions might assert that disability discrimination laws, which uniquely among
discrimination laws impose obligations to make academic adjustments for covered students,435
impinge on their academic freedom. The Supreme Court has indicated, however, that academic
freedom does not extend to noncompliance with discrimination laws, noting that while it
generally defers to academic judgments, this “principle of respect [is] for legitimate academic

432

Id.
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More than a cursory discussion of academic freedom issues is beyond the scope of this
article. For more extensive general discussion of academic freedom issues, see J. Peter Byrne,
Academic Freedom: A “Special Concern of the First Amendment,” 99 YALE L. J. 251 (1989).
For a brief discussion of individual and institutional academic freedom issues and disability, see
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decisionmaking,” which the Court indicated would not include illegal discrimination.436
Finally, and most relevant to this Article, there are academic freedom claims between
faculty and their employing universities. Specifically, faculty who are told of academic
adjustments for their students might assert infringement of their individual academic freedom.
Such claims might be enforced via lawsuit,437 and/or by a grievance under a labor contract or
faculty handbook, or a complaint to accrediting agencies or professional organizations such as
AAUP. The outcome of such claims seems clear if the academic adjustments are required by
discrimination laws: academic freedom does not trump the obligation to comply with such laws.
If on the other hand the academic adjustments go beyond those which are legally
required, the outcome may be different. As one commentator notes, institutional academic
freedom is protected as the collective of individual faculty academic freedoms:
[C]ourts’ willingness to defer to [institutional] policies is in large part a consequence of
their having been established or reviewed by duly constituted faculty bodies (e.g., course
content is the province of curriculum committees; the overall level of academic rigor is
ultimately traceable to decisions of faculty admissions committees). In a very real sense,
then, the institutional academic freedom recognized in many judicial opinions may be
viewed as the sum of acts of individual faculty academic freedom.438
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University of Penn. v. Equal Empl. Opp’y Comm’n, 493 U.S. 182, 199 (1990) (private
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This means that the individual faculty member’s academic freedom likely does not extend to
noncompliance with faculty-approved academic policies (such as, for example, a mandatory
grade curve). It also means that institutional judgments by administrators rather than faculty
may not have the protective armor of academic freedom and thus may be overridden by the
individual faculty member’s academic freedom. Consequently, one important issue in academic
freedom claims involving nonstatutorily required academic adjustments would be who made the
decision to provide the non-required academic adjustments. If the law school faculty had voted
to go beyond statutory requirements, precedent cases suggest requiring compliance with facultyapproved academic policies would not violate individual dissenting faculty’s academic
freedom.439 If on the other hand nonacademic university officials attempted to make such a
decision, the faculty member would seem to have a colorable claim of infringement of academic
freedom in addition to the violation of accreditation standards described above.
The Ninth Circuit provided helpful guidance on these issues in the context of a
professor’s successful challenge to his discipline pursuant to his school’s sexual harassment
policy. In that case, the Ninth Circuit held that higher education discrimination policies which
are vague and/or overbroad “impermissibly delegate basic policy matters to low level officials
for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and
discriminatory application . . . [and] discourage[] the exercise of first amendment freedoms.”440
4.

Triggering additional disability law obligations. If a law school chooses

439

See, e.g., Wozniak v. Conry, 236 F.3d 888 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 2243
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to serve students who have impairments which do not amount to statutory disabilities, and/or to
make accommodations beyond the statutorily required ones, additional obligations under
disability law may be triggered. First, serving students with impairments which do not amount
to statutory disabilities and who therefore are not covered by disability laws may suggest that the
law school “regards” such students as having a disability within the meaning of the statute.441
Federal appeals courts are currently split on whether there are reasonable accommodation
obligations toward persons who are regarded as having a disability. Relying primarily on the
plain language of the statutes, which impose affirmative obligations equally on persons who
actually have statutory disabilities and who are merely regarded as having statutory disabilities,
the First,442 Third443 and Tenth Circuits444 have held that reasonable accommodation obligations
include persons regarded as having statutory disabilities. The Fifth,445 Sixth,446 Eighth447 and
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As discussed earlier in the Article, persons who are regarded as having a disability are
covered by the statutes as well as persons who actually have statutory disabilities. See supra
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2004).

Ninth448 Circuits have rejected accommodation obligations toward “regarded as” persons,
because those courts perceive “bizarre results” would result from imposing such obligations.449
Thus it appears that in some circuits a law school can, by serving a student who does not have a
statutory disability, assume nondiscrimination and reasonable accommodation obligations to that
student. A law school may be able to avoid this scenario by documenting to such students that
while the school is choosing to serve them, the school does not believe them to have statutory
disabilities. For example, in the illustrative scenario, if the law school decides to readmit
dismissed Student but does not believe she has a statutory disability, it might choose to offer her
accommodations, while at the same time clarifying with her that it does not perceive her as
having a statutory disability.
Somewhat similarly, if a law school chooses to offer services to a student with a statutory
disability beyond those which are statutorily required reasonable accommodations, the school’s
obligations may indirectly become enhanced. If for example, a school offers a student with a
disability a waiver of class attendance requirements (which normally would be an essential
requirement for law students and thus not subject to reasonable accommodation), it does not
necessarily operate to waive an argument a school might make in the future about its legal
obligations. As one court has noted, making concession neither obligates a school to do it in
future, nor makes the concession a legal reasonable accommodation.450 However, a jury may
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Id. (also noting that it would be a “perverse and troubling result” if “impaired [but not
actually disabled] employees would be better off under the statute if their employers treated them
as disabled even if they were not”).
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See Wong I, 192 F.3d at 820.
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find actually making an accommodation to be persuasive evidence that it is a reasonable
accommodation.451 Moreover, a law school which offers tutoring or other personal services to
students must offer those services on a nondiscriminatory basis to students with disabilities.452
Thus, for example, making tutoring available to an impaired but not statutorily disabled law
student triggers an obligation to make tutoring available on a nondiscriminatory basis to students
with statutory disabilities.
5.

Potential tort and contract claims. A student who is wrongfully readmitted

(that is, readmitted when there is not a good faith basis for believing she will be academically
successful) and who does not in fact succeed after paying the law school additional tuition rather
than earning income or pursuing a different educational or training program may file tort and or
contract claims against the school. While courts have rejected claims sounding in educational
malpractice for public policy reasons, claims of misrepresentation453 (that, given the
accreditation standards discussed above, readmission amounts to an affirmative representation by
the law school of its belief that the student will succeed) and/or breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing in the contractual relationship between the student and the
school454 may be viable.
Faculty for whose students nonstatutorily required academic adjustments are made
without their consent may also have contractual claims in addition to those surrounding their
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See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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academic freedom. Some faculty handbooks or labor contracts may offer faculty the opportunity
to grieve not just violations of school policy, but more generally decisions which the faculty
member believes are wrong.455
B.

Guidelines for complying with disability discrimination statutes in readmissions
cases
1.

Verify the existence of a statutory disability. It has long been clear that

higher education students are responsible for self-identifying as having a disability, and for
providing appropriate documentation of their disability.456 More recently, the Court’s 1999
Sutton trilogy decisions requiring that mitigators be considered in determining whether the
impairment is a statutory disability, and its 2002 Toyota decision emphasizing the requirement
that the impairment “substantially limit” a major life activity in order to be a statutory disability,
make it clear that having a diagnosed impairment is not necessarily equivalent to being a
statutorily covered person with a disability. These developments may require some rethinking
on the parts of schools and students, who may have been accustomed to equating a diagnosed
impairment with a statutory disability.
Most of the disputes in the readmissions cases precede the Court’s 2002 Toyota decision
interpreting “substantially limits.” Perhaps in part for this reason, when there was a documented
impairment, most of the schools in the readmission cases did not dispute whether the
complaining student was a statutorily covered person with a disability. In appropriate future

455

At the author’s university, for example, the faculty handbook makes available a
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cases, as illustrated by Wong II and Marlon, law schools may well challenge whether a dismissed
student claiming a “disability” caused academic failure actually has a statutory disability.
Whether a dismissed student has a physical or mental impairment is not an issue about which
law school faculty normally have special expertise. However, the law school can insist on
documentation that the dismissed student claiming a disability has a diagnosed impairment, and
that the impairment, with mitigators, does in fact substantially impair a major life activity.
Commentary by both legal scholars and disability experts suggests that few law students newly
diagnosed learning disabilities, ADHD, or other mental impairments will meet the post-Toyota
“substantially impairs” standard, since few such students’ learning disabilities substantially limit
their learning in comparison to the average learner.457 Similarly, a student with a broken
(writing) arm may not have the long-term or permanent substantial limitation of writing that the
Toyota Court appears to require. A student with a mental illness such as bipolar disorder which
is successfully treated with medication may not have substantial impairment with the medication
mitigator. On the other hand, if the medication has significant negative side effects, such as
rendering the student unable to think clearly at certain times of day, those side effects must be
considered in determining if the student has a statutory disability.
In the illustrative scenario, the law school has undisputed evidence that Student has the
impairment of dyslexia, and the readmissions committee has neither the expertise nor any
informational basis to dispute the diagnosis. If the committee has questions about the diagnosis,
it may consult with disability experts within the university, such as the disability services office,
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See supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
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and in appropriate cases might ask the student for permission to speak with Evaluator, obtain
additional information from Evaluator, or even obtain an additional evaluation or outside expert
review (if from a person of the school’s choosing at the school’s expense). Otherwise, disputing
the diagnosis suggests the committee is improperly operating based on stereotypes.
As discussed above, however, having an impairment and being a statutorily protected
person with a disability are not the same thing; the impairment must, with mitigators,
substantially impair a major life activity such as learning. The evidence provided in the
illustrative scenario suggests the impairment does not amount to a statutory disability. Student
has apparently used self-mitigators (coping strategies) in the past, with success; these must be
considered in the analysis. With a B average in college in a subject area which involves
substantial reading and without any accommodations, and an LSAT high enough to gain
admittance to law school, Student’s record indicates that Student’s prior learning, and thus
overall learning, may not have been substantially limited. Any factual findings by Evaluator
about the extent to which the impairment affected Student should normally be accepted, but to
the extent the committee has additional information on this point (e.g. the undergraduate success)
that additional information is also relevant.
Who has expertise and responsibility for making the legal determination of the presence
of a statutory disability will vary from one law school to another; perhaps it is the university
disability services office, perhaps the committee, perhaps university counsel.458 What is clear is
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See James Leonard, Judicial Deference to Academic Standards under Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act and Titles II and II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 75 NEBR. L.
REV. 27, 34 (1996) (status of dismissed student as a person with a disability is not an academic
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that: 1) Evaluator’s diagnosis of an impairment is not necessarily sufficient, and 2) Evaluator
lacks the expertise and responsibility for determining that the impairment amounts to a statutory
disability.459
2.

Carefully document consideration of the case by a faculty committee

and/or the full faculty. The court cases also provide substantial guidance as to what constitutes a
nondiscriminatory readmissions process when a law student claiming a disability is involved,
and specifically what will trigger judicial deference to the school’s judgment not to readmit.
First and foremost, the cases announce a policy of deference when the school’s judgment is a
careful, truly academic one; a factual record of introspection about the basis for the decision and
the consideration of disability information is specifically required by some courts.460 The newest
Supreme Court decisions in Grutter and Gratz are significant in according deference to a law
school’s academic judgment in the context of a race discrimination claim requiring strict judicial
scrutiny. Conspicuously, the Court in those cases deferred to a law school faculty-approved,
subjective, holistic admissions policy tied to specific academic needs on the one hand.461 The
Court did not defer to an undergraduate admissions policy created by nonacademic
administrators, and which was neither subjective nor holistic and was not tied to specific
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academic needs.462 These cases counsel law schools, both in initially setting standards for
dismissal and for readmission, and in applying the readmissions standards, to do so as a faculty,
or as a committee or other group of faculty with delegated authority from the faculty, rather than
as a decision by a single administrator or administrative group463 and to set and apply standards
that are tied to the law school’s academic integrity and needs, in ways which are documented by
the law school. It is clear from a review of relevant authority that neither a court nor OCR will
normally second guess generally applicable readmissions standards.
Most law schools appear to assign at least initial responsibility for evaluating
readmissions petitions to a faculty committee, with some schools delegating actual decision
making authority to the committee.464 While no court or OCR opinion has questioned the
decision by committee approach, there are advantages to faculty-wide decisions. Reserving the
decision to the full faculty, with a recommendation from a committee, both helps avoid
appearance of bias by individual/small groups in some of the cases discussed earlier465 in which
schools encountered difficulty, and ensures consistency of application of the readmission
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standard from one year to the next.
3.

Make a decision which is holistic and considers context. The cases also

emphasize that deference is appropriate when academic decisions are made holistically and in
context. It is thus appropriate for law schools to use context, both school-wide and studentspecific, to make readmissions decisions, and to document that context. At the school-wide
level, for example, the law school may have data on the law school grades and/or bar exam
performance of readmitted students from past years and may accordingly adjust its readmissions
standards and/or how strictly it applies them to current petitions. Law schools also operate under
ABA accreditation standards that prohibit them from readmitting students unless the school
believes the student will be successful.466 Law schools may also wish to consider the extent to
which faculty and other resources are available to help marginal students succeed. At the
student-specific level, the law school has a wealth of information about each petitioning student,
most importantly the feedback of the faculty who have actually instructed and evaluated the
student, and if applicable the student tutors who have worked with the petitioning student,
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perhaps in an academic resource program. The law school also has information from the
student’s file including the student’s LSAT score and undergraduate grades, as well as the
student’s actual exam answers and numerical data comparing the student’s exam and course
grades with those of classmates. Several decisions, including Horowitz and Ewing, teach that
documentation of this complex basis for each readmission decision is crucial.467 While
collecting and synthesizing this information and memorializing the basis for the decision is time
consuming, it is crucial to assist the school in making both correct and legally defensible
readmissions decisions.468
4.

Give reasoned and informed consideration to disability information, with

appropriate confidentiality. To the extent a petitioning student submits disability information, it
must be considered in a reasoned and informed way. As discussed below, however, the
committee need not and should not defer to the disability information to the extent it offers an
opinion on an academic issue, such as the student’s ability to succeed if readmitted, or a legal
issues, such as whether the student has a statutory disability. Normally the disability information
submitted by a student is an evaluator’s report containing a diagnosis and recommendations
addressed to the committee, written so that it can be readily understood by law faculty. The

467
468

See supra notes 171-202 and accompanying text.

As discussed earlier, most law school readmissions decisions are made over the
summer, when most law faculty are not on contract. It may thus be tempting to do this often
uncompensated work over the summer break in a less than completely thorough fashion. The
author suggests that readmissions work is important and time consuming enough to compensate
9-month faculty who are willing to take time from their summer to perform it, just as faculty who
teach summer school are paid, and faculty who engage in scholarship over the summer may
receive a research stipend. The DePaul OCR opinion, discussed supra at notes 377-396 and
accompanying text, illustrates the consequences when such decisions are made in a way which
appeared to OCR to be less than careful and thorough.
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court decisions and OCR opinions do not suggest that under usual circumstances the school
needs to consult with technical experts in order to interpret disability information.469 In fact, a
policy or practice which requires all petitioning students’ disability information to go to a
university disability services office, with a summary report of that information prepared by that
office for the committee and not the underlying disability information, may be a form of
disability discrimination. Specifically, such a policy would preclude students from using
unfiltered information to make a strong, documented case for readmission, a criterion which
OCR has indicated is a legitimate factor in making readmissions decisions.470 On the other hand,
in the event a student wishes to use the services of the university disability office in connection
with her petition, she should be allowed to do so. Moreover, to the extent a law school
committee is unclear about any disability information provided, or, as in DePaul,471 there is any
evidence that any committee member is engaging in stereotypical or otherwise discriminatory
thinking, disability experts (such as university counsel, the university disability services office,
and/or the evaluator as appropriate) could be brought in.
While the ADA’s employee provisions require confidentiality for employee disability
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See, e.g., Marlon, discussed supra at notes 280-281 and accompanying text (disability
services office evaluation attached to student’s petition, but office is not otherwise involved,
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information,472 there are no corresponding provisions concerning student disability information
under Section 504 or the ADA.473 As student records information, however, student disability
information is subject to FERPA (Family Education Rights and Privacy Act, the federal student
records statute).474 FERPA requires confidentiality of information contained in student records
unless the student has given written consent for disclosure,475 or the disclosure is pursuant to one
of FERPA’s many exceptions.476 Most pertinent is FERPA’s exception for internal sharing with
school employees who have “legitimate educational interest” in the information,477 as defined in
the school’s student records policy. Under this exception, it is appropriate to share disability
information with agents of the school, such as the committee making readmissions
decisions/recommendations, and the full faculty if the readmission decision is its to make.
Persons who have such information must keep it confidential; disclosure beyond that permitted
by FERPA may be treated as a form of disability discrimination.
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5. Defer, and refuse to defer, as appropriate: university administrators and law
faculty should defer when appropriate, but the law faculty should not defer, internally or
externally, on academic issues. The law school must also determine which issues and decisions
regarding the readmission petition are: 1) academic, such as whether a student is likely to be
successful if readmitted and whether a requested accommodation would alter the law school’s
academic standards, and thus ones in which it has primary expertise and the responsibility for
making the ultimate judgment, 2) concern the existence and nature of an impairment, for which a
disability expert has primary expertise and should make the ultimate judgment, or 3) legal, such
as whether an impairment is a substantially-limiting-with-mitigators statutory disability.
In the illustrative scenario, Evaluator recommends and Student requests accommodations
consisting of tutoring, note taking assistance, elimination of the writing requirement and extra
time on exams. Their recommendation by Evaluator does not necessarily mean these
adjustments are legally required reasonable accommodations. At many law schools, the
university disability office makes recommendations for reasonable accommodations, while the
law school retains the final decision, primarily so that it can determine whether any proposed
accommodations would alter the law school’s academic standards or present an undue hardship.
Here, assuming Student is a statutorily covered person with the disability of dyslexia/reading
disorder, there are two proposed accommodations, notetaking and extra time on exams, which
are rather common for dyslexic/reading disordered students and should be familiar and
noncontroversial to the committee. As to the recommendation for tutoring, the statutes provide
that personal services are not required, although to the extent a school makes tutoring available
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to students without disabilities (as this school apparently does through its academic resource
program for 1Ls) it must make such tutoring available to students with disabilities on a
nondiscriminatory basis.478 Finally, as to the elimination of the writing requirement, the decision
as to whether this amounts to a change in academic standards is an academic one about which
the law school, not Evaluator nor the university disability office, has expertise and ultimate
responsibility.479
Not deferring to internal or external disability experts on academic issues is expected by
the courts,480 and is important both to making good decisions on the merits and to preserving
court and/or OCR deferral if those decisions are challenged. Consider, for example, a law school
committee which defers to the opinion of its disability services office, or that of the student’s
evaluator, that a newly diagnosed student’s grades would be substantially higher if she were
allowed extra time on exams, when the committee really thinks that the student had not grasped
legal analysis (in which event the student extra time will not improve the student’s exam
performance). This committee’s actions suggest that the decision is not such an academic one.
Consequently a court has little reason to defer to that judgment. Conversely, university
administrators hearing internal appeals of readmissions decisions or internal disability
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-134-

discrimination complaints should also defer to the law faculty’s academic judgments. Second
guessing by university administrators of the law faculty’s decisions on academic issues invites
courts and OCR to do so as well, intrudes upon the expertise of the law faculty, and violates
accreditation standards.481
6.

Apply the readmission standard in a nondiscriminatory way. The school

need not make the “correct” decision, with the aid of hindsight, on a petition, but it must apply
its readmission process and standards in a nondiscriminatory way. This obligation runs from the
mundane (e.g. applying a deadline for documentation equally to disability and other information)
to the complex (e.g. predicting a petitioning student’s future success). A school decision on the
more complex end of the spectrum is whether to apply its readmission standard strictly or
leniently. For example, if a school’s policy or practice was to be lenient about the
“extraordinariness” of circumstances required if a student’s GPA is very close to the required
minimum, the school must be equally lenient about extraordinariness when a student with a
disability’s GPA is very close to the required minimum. It would be helpful for law schools to
collect and periodically review the readmission decisions of all students over a several-year
period to ensure that standards are being applied nondiscriminatorily, and as OCR is likely to do
if it investigates a complaint.
a.

Nondiscriminatory consideration of disability as an extraordinary

circumstance. Applying the readmission standard to Student’s petition in the illustrative
scenario, and assuming arguendo that Student has a statutory disability, the committee must first
determine whether the student’s failure was caused by “extraordinary circumstances.” The
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committee’s determination of the cause of academic failure is an academic judgment for which
the law school has expertise and responsibility. Student’s asserted disability may be, but is not
automatically, an extraordinary circumstance. In fact, the impairment could be an extraordinary
circumstance even if it does not amount to a statutory disability.482 In the illustrative scenario,
there is conflicting evidence on this issue, both about causation and about whether Student had a
reasonable opportunity to obtain administrative relief prior to dismissal. As to the cause of
failure, there is Evaluator and the student’s claim that an undiagnosed and unaccommodated
disability is the cause. On the other hand, there is a suggestion that an unwise decision to spend
inordinate time on extracurricular activities is a problem. Even more significantly, there is
evidence (the “very low” LSAT score) that the student was not one for whom legal analysis
would come easily, and that Student’s failure to master legal analysis and some of the basic
concepts (based on instructor feedback) was the cause of the failure. As to whether there was a
reasonable opportunity to obtain administrative relief, the committee might reasonably conclude
that Student has the legal obligation to self-identify and document a disability, and then to
request accommodations. The committee might reasonably conclude that Student should have
pursued disability documentation and accommodations after receiving her poor fall grades, in
concert with her actual understanding that she likely has a reading disability and could be tested
for it. On the other hand, the committee might reasonably conclude that a person similarly
situated to Student who has always done well without accommodations is reasonable in thinking
she can “tough it out” successfully. In any event, the committee must apply the extraordinary
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circumstances standard (with the tort-like multiple causes and reasonable person analysis as
illustrated by the scenario) in the same way to Student’s case as it does to other cases not
asserting a disability, or at least no more harshly than it does to other cases. For example, if
another student asserts her failure was caused by a nasty divorce during her first year, the
committee must do a no less strict “are the circumstances extraordinary/causation/reasonable
person analysis,” with the same degree of strictness to that case.483
b.

Nondiscriminatory consideration of disability and prediction of

future success if readmitted. Whether the student would be academically successful if
readmitted is the ultimate academic judgment for which the law school has the expertise and
responsibility. In the illustrative scenario, as discussed above, there is conflicting evidence as to
the cause of the failure and thus conflicting evidence about Student’s ability to succeed in the
future. The law school faculty have provided legal instruction to Student for a year; no one else
has done so. The law school faculty collectively have decades if not centuries of observing law
students go on to succeed or fail in law school, on the bar exam, and in practice. The law school
faculty know that some students, while bright, are just not intellectually suited to do legal
analysis.
In the scenario, Evaluator has opined that Student will succeed if provided with the
requested accommodations. While not disputing Evaluator’s good intentions, she has neither the
information (she is likely not privy to the student’s LSAT score, nor the instructor and tutor
feedback) nor the expertise (she has not attended law school, taught law school, taken a bar
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exam, nor practiced law) to form an opinion about likely academic success to which the law
school must or should defer. Nor, in fact do the university disability services office or university
administrators such as provosts have the expertise to helpfully opine on this ultimate academic
judgment call. The committee must consider all of the disability information provided by the
student, including Evaluator’s prediction of future academic success. The actual judgment,
however, in all its subjectivity and complexity, should and must be made by the committee. This
is necessary not only to make the best decision possible but also, and somewhat ironically, to
preserve the possibility of judicial deference to the decision down the road. As previously
discussed, if a law school defers to the judgment of another on this issue, it risks a court later
seeing the issue as not such an academic one and thus not deferring to the school’s decision.
In predicting success, the committee should do its best to factor in legally required
reasonable accommodations if the student is a person with a statutory disability. Specifically, the
committee should try to predict how Student in the illustrative scenario would perform if
provided with reasonable accommodations (in the scenario, likely notetaking and extra time on
tests)484 In some cases where the student has received accommodations such as extra time on
tests and still not earned the minimum required grades, making this prediction is fairly
straightforward. In the illustrative scenario, there is no data on Student’s performance with
accommodations, and the committee simply must do its best to make a prediction. The
committee may, for example, find it helpful to see if Student performed better on law school

finding on this issue, and move on to the future success criterion.
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assignments such as take home exams and legal writing papers which did not have time limits. If
she did not, it suggests that something other than reading and writing under time limits (perhaps
the problems with analysis and concept mastery identified by the instructors) is the primary
cause of the student’s failure, and additional time on exams is not likely to significantly improve
performance. The scenario is further complicated by the fact that some of the requested
accommodations may not be reasonable ones as discussed above.485 On this last issue, one
approach the committee may want to consider is to explicitly assume without deciding that the
requested accommodations are reasonable, and predict success with all the requested
accommodations.
In the illustrative scenario, there is conflicting evidence on Student’s ability to succeed.
On the one hand is the evaluation which may be taken to suggest that Student’s exam
performance underestimates her mastery of the curriculum, and the “very low” LSAT without
accommodations might also be underestimating Student’s potential. On the other hand, the
LSAT score suggests Student’s native legal reasoning ability may be limited, and feedback from
Student’s instructors suggests the problem is one with legal reasoning rather than reading, which
will not be cured with additional exam time. Student’s extremely active role in extracurricular
activities and failure to attend tutoring sessions suggests other possible causes of her failure.
Student’s history of academic success, including a B average in a major subject area requiring
much reading, suggests her reading abilities may not be severely limited. Student’s suggestion in
her petition that she needs tutoring and a waiver of the writing requirement to succeed might be
taken to suggest that she is not otherwise qualified for readmission if those adjustments are
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determined to be part of the school’s fundamental academic standards. The committee could
reasonably decide either way; it must, and can only, do what it thinks is the “right thing,” and
can expect a court to defer to its decision when it does so if it follows the above-described
guidelines.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is an honor for college administrators that the Supreme Court has selected higher
education as the one unique community in our society eligible for such judicial deference.
Like all honors, it comes with a responsibility . . . . a challenge to all those working in
higher education: use your educational judgment carefully, deliberately, and often. If we
continue to do so, we will both earn judicial deference to our efforts and continue to
create vibrant, living, learning environments for our students, faculty, and staff.486
While this statement was made with regard to higher education academic decisions
generally, it applies with equal force to the specific category of deciding whether to readmit
academically dismissed students who claim a disability. The confluence of strict standards for
defining who has a statutory disability, and the courts’ largely deferential approach to disability
discrimination claims by academically dismissed students, means that schools can normally
make readmissions decisions about students with disabilities without worrying about being
reversed in court. Law schools thus currently have the freedom to do the right thing, as their
educational judgment defines it: to “use [our] educational judgment carefully, deliberately, and
often” to make readmissions decisions, including denying readmission to students with
disabilities, nondiscriminatorily and in good faith. The court cases suggest that the courts
believe law schools have been meeting this standard, and they must endeavor to continue to do
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so, or risk the judicial deference law schools currently enjoy.
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